ARE MIRACLES OPPOSED TO REASON?

New Zealand Times, Volume XXX, Issue 4485, 4 August 1875, Page 2

ARE MIRACLES OPPOSED TO REASON?

REVIEW OX REVIEW OF THE 27th IXSTAXT. TO THE EDITOU OF THE NEW ZEAL AMD TIMES. Sir. —I confess I do not exactly understand the gist of the review on the above subject, but if I mistake not, it goes to show that miracles are only something of the.past, and that they would not have existed even then, if cultivated reason had pervaded anterior ages. And this being so, it now asks the Bishop of Wellington to undertake the modification of the present theology of the Church, so as to ignore all probability of miracles. But the review asks too much of the Bishop if it expects him to put the Church in gear with the intelligent spirit of the age, for in reality tills simply means to deny the existence of an independent, willing Supreme Being, without which spiritual biblical religion could not exist. If theology only but admitted the Supreme Being to be a disintegrated, omniscient ami omnipresent being, whoso presence pervades ail things, then I could see no difficulty for educated reason to trace many of the said miracles to be merely the effects of causes, but so long as it is believed that the elements of matter had no coexistence with the,Supreme Bciug.it is clear that educated reason and miracles can never agree. Still, the Church cannot afford just yet to part with its dogmas as laid down in the Bible, for who knows but the radiance of advanced reason its it evolves may yet still further assist the human mind to get a much clearer conception of the latent operations of the omnipotent, and by this means draw the highest order of intellectual reason to become the very jewels of the true Church instead of emotional awe.—l am, &c., J. S. [advertisement.] TO THE EDITOR OF THE NEW ZEALAND TIMES. Sir, —I have received a pamphlet purporting to contain a refutation of my “ Reply to the question, Is a Miracle opposed to Reason?*’ The writer lias failed to apprehend my meaning as tb the distinction that exists between belief and necessary knowledge, as well as between “ a universal law,” and “a universal proposition,” in other words, between the propositions— Such is the; fact, and—such must everywhere and ahvays bo the fact. Ho has throughout contended with’a man of straw of his own creation. Had I not ascertained by letters received that my meaning had been thoroughly understood by others, I should have attributed his misapprehension to obscurity on my part; as it is, I am unable to give the writer the benefit of such an admission. Those who do apprehend my position, will easily perceive that it is not affected by this writer's reply. To those who do not, I fear I am unable to offer anything more intelligible on tlie subject.—l am, Ac., August 3, 0. Wellington.