COUNT ARNIM.

New Zealand Times, Volume XXX, Issue 4355, 5 March 1875, Page 3

COUNT ARNIM.

The London correspondent of the Melbourne Argus, writing- on. December. 15, has the following : • :• . . .(' The trial of Count Arnim is the one mci-, dent which just now engages the attention of Europe. Whatever may be the opinion of the general public on the policy of the prosecution, there can be no doubt that the revelations which it has elicited are of the deepest interest, an laying bare for the first time the secret thoughts and, designs of Prince Bismarck. Whether Count Arnim is or is not guilty of appropriating to himself certain documents which were the property of the State, is '.a, question of infinitessimally Binall importance. That is a question purely of discipline, which, perhaps, it was right on the part of Prince Bismarck to take up, though we may still wonder that all this dirty linen'was not washed at home. What is annoying about the transaction is that the German Chancellor j for the sake of insisting upon a point of discipline, should have exposed himself to a trial which would inevitably tend to the disclosure of many! State secrets, much more important than oven the relations between himself and his late representative in Paris. We can only suppose that there are "wheels'within wheels," whose working is not visible to the public eye—that there must be some strong private reason on the part of Bismarck to choose this occasion for revealing to the world his whole mind on European affairs. Under the pretence of the trial of Count Arnim for keeping back some

papers which belonged to the German Foreign Office, this is in fact an appeal to the public opinion of Germany on behalf of Bismarck's foreign policy, especially in regard to his policy towards France.

The correspondence between Prince Bismarck aud Count Aruim has created in this country, and especially in France, the greatest curiosity, and it is perhaps the most remarkable expose of the inner mind of diplomacy that we have ever had. From the date of Arnim's appointment to the Paris mission, in August, 1871,- there seems to have been some distrust' of him on the part of Bismarck. Count Arnim had already been employed in several important capacities. He had been ambassador to Rome, and was supposed, while there, to have fully shaved in his employer's anti-Ultramontane views, 1 He had been one of the Commissioners for making peace with France. Notwithstanding all these proofs of a close sympathy between the two men, Arnim had hardly been established in the French Embassy at, Paris, when we find his principal addressing him in terms implying suspicion and dissatisfaction. In November, 1871, upon Marshal Manteuffel's report of a conversation which he had had with Count Arnim, in the course of which the latter had spoken of a monarchical restoration in France, and had hinted at the contingency of a Napoleon IV. on the throne, Prince Bismarck writes to his Minister, asking him whether he had really uttered the "incredible words" attributed to him. Count Arnim replies denying the truth of the report, and resenting the interference of Manteuffel. Very soon after this there- seems to have been, another misunderstanding, for Count Aruim is. officially rebuked for supposing that the inspired portion of the German Press is engaged in a campaign against French legitimacy. The, semi-official journals saw no reason for shaking the' position of M. Thiers, and Prince Bismarck regarded him as the most likely man in France to pay the indemnity. Count Arnim was also informed that his views respecting the establishment of a republic in France were not shared by Prince Bismarck, who thought, on the contrary, that the spectacle offered by Republican France would be favorable rather than prejudicial to the cause of monarchy in other countries.. In no case would Prince Bismarck be a party to intrigues for the purpose of promoting the views of any party in France: As to the Legitimists, they, were friends of the .Pope, and, accordingly, enemies'of Germany. The ambassador was, in conclusion, reminded that he was the Emperor's servant, and had no right to utter his own peculiar opinions or to deviate from his instructions. A few weeks afterwards Prince Bismarck himself addresses Count Arnim, and points out, politely but sarcastically, the errors the latter has committed, and warns him again of the danger of opposing the policy which his Majesty the Emperor and King, through his faithful Chancellor, had adopted. . In this letter there are some very remarkable expressions, showing that. Prince Bismarck was doubtful of the full payment of the subsidy, even under the Government of M. Thiers. He pronounces Count Arnim's contrary opinion to be "very venturesome," and declares that the latter is taking upon himself a responsibility which no single individual ought to incur. ...He. thinks it probable that the remaining instalment.? of the indemnity will be paid if M., Thiers remains in power, "or if the government is handed over to another person in the regular way ;" but he is afraid that Germany would have "to fight for her money" if a revolution: .were to occur, and result in giving the Republic "another class of leaders. Therefore Count Arnim is enjoined to refrain from any step calculated to weaken the existing Government in France. The' accession of any one of the monarchical pretenders before the indemnity was paid, and ; the French territory evacuated, is declared to be undesirable, because "wo should then find ourselves courteously requested to help to nurse the monarchical embryo, by not enforcing the indemnity and the stipulation for occupation with the same rigor we might have observed towards a republic." No less subtle is the remark .which Bismarck makes about-the. policy . which some of theother Governments would be. tempted to pur-' sue in .such a" case. The; Vienna statesmen, already out of humor at the success and at the acquisitions of Germany, would find a pretext for furthering purposes of their own by frecommending the young French Monarchy ta. the tender consideration of Germany. It "is just possible, says Bismarck, that "a very inconvenient grouping of the., Powers might be the result of it, as they would begin by exer-. cisihg a friendly pressure upon us with a view to', deprive us. of a portion of the advantage ; secured." Some such attempt, says the suspicious Chancellor with a notable frankness, ." will be made under any circumstances at no distant future, •' but surely it cannot be our task to assist in the consolidation of France, and, by restoring monarchy, make that country once more' powerful, and a desirable ally '■ for our present friends " (with a glance at Russia, Oh cunning Chancellor .'). The policy of Germany, it is .declared, in the continued hostility of France, iSito make her weak, and credit is taken for. disinterestedness by Bismarck l "in not resisting by main force the re-establishment of monarchy," by the : Versailles '■ Government. A contrary policy, if it Were -to ooze but, would excite the just anger of the German nation; and possibly, " hand over to' criminal' punishment the responsible Minister directly hdstile to his country." . Count Arnim is ■reproved in ',-polite, but" bitter terms, for sup-. ;ppsing that-a (Monarchical Government in .France would be'friendly to Germany, and th'ere. occurs 1 this remarkable ■ paragraph in Bismarck's 'letter:—"T ani 1 c.on'vinced that if "God were, ever to punish us With'the hprrors of a Republican' "anarchy, no'. Frenchman would ever . hit , upon the idea', of helping us to recover the of a Monarchical .Goyerirment,. , It7 is " a German; peculiarity, to| take so ■ very benevolent an interest ( hi the fate of t hostile neighbors." Since the experiment ; ■of 'the ►'Paris' Commune, Bismarck declares that conservative sentiments have, acquired an ascendancy in Germany, and 'though' he is "too much of a philanthropist to wish . that France should treat us to another act of the interesting .drama of a Commune,' he believes that if she were to do so it would7°nly strengthen tbe,attachment, of the Germans'to the' institutions which they) enjoy." What. Germany wishes is to be left" alone by France, 'or if this cannot be, to " prevent her: from securing allies iagainst us." Without, allies: France is declared not to be dangerous, and " a 3 long as the great monarchies of Europe cling together, no republic can harm.them/'; Such being 'Prince.'Bismarck's, convictions,.he finds itimpossibloitofadvise.theGerman Emperor to encourage the monarchU'l cal party in France, " the more so, as to strengthen the Legitimists would be to confer fresh power upon the Ultramontanes." In conclusion, Prince Bismarck snubs the ambassador for giving;credence to the rumor of direct- relations ,;between Gambetta and the Imperial Government—a rumor which is "an,insult to our most gracious master ;" and winds ,up with a significant threat of what he, mighfj, do if 'he' paid heed to certain analogous reports.respecting the political connections of the German ambassador at. Paris. '■..,,■

The only wonder is that after such a despatch Prince Bismarck should hare Buffered Count Arnim to remain in hia place, and that Count Arnfan should have consented to represent Prince Bismarck in the French capital. The subsequent communications between them' arc ahnost as offensive to Count Arnim, who is perpetually being rebxiked for shaping his policy in a direction contrary to that of Bismarck. Frequent censures are conveyed upon minor acts of Count Arnim, especially in respect to his relations with the Press ; and in ono letter, dated January, 1874, the ambassador is sarcastically told that "all German agents abroad, including the very highest, must display a greater degree of compliance with instructions and a smaller degree of I initiative and political fertility, than your Excellency has lately displayed in your reports and whole official deportment." It is unnecessary to quote from the numerous other documents and rescripts which have been brought forward at the trial against Count Arnim. Their effect, whatever may be the result of this specific indictment, will

certainly be to damage Count Arnim and his policy in the same degree that it exalts Prince Bismarck in the eyes of the German people. This, in fact, must be the purpose which the trial was intended to serve, and from Bismarck's point of view it is hard to blame him for the step he has taken. However great the scandal may be of one high German functionary being brought before a court of justice on a charge of abstracting public documents, it is doubtful whether the scandal has not profited Bismarck in precisely the Way it was intended to profit him. The English Press generally take what appears to me to be too contracted and insular a view of the situation— The Times _ being wrong in quite another way, in allowing its columns to be used as the vehicle of the Bismarckian policy. That policy is not like any other policy, British or Constitutional. Prince Bismarck has his own game to play, and it is ■a game which requires great audacity, and a certain contsmpt of the forms in use in Constitutional countries. From the German point of view, and as between Bismarck and Arnim, there can be no doubt that the former is as much in the right as he is superior in craft and in courage to his rival. ' If it is true that Count Arnim had intrigued with the monarchal parties in France against the republic, or that he had ever pursued a line of policy which was not that of his master, as there seems to be very little doubt that he did, there can be no excuse for his conduct. The duty of an ambassador is to represent his country, and he caii only know his country as it is reflected through its Government. It is not whether Bismarck was right or Arnim was right in the theory which either had adopted, but whether Arnim was not bound to instructions of his official superior. In England, any envoy not sharing in the opinions of the Government he represents, would feel impelled to resign his post. It is purely a question of discipline. But on such a question, especially in Germany, where the doctrine of passive obedience to authority is carried further than elsewhere, it is inconceivable that so long a time should have elapsed between the discovery of Count Arnim's opinions and his recall from the French Embassy. An ambassador to whom such language was addressed as that which Bismarck used to Arnim in the letter from which we have quoted, was clearly unworthy of being retained in his office, and yet we know that Count Amim held his place for two years afterwards. This is the strangest part of the affair, inexplicable except on some theory of secret influences which have, favored .the prisoner and impeded his adversary. Why was so long a time allowed to elapse between the discovery of Count Arnim's sentiments and his removal from office? Why was the charge against him shaped in this way ? It is clear that if he lias been guilty of anything, he has been guilty of something far more serious than the appropriation of official documents. It is absurd to commute what is a case of treason, into one of petty larceny. This view of _ the case, which seems to be so natural to all minds trained in English ideas of justice, seems strangely incomprehensible to the great body of the German people. They are full of admiration of the calm, disinterested, and discreet policy of Prince Bismarck, as revealed in this unexpected manner ; and they call upon us to acknowledge the truth, candour, and wisdom of their Government ; but it never seems to strike them that it is hardly fair to punish a man as a thief, because he did not support that policy or agree with that Government.