New Zealand Times. FRIDAY, JULY 31, 1874.

New Zealand Times, Volume XXIX, Issue 4169, 31 July 1874, Page 4

New Zealand Times. FRIDAY, JULY 31, 1874.

The public will naturally look forward with interest to the debate that will take place this afternoon in the Legislative Council on the proposition of the Government to amend the Constitution Act. It is to provide a Chamber, consisting of members of both Houses of Parliament, which shall consider Bills that have been twice rejected by the Council, or have been once rejected and have lapsed because of a disagreement of the one House with amendments made by the other, that shall be deemed by the Governor worthy of this further consideration. The proposition is, to a certain extent, similar to one that has been introduced into the Victorian Parliament by the Chief Secretary of that Colony. The fact should be remembered, however, that in describing supposed analogies, it is very important to ascertain whether they be perfect or partial. The Victorian scheme of Mr. Francis has encountered very much criticism, that is scarcely fair, in consequence of this neglect. It is known as the “ Norwegian scheme.” There is sufficient accuracy in this description to commend it to persons who deal in generalities; but, as the political and constitutional circumstances of Victoria and Norway are very dissimilar, that which may be found to act very well in the one country may not do so in the other. Norway is in union with Sweden, and the Swedish Foreign Minister transacts the international business of both countries. Norway has no responsible Ministry. There is a Diet called the Storthing, which contains 111 members, one portion of which is elected by the population of towns and the other in country districts. This Diet is divided into two Chambers —one the Odelsting, comprising three-fourths of the members, before whom all measures must be introduced ; the other the Jagthing, of one fourth, sitting in review of measures passed in the Odelsting. If the Jagthing persistently throws out a measure passed by the Odelsting, the Storthing may pass it, and it may become law, independently of the Royal veto, which only applies to Bills passed in the ordinary way. Possibly we may hear, this afternoon, the proposition of the Government defined as a Norwegian scheme, humorously, or as a term of contumely ; but we think we have shown'that it cannot be so called fairly. We would also point out that an analogy between the circumstances of Victoria and those of this Colony cannot be established. There, the Upper House is composed of an elected body ; here, of a nominated one. Those who have studied constitutional questions, will bear us out in the statement that this difference is a most important one, and strikes really at the root of the whole matter. The Colonial Secretary is not to be envied his task this afternoon of moving the second reading of the Bill. He will bo expected to show that it is requisite, that the time for its introduction is apposite, and that it is the best one to be devised to meet the requirement he has announced. And it will be expected that he wall give an idea how, in the opinion of the Government, the scheme may be expected to work. This latter opinion will probably meet with some dissent. The first and most superficial aspect of the Bill is,: that in a bicameral Chamber, in which members of the Council would be in a minority, their power would be lessened, and their political status lowered. On the other hand, it may very fairly be argued that the political position of hon. members would bo strengthened. Of course, if the members of the Lower House should vote solid, the result would be a foregone conclusion. But, when do they? Most measures that are carried are opposed by a minority that is far from inconsiderable. Any one who lives until the time that the Lower House is unanimous may calculate upon living till he attains a good old ago. The stronger probability is that the Council being, as a rule, much more unanimous than the House of Representatives, and its members possessing a stronger feeling of esprit de corps, would be likely to vote with the minority in the Lower House, and practically reduce the majority there into a minority. Whether this would be an advantage wo leave to hon. members to consider; but it certainly forms one element in the calculation. A very important difference between the plan proposed hero and that which obtains in Norway is the power that the Bill in question preserves to His Excellency the Governor. Ho may assent to or reserve for consideration a Bill that has passed the combined Chambers, and he may even suggest to the Chambers any amendments he may consider desirable to be made in it. The' power proposed to

be placed in the hands of His Excellency of determining which Bills should he submitted to the combined Chambers, of proposing amendments in these, and of subsequently vetoing measures or reserving them, really seems very considerable, but, there is to be recollected that it will be called into exercise very rarely. The intention of the Ministry to guard against a contingency that may arise, rather than to meet any pressing requirement, is obvious. And no_ one will urge that the contingency is outside the regions of possibility, nor that, should it arise, a remedy to hand would be undesirable. Almost necessarily, in the discussion, the question of one or two Chambers will crop up. Respecting this there will be little difference in opinion. Theoretically, one Chamber, composed of the wisest and best men in a country, is sufficient. Practically, two have been found desirable wherever Constitutional Government has existed. All power being consolidated in one, necessarily renders it despotic in its nature ; and unrestrained authority must be admitted to be undesirable. But, if there be two Chambers, they should be, as in New Zealand, constituted on an entirely different basis. Where both are elective, that which represents the greater power is necessarily the stronger. In this thesis is contained the demand for change in Victoria. The Legislative Assembly is felt to most thoroughly represent the voice of the majority of the people, and, therefore, the institutions of the Colony being democratic and not aristocratic, the check, entrusted to the Upper Chamber representing a minority in the country, is sought to be removed. In England the difficulty is generally got rid of by the good sense of the House of Lords, but should extreme need arise, sufficient peers could be created by Royal prerogative to carry any measure. In Victoria, legislation approved by a majority of the electors could be obstructed by the Council, representing a minority, without there being any appeal. Here the Council, if it occupies somewhat the same position as that in Victoria, does so under very different conditions. Its members have all been chosen on account of their supposed capacity and suitability to sit in the Upper Chamber of the Legislature. Either by public service, special ability, or distinctive training, they have had recommendations that have been considered favorable by the responsible advisers of the Governor. The method of the constitution of their House is near to that of the Roman Senate, which was said by Mill to have been “the most consistently prudent and sagacious body that ever administered public affairs.” The scheme of the Government must, we argue from these considerations, be considered on its merits, and not in reference to a fancied analogy between it and either a Norwegian or Victorian one.