TOLLS ON MAIL COACHES.

New Zealand Times, Volume XXIX, Issue 4133, 19 June 1874, Page 3

TOLLS ON MAIL COACHES.

The case Gough v. Cassidy, and Ashton, which has for some time been before the Courts, was brought to a final issue at the Resident Magistrate’s Court, Ahaura, at the last sitting. The plaintiff originally sued the defendants on the 16th January for £2 9s. 7d., for tolls for crossing- the mail coach with passengers at various times on the punt on the Ahaura River. He also claimed toll for horses going backwards aud forwards to the relay stations of the defendants. The Magistrate refused to allow tile charges for the mail coach with its horses, but gave a verdict for the rest of the claim. The plaintiff appealed against the Magistrate’s decision, and the appeal was tried before J udge Richmond at the last sitting of the Supreme Court, at Hokitika. The right of the plaintiff to charge tolls was based upon the authority given him by the Superintendent of Nelson—this authority beiug granted under the 13th section of the Goldfields Act, 1806. Several technical objections were taken by the defendants, among them that the plaintiff’s right from the Superintendent had not been proved, and that the Superintendent’s right from the Governor to give such a grant had not been shown. The Magistrate virtually disposed of the objections by giving a verdict for any portion of the claim, and the Judge held the lower Court was right, saying that “the facts on which the Court below had proceeded, that (the Supreme) Court would assume to exist.” This disposed of the preliminary objections, and His Honor then proceeded to the main question of the right of any ferryman or puntowuer to demand toll on any vehicle conveying Her Majesty’s mails. The respondents (the defendants below) claimed exemption from paying toll on the ground that their coach carried the mails. In support of this claim it was said that “ Her Majesty and her servants are free of all tolls,” and it was laid down “that the Queen by her prerogative was quit of all tolls.” On this point His Honor said he presumed this exemption would extend to those who were in actual attendance on the person of the monarch when travelling. But clearly the exemption was personal to the Sovereign, and persons engaged under contract in the conveyance of the mail-bags, could not claim such a privilege. In local ordinances authorising the collection of tolls, exceptions were sometimes made in favor of the service of the Post Office, hut, continued his Honor, “ I have been referred to no authority whatever in favor of such an exemption from paying toll as the respondents have contended for." The terms of the protection of the appellants were then referred to, one being “ that all Government officers on duty, including postmen, should pass free of charge.” This, it was contended in the Court below, included “ any means of conveying the mails,” hut his Honor said that no reference was made among the conditions of the grant to the appellant to vehicles of any kind, and certainly not to a four-horse coach, which conveyed not only the mails but numerous passengers. The next objection was, that because a coacli and tlie horses drawing it were not mentioned amongst things for which the appellant was allowed to charge by the Superintendent, he could not therefore levy toll for the passage of it, but his Honor held, in effect, that if the ferryman crossed anything not mentioned in ins protection he was at least entitled to be paid for his services. But if the ferryman was at liberty to refuse the use of the ferry for the transport of anything to which the apparatus (punt, &c.) was adapted, it would cause an impediment to the traffic, such as it could not have been the intention of the Legislature to permit, and the same result would follow if the ferryman was allowed to charge an exorbitant price. On the other hand, it could not bo supposed that protected ferrymen were bound to carry gratuitously anything not mentioned in the schedule of tolls, for the obligation of the ferryman to carry would imply a corresponding right on his part to demand reasonable remuneration. His Honor concluded as follows ; “ I have no hesitation in saying that the use by the coach proprietors of the ferry for the transport of their coach and of the horses drawing it implies a contract on their part to pay their accustomed fare, if there be one, or if there be no accustomed fare, then a reasonable remuneration for the service vyhich they have accepted from the appellants;'just as in the case of a person entering any ordinary public vehicle. I can allow no weight to a final objection to the claim, which was made on the ground that to allow it wovdd bo to permit the levying of a toll by private authority. The appeal must, therefore, bo allowed with costs, and the cause is by consent of the parties to be remitted to the Magistrate to assess damages iu ’respect of the disallowed items iu the demand.” This assessment was made at a recent sitting of the Resilient Magistrate's Court, Ahaura. After hearing Mr. Staite with respect to costs, the Magistrate gave judgment for the plaintiff (Gough) for £ll Ha. Od. with coats and professional costs. The effect of this judgment (says the Grey River Argus)' is, that although the punt owner, according to the condition of his protection, was bound to cross a “ postman ” carrying the mails free of toll, he was not compelled to cross a four-wheeled coach or other vehicle on the same terms, when the progress of the country and the increased traffic rendered a more safe means of conveyance necessary; or, in other words, before the mails can pass free of toll over the punt, the mail-bags must still bo carried on a pack-horse. Similar disputes to the above are now pending in different parts of the Colony, and no doubt his Honor's judgment—of which the above is merely an outline—iu this case, will have an important bearing in effecting a settlement of them.