RUSSIA AND THE GERMAN POWERS. [From the Times, February 6.]

New Zealand Spectator and Cook's Strait Guardian, Volume IX, Issue 922, 3 June 1854, Page 4

RUSSIA AND THE GERMAN POWERS. [From the Times, February 6.]

The exact tenonr of the proposal brought by tbe Count Orloff to Vienna has not yet transpired, bat we know that it was successively and peremptorily Rejected by tbe Emperor Francis Joseph in person, by bis Ministers, and by the Conference of the Four Powers, who signed a further protocol to that effect. The Russian Envoy Extraordinary did Dot, however, think fit to quit Vienna even after this rebuff, and, under pretence of a trifling indisposition, has delayed big departure for a few days. It was inferred from this circumstance that Count OrlofFs first proposal was not his last, that he is still trifling with tbe repre sentatives of the Four Courts, and that he may possibly have discretionary power 3 to treat on a wider basis. We can, however, discover no rational or honest object in this studied play ; our cards are on the table ; Europe has declared on what terms tbe Turkish Government can and ought to treat. These terms are still open to tbe acceptance of Russia ; but we are bound in j honour and in policy to suffer no deviation from them, for, from the date of the protocol of the 13th of January, these terms have to all intents and purposes beep adopted by France. From Berlin we learn that the proposal addressed to tbe Prussian Government by M. de Budberg, the Russian Minister at that Court, wai nothing less than a demand that Prussia should conclude an alliance of tbe most intimate character with the Emperor Nicholas, who offered to protect Prussia from the consequences of snch an engagement by sea and by land. To this insolent proposition M. de Manteufxel, as Foreign Minister, replied with becoming dignity, that Prussia stood ia no need of Foreign protection, and that she would enter into no alliance on such terms ; but that, under any circumstances, Russia would' not be capable of affording protection to her coasts and ports against the fleets of England, or to the Rhenish provinces against the armies of France. These extravagant missions and proposals to the German Courts denote most forcibly the strange delusions the Emperor of Russia still appears to entertain on the state of public opinion throughout Europe. Can he be so ignorant of the course hitherto pursued by the Courts of Berlin and Vicuna, or can he have formed so contemptuous an estimate of their sincerity as to suppose they are capable of repudiating everything they have said and done since the beginning of this quarrel, and even ot allying themselves with him to accomplish the dismemberment of the East and the subjugation of Europe? Is he not aware that the first energetic sign given by the German Governments of their firm determination to withstand Russian influence will be responded to by their subjects with an energy and a union which lias not been -witnessed for .-many years. This supposed snbseryiency to Russia has done more to alienate the confidence and good will of

tbe Germans from their A Government than any single cause that could be named \ and we have no doubt that when the .manly reply of Baron Manteufrel is known, as it deserves to be throughout Germany, it will excite the liveliest feelings of gratitude and approbation. On grounds of internal policy alone this opportunity to display their vigour and independence is of priceless value to the German Courts, for they^may make it not only the means of preserving peace in Europe, but of effecting a reconciliation with their own subjects, and of obliterating the painful recollections which still hang over the years 1848 and 1849. Let them be assured that their best protection against revolution and disaffection within their dominions is a ' national policy, in conjunction with that of the Western Powers. f They are arrived at a moment which will decide the character and position of tbe Sovereigns of Austria and Prussia, probably for their respective lives ; but they must act with vigour, and they must act now. * The considerations ef Internal policy tre, however, less calculated to strike a superficial observer than the external and strategical effects of any movement adverse to Russia on the part cf the German Powers. Without a complete assurance of their support or neutrality, we are wholly at a lois to discover by what means, or by what roads of approach, Russia is ioycarry on an iggrestive war against the Ottoman empire. Already to occupy Little Wallachia and prepare for tbe assralt on Kalafat the Russian army has been compelled to extend its line over at least 300 miles parallel to the frontier and the forces of Turkey. The stronghold of Omar Pasha at Shumla and Silistria is *itbin a few marches of the base of this line, which at any time may be intersected by the maiu body of the Turkish army. The head of the line of operations at Krajova is completely shut in between tbe Turkish forces on the Upper Danube and the frontier of Transylvania ; and if tbe river were eventual!*' crossed by the Russians as high up as Widdiu, they would be continually exposed to a fatal check on the right flank and rear. The Austrians, would, in fact, hold that division of tbeJELussian army completely at their mercy. General Schlick already commands a considerable catss of -observation oa the frontier, and we # have lately had information that the army of Bohemia is on its vrny to reinforce this officer. Thus, this line of operations, which, though the longest, is upon the whole the least difficult, becomes in reality the most dangerous. There are, however, two other lines by which an army may be led across the Balkan. That nearest to the 6eacoast was the one principally followed by Diebitsch in 1828, and it has the advantage of starting from the Russian base of operations in Bessarabia and leading direct to Adrianople. But that road is wholly impassable without the command of the Black Sea. It is protected by Varna, a place not likely to be taken while our fleets support it, and it could only be forced by tbe defeat of the 'best portion of the Turkish army in its strongest positions. There remains a road, or rather pass, lying between tbe two extremities, and descending upon Kazanlik, but in what condition would an army be 'which should attempt such an operation, being dependent for its provisions on its own means of transport, having its base of operations 250 mile* off, and threatened oa both'its wings by other Powers anxious to repel this Bggiwion and *o tcrmipate 'tbe*~w«f?" "Under such cirßmntfoncea'it becomes a matter of great doubt whether tbe Russians can cross the Danube at all, and certainly, if they do, they will run the risk of a terrible catastrophe. So again, in the North, tbe appearance of the Baltic, ftod the attitude of observation 'assumed by Prussia, would, to say" the least of it, require the presence cf a large corps of the best troops in the empire, and entirely prevent them from taking part in the Turkish war. To succeed agaiuct such odds is totally impossible. Louis XIV. and Napoleon, in the height of their power, braved the combined interests of Europe, and fell before them, though they had exercised an influence over iheir contemporaries to which the Emperor Nicholas can lay no claim. His pride may be wounded at the necessity of a retreat, which is the just punishment of his aggression ; but be will seek in vain /or any motive of policy or »ny ground of hope to justify an attempt to maintain by arms so desperate a position. Ke began this war to coerce Turkey into submission to his demands. All Europe has applauded and abetted Turkey in her resistance to thoße demands. Does the ; Emperor Nicholas imagine he can reduce all \ Europe to submission, or even coerce Turkey so j protected ? That is the whole question, and the attempt is happily beyond bis power.