WHAT'S TO BE DONE IN KAFFRARIA?

New Zealand Spectator and Cook's Strait Guardian, Volume VIII, Issue 730, 31 July 1852, Page 3

WHAT'S TO BE DONE IN KAFFRARIA?

Aceo r ding to an estimate recently given in tbe Times, the cost of the Kaffir war, at its present rate of expenditure, is £1.359,000 a year, that is, £122,000 a month, or £3,800 per day. How long this is to last, no mortal man can tell. There is a considerable party in the colony whom it suits extremely well, and who will certai-ily not bate one jot in their cry of " more men from England ; " and in their furious and exaggerated representations of the crimes and cruellies of the Kaffirs. Of this class Sir George Napier said, in his evidence before the Committee of the House of Commons, just published, " The Committee roust be aware, that there are a great many people in the colony who make a great deal of money by wars and by tha troops, whose constant cry was, ' Have more troops;' that was the great reason why they wished to go to war." But as these patriotic worthies are enriched at the expense of this country, v.c have precisely the same reason to scrutinise very carefully and critically any counsels which may corns from that quarter. The great } radical question to be asked and answered is, Plow shall we deal with the Kaffirs for the future, including in that future not merely the period after the war, but during its continuance ? for the entire success of our after policy will most materially depend upon the manner in which the couflict is to be brought to a termination. We have read the bulky volume just published, containing tbe evidence given before the Committee which sat at the close of last session, in hope of obtaining some herp towards a satisfactory conclusion on this point. The military gen-, tletnen examined have of course but one si.nple and summary prescription.- Let the Kaffirs be put down by an overwhelming display .of physical force on our part. The first and indispensable condition of all our dealings with them is to defeat them so signally and that they must confess themselves beaten beyond hope. We are grieved and surprised to find other witnesses of a very different character chime in with this advice. On what principle judicious and enlightened Christian men, who not only admit, but boldly maintain, that this war is tbe result of a long series of bitter and exasperating wrongs on our parts towards the natives, can still uphold that the war must be prosecuted until these injured men are crushed into complete subjection by brute force, we are utterly at a loss to conceive. When we have committed a manifest and admitted injustice upon another, it seems to us a most singular versioo. of Christian djbiy to say, 1 Now that we have done this viong, we must support it by violence, come what may, lest our enemy should misconstrue the concessions which justice demands.' But apart from its obvious contempt of right, is the course thus recommended good as a matter of policy ? Not indeed that we imagine whit is morally wrong can ever be politically wise. But may it not be made obvious to the apprehensions even of (those who govern themselves by the merest maxims of worldly wisdom, that to initiate a system of reparation and meicy, (such as some of these gentlemen insist should be adopted) by the resolute enforcement beforehand of our military superiority, is not a very congruous or rational proceeding, nor one likely to lead to a happy issue ? What right have we to demand the unconditional submission to our mere display of physical violence of those whom it is not denjed we have long plundered, insulted, and maligned? And will our insistance upon this preliminary humiliation incline the Kaflirs to receive with" good grace our subsequent concessions ?

The military witnesses, however, are consistent. Their motio is, "No concession." Drive the natives from the Amalola mountains, and when you have vanquished them, let there be a strong line of. defence along the frontier. It is well, however, that the people of England should be aware what is meant by " a strong line oi defence," before they accept the bargain. Major Bissett says, " When you have cleared the Amatolas, you should have 3,000 troops on" the border, independently of (he Coloni.il corps." The Chairman of the Committee then asks, " When you speak of 3,000 men, have you contemplated the possibility of difficulties arising in the northwest, in the Orange River territory ? " The reply is, " When I speak of 3,000 men I mean them exclusively for the defence of Kaffraria." So that, according to this proportion, it would require probably 10,000 or 12,000 men to defend, on the same system, the whole of our line of frontier in South Africa. But Major Bisseti's estimate is modest compared with that of some of bis brother officers. Sir George Napier says, "1 would maintain a military loice of about 4,000 to 5,000, but not less than 4,000 certainly." Sir Peregiine Maitland, however, caps the climax. He is asked, still speaking of Kaffraria, " Should you think 6,000 men would be required to vkeep our frontier?" "Yes, I think humanity (!) would require as many." Such then is the prospect before us, if vie-perse-vere in our present course" of military government. For the sake of protecting a few straggling farmers, scattered over hundreds of miles of African wilderness, and to support them, in their insolent aggressions on the territories of the aborigines, the heavily-taxed people of this country must be content to pay for the transport and maintenance of-4,000 oi 6,000 troops on the frontie.r.

And is there no alternative ? We believe that this Blue-book itself, though compiled under auspices by no means favourable to a policy of conciliation, furnishes abundant data, on which to ground the assertion, that the method of dealing with uncivilised tribes, on principles of right and humanity, is not only more accordant with our profession as a Christian people, but far more economical and effective. Tiie system, called by the name of Lord Glenelg, has never had a. fair trial in South Africa. Sir Geoige Napier, in his evidence, says, tlat Sir Andries Stockenstrom did all that man could do to administer it faithfully ; bu.t, he adds, " he was thwarted in every way, and by every body." It was then modified to meet the .clamours of the colonists; but even in this mutilated and imperfect form, it was found more successful in preserving peace than that which it superseded, and which was afterwards, with fatal infatuation, restored. We feel pleasure in saying, that we consider Sir George Napier to have been incomparably the best governor we ever had at the Cape. He was, a warrior by profession ; and, probably, also by temper'druent and taste. No person will suspect one bearing his name of shrinking from war from want of spirit or courage, or a disposition sufficiently prompt to resent injury, and resort to force. Yet he did shrink from it, with a most humane and •honourable repugnance ; and, there is no reason to doubt, that if other governors had been actuated by the same spirit, which led him so firmly to resist the sinister incitements to war applied to him by the colonists, we might have been altogether spared the* deplorable conflicts of 1846, as well as that which is now ravaging the colony, and absorbing the taxation of this country. The following is the language of Sir George Napier, in describing his own administration at the Cape :—: — " I never did anything but through (he chiefs; and I never fired,a shot against the Kaffirs, nor the Kaffiis against me, the whole time. 1 ordered monthly retuins of the number of head of cattle or horses, or any other property which was stolen by the Kaffirs, and what means were taken, according to Sir Andries Stockenstrom's treaties, to recover those cattle. I was urged over and over again to go to war with them, but I resisted it. It struck me that it was great folly for a nation like England, who has conquered most nations in tbe world, to be provoked into such a war. Daring the first six weeks of the war, I would defy any man to prevent the Kaffirs darting into the colony and committing enormous ravages, leading to great loss of life and property. Taking the greatest amount of properlylost by their depredations to be £4,000 per annum, I thought to myself, is it worth while for such an amount of loss te encounter all the damage that will be done by going to war ?" — p. 201. Still more gratifying is the evidence given before tbe Committee, by Col. Ovans, detailing the process of an experiment made by himself on a tribe of barbarians in India, who seem to have Jjeen far more wild, desperate, and ferocious, than the Kaffirs. The Colonel states, that after having utterly failed in putting them down by military force, a policy of conciliation and justice has raised these men from a prowling and predatory tribe, who were the terror and curse of the country, into an orderly, industrious, and rapidly improving community.