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THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION. [From the Times, December 30.] To the Editor of the Times.

Sir, — In the Times of the of Ist of December appeared a letter from Prince Paul Esterhazy, and shortly afterwards an answer, or ratherecho to it, which has only the relative importance to me of having the name of Batthyany appended to it. The Batthyany family is, as you are probably aware, a not less numerous one than Esterhazy and several other Hungarian families. No member of these families has an exclusive right to the family name, but for the sake of distinction ii is customary for each member to place bis Christian name to his signature, or "at, least such distinctive name or title as he alone has a right to claim. Having been literally assailed I by questions on the subject, I heg leave, in order to prevent all further mistakes, to declare once for all that I am not the writer of that letter ; and in making tbis declaration I tfust that your sense of justice will induce you to find space in your columns for' some further observations which 1 should wish to make, not on the letter in question, but on that of Prince Esterhazy. The Prince's letter, clouded as it is in a sort of diplomatic halo, seems more adapted to involve the events of the Hungarian revolution in obscurity than to throw any light on " the strange confusion of ideas" of which the Prince complains, and which certainly does prevail. Although it presents a clear view of the feelings and impressions under which the Prince entered the Hungarian Ministry, and remained in it up to its dissolution, we look in vain in it for a rlue to the motives which, consistently with the high character of a statesman, induced the Prince to enter a Ministry from the majority of whose members he differed so materially, as he himself admits,' both in opinions and principles. What could have been his object in coalescing with men " the value of whose influence was in reverse proportion to the value of their principles ?" For what purpose could he have associated, himself with men for -whom he entertained so little consideration ? How are we to understand his meaning when he informs us that his principal motive for doing so was not owing to any sympatby.be felt for these men, or any political or social connexion he had with them, but to the " reiterated solicitations" of other men " whose devotedness to the reigning dynasty were above all doubt?" How, under such circumstaucesj could he hope to counteract the policy of those who had such " a preponderating influence over public opinion in Hungary ?" What result could he have anticipated from such a delicate and important mission when he disagreed with and stood aloof from his fellow Ministers? Was it fair to intrude into the secrets of a council that trusted to his honour and discretion -when he did not mean to identify himself with its policy ? What would you say in England of a statesman who entered a Ministry under such conditions, and with the express design x>{ following a total different policy for his colleagues ? What would you say of the member of an Admin- * istration, who, years after the death of its chief — in whose general policy he must, ostensibly at least, in accepting his offer of a seat in the Cabinet, have acquiesced — should apologise for 'the share he had taken in that Administration, and whitewash himself before another party in office by alleging that he had remained inactive or steered a different course than his colleagues, slandering at the same time the memory of one who rests in his grave, accusing of misdemeanours and want of loyally one whose voice can no longer indignantly repel such aspersions ? It was not thus that the late Count Louis Batthyany acted, when he asked Prince Esterhazy to enter the Administration of which he was the head.- It was owing to his high station, to the respect in which his character, though but little known in Hungary at that period, was generally held, to his' long diplomatic career, which it was snpposed had afforded him the best opportunities of studying constitutional life in all its intricacies,- and in its most perfect state ok development, that Prince Esterhazy was deemed peculiarly adapted for the important* but delicate mission of the Minister of the Hungarian, Crown who had to remain near the person of the Sovereign, and thus fornrthe link between the Hungarian and Austrian Governments, and on whom, therefore, chiefly devolved the task of maintaining the rights of the nation,' of smoothing any

difficulties that might arise, and of maintaining, in conformity with the Pragmatic Sanction, the connexion between Hungary and the Austrian hereditary States. , The principal motives, however, that induced Louis Batthyany to select such men as Prince Esterhazy for bis colleagues weie precisely those put forward by the Prince himself, viz. — 1. "The firm determination of maintaining the Hungarian crown on the head of the Emperor Ferdinand, as well as the laws which had received the Royal sanction ;" 2. The conviction that the formation of an Hungarian Ministry "was not the most prejudicial step for supporting monarchical interests and the principles of the union, because the absolute maintenance of the Pragmatic Sanction was thus formally confirmed ;" and, 3, the impression that " the concessions already obtained from the Emperor in a legal form" — whatever may have been the " pressure" under which they were obtained should be regarded iv as the final term but not as -the starring point for renewed agitation." In following up these very principles Louis Batihyany called into his administration not only Prince Esterhazy, but Count Stephen Sz6ch6nyi, and other equally enlightened, patriotic, and honourable men, whom the Prince slurs over in his letter, but who have acquired a wellmerited reputation in their own country, either as practical statesmen, equally distinguished for firmness of principle and for wisdom and moderation in their views, like Mr. Francis Deak ; or as men of highly cultivated minds and profound knowledge, like Baron Joseph Eotvos and Mr, Bartholomew Szemere ; or as independent men and brilliant orators, with liberal though moderate tendencies, like M. Gabriel Klauzal ; or finally, as the representatives of military honour and bravery, like General Meszaros. Their combined influence secured a large majority in the Diet, as well as in the municipal corporations throughout the country, and this influence was entirely and exclusively exercised in the maintenance of the status quo, that would -unquestionably have" settled down into a permanent order of things had it not been for the events that intervened. I am not going to- recapitulate these events, they are historical facts which cannot be denied. Suffice it to say, Ist, that the financial regulations, and those concerning the army, to which the Prince alludes, were clearly designed by the acts of the Diet of 1847-8, as belonging exclusively to the functions of the Hungarian Government ; 2nd, that Kossuth was appointed Hungarian Minister of Finance with the express consent of his Majesty ; and 3rd, that.'tfie Hungarian troops were placed by a royal decree under the orders of the Hungarian Minister of War, who was empowered to administer to them the oath on the Constitution. It was no wonder, therefore, that " the troops levied and the money raised " were " applied exclusively to Hungarian purposes," at a period, too, when rebellion bad broken out, which, supported as it was by a power at first unknown and scarcely suspected, but soon divined and finally unmasked, threatened to engulph the country aud sweep away its Constitution, which, old and time-honoured in its origin and practice, had, in the opinion of all honest men, been invigorated by the recent reforms. And it was this reformed Constitution that bad been guaranteed by the oath of a King — a King who was no longer undsr the trammels of an insurgent mob at Vienna, but who had repaired a month afterwards, of his own free will, to his good city of Presburgh, where he was surrounded by a loyal nation full of gratitude^and and reverence for the throne. The statement of Hungarian troops and money being reserved exclusively for Hungarian purposes is not, moreover, strictly correct. The grant of troops for Italy was made conditionally, it is true, because Hungary had then no troops to spare ; but it was made wiih the view of keeping up* the integrity of the Austrian Empire according to the spirit of the Pragmatic Sanction, and at the same lime of conferring the blessing of'constitutional liberty on the Italian subjects of His Majesty, and thus consolidating the empire upon the only principle that could thenceforward secure its existence — that of a confederation of autonomic States. This grant, which has lately been the subject of discussion in the English press, is the best proof of tbe loyal policy of Louis Batlbyany's Ministry, as well as of the conciliatory spirit that pervaded the majority of the Diet. And this same policy was pursued by Louis Batthyany until the last moment, notwithstanding all the disappointments and deceptions he Was doomed to experience. To this policy he sacrificed even his popularity ; and while he spumed on one hand the threats of the inconstant masses, and on the other braved death itself in the consciousness of his integrity and patriotism, he was subjected to the taunts of detractors during his life, and was executed by those he bad faithfully served, and is now disavowed after his death, and mixed up with the scum of unprincipled .demagogues and political condottieri by one of those whom lie had selected to stand honourably by bis side, and aid him in his efforts to save the Crown, and extricate the Austrian Empire from the abyss into which it had been plunged by the temporizing and wavering policy which the' Government had so long pursued. And Louis Batthyanny follow-, ed this policy until the atrocious murder of Count Lamberg. This foul deed so disgusted him that he went to Vienna, and resigned his office into the hands of his Majesty, showing thereby his disapprobation of popular justice exercised in a summary manner, as well as his dissent from a measure which, whatever may be its ultimate result, was illegal both in its form and its principle. How Prince Esterhazy during this interval fulfilled tho duties he hadassurued, what part he acted, what share he took in furthering the -patriotic endeavours of the Premier, in what direction he used his authority and influence, are facts which probably lie concealed iv the proto- i cols which he mentions in his letter. Hungary knows very little of his doings. Neither does be give us himself the least information on this point, nor offer any explanation of tbe principal and the only special accusation which he brings against tbe Prime Minister under whom he consented to take office and to remain in office long after tbe fact alluded to was accomplished. The accusation is, that Louis Batthyany published the decree of the Emperor by which the Ban of Croatia was deprived, as a traitor, of all honours, titles,,and dignities, before a certain eventuality

took place ; whereas, according to the Prince, a solemn agreementrwas entered into at a conference at Innspruck that the decree should not be published until this eventuality had actually occurred. Strange,as this story sounds, and trifling as the circumstance is in' itself, even on the supposition that Louis Batthyanny had, in the interest of his own country taken such n liberty towards a 6et of men whose' influence predominated at Court, and who - had already in several instances shown their want of' good faith, and bad, moreover, constantly exercised a direct and therefore illegal influence on the internal affairs of Hungary, still, in order to give it the least semblance of truth, the public had a right to expect that his Highness would have shown what the eventuality alluded to really was. Then, and then only, would the public have been able to form a correct judgment respecting the statement, and to examine whether the eventuality bad not actually taken place, or wheiher the Hungarian Premier bad not also on his part laid down certain conditions before he consented to receive the Royal decree — such as, for instance, the quiet removal of the Ban, or a severe rebuke from tb«, King, with a peremptory order to desist /from bis military preparations. What is certaiu is the historical fact of the brilliant reception which the Ban met with immediately afterwards* and. before Louis Batthyany could have ever bad time to publish the document at the same Court of Innspruck, whither be had been examined to appear ad audiendum verbum regium. It is also 'certain that at the same time that this decree was drawn up, manifestoes were addressed by the Emperor to the Croatians themselves warning them not to suffer themselves to be led astray by the manosuvres of the Ban, but to adhere steadily to the Hungarian Ministry. That the Ban, in despite of these proceedings, continued his preparations, and soon invaded Hungary in the name of the Emperor, and that at.the very mome-nt he was doing so the decree in question was not only revoked, but fiesh honours showered on him ; that he was successively made Lieutenant-Field Marshal, Comtnan-der-in-Chief of all the forces iv Hungary, and Royal Plenipotentiary Commissary, are so many proofs that Louis Batthyany regarded the King's word and signature as sacred and irrevocable, and acted in conformity with this conviction, while the counsellors of his Majesty at Vienna and Innspruck did not scruple to compromise the dignity of the Sovereign by persuading his Majesty to affix his signature first to one document, and then to another of a tptally opposite tendency. The whole transaction was in fact a trick practised on the goodnature and faith of Louis Battbyany and the Hungarian nation, in -order that the nation might be lulled iuto a fatal security, and the way smoothed for the Ban, that he might be enabled quietly \o proceed to Ptjsth, and there place himsalf in possession of power ' and full executive authority. Is not such proI ceeding in itself sufficient to justify — nay, even I command such an indiscretion on the part of I Louis Batthyany as is here imputed to him ? There is, moreover^ one circumstance that must always be horns'- ia mind when these events are made the subject of discussion, which is, that this proceeding," as" well as every other of the same kind, was not taken, and would not have been taken, by Louis Batlhyany without the consent, and authorisation of his Imperial Highness the Archduke Stephen, the Palatine and Vicegerent of the kingdom. It will thus appear that the decree in question was published and sent in the name of tbe Palatine to all the authorities under his jurisdiction. It was the same in respect to the indictment issued against the Ban in virtue of the Royal decree, and to the commission by which Geoeral Wrabowsky and two Royal attorneys were empowered to institute legal proceedings against the Ban if he persisted in his refusal to obey the Royal commands. All these documents, I repeat, were Issued in the name of and signed by the Palatine. It cannot be denied that there was a faction in the country, and even in tbe Diet, that was daily increasing in numbers and that Kossuth was weak enough to countenance, whose object was to keep up a perpetual Bgitation, not for the purposes of maintaining tbe laws and liberties of tbe country, but with the view of hurrying the country into revolution. This faction was kept down by Louis Batthyany so long as he was able to maintain bis position. If, without getting precisely the- .upper hand, this faction finally succeeded in spreading' terror in the ranks of all other parties and forcing the country into extreme measures, it was merely because it was enabled to gain a firm footing through the policy pursued by the Austrian Ministers. Tbe urgent necessity of placing Hungary in a state of defence against the machinations "of the Austrian Cabinet served' as a good pretext to cloak the real designs of the factions. The tortuous policy pursued towards Hungary from the very beginning, and the strange spectacle of his Majesty's Hungarian and Austrian troops fighting on both sides during tbe Servian insurrection and the Croatian inroad, .first shook- the confidence which the nation had so long placed in the throne, and eventually forced tbe Batthyany Ministry to resign. The manifesto of tbe Austrian Ministers against the Hungarian constitution ; the rehabilitation of the Ban; the manifestoes of September, October, and December, by which the Diet was dissolved, tbe constitution destroyed, and the country placed under martial law ; tbe aftdication of Ferdinand, • and the assumption of the crown of Hungary by the Enjperor Francis Joseph, in contempt of leg^ forms and the compact by which all his predecessors had ascended the Hungarian throne which stood open to him in a legal way if he bad chosln to avail himself of it ; and finally, the dogged and stubborn refusals of Prince Windiscbgratz \o listen to any compromise with " rebels" — all these circumstances combined drove the nation [° have recourse to arms and to rely exclusively \n its own resources. The Austrian constitution ft March 1849, by which the political existence pf Hungary was blotted out, and Hungary treated as a mere province of the Austrian empire, gaf e the strongest hold to that insatiate party, ai 1( * | served as welcome argument for breaking the ti^ s that attached Hungary to the Hapsburg dynasty* The blind and unscrupulous policy of the facti oo that had seized the reins of Government in AustH a soon made the most moderate men in Hungry regret that the defence of the country had been so long neglected, and obliged even those (a 00 * they formed the majority in the country) who

were averse to the extreme measure of the deposition of the Hapsburg dynasty- and the declaration of complete independence, to acquiesce in this measure when it was accomplished rather than to. withdraw from the service of their country. And in asserting that, with the excpption of a contemptible faction, it was, at the commencement, the loyal intention of every one in Hungary to maintain the union with Austria, I Jo not — whatever he may have done sinee — exclude Kos-

suth himself. The very versatility of his mind and temper which makes him embrace every novelty with so much atdour and such sanguine expectation, is the best proof that, although stamped by nature for an agitator, he was honest and sincere in this respect, and would have remained so had Austria kept her side of the bargain. Besides, what could have induced any man of common sense in Hungary at that period to overstep the bounds of constitutional legality, the attainment of which had been the constant aim of so many Diets, and which was for the first time fully sanctioned and supported by guarantees which it was fondly hoped would render such a desirable state permanent — at a time, too, when he who had provoked a struggle would have been left alone, because the country had everything to lose and nothing to gain by it ? Yes, I repeat, Kossuth himself was sincerely desirous of keeping up the connection with Austria on the terms that had been agreed to. But when the underhand practices that had been constantly carried on could no longer be concealed ; when unexpected blows were dealt in the dark with the intention of wearing Hungary out and exhausting her strength and patience in fruitless struggles, then it was that Kossuth's impetuous and restless temper, and the inherent weakness of his character and laxity oT principle predominated over his better feelings. Ambition and a hankering after notoriety, and the suppleuess with which he always yielded to the most pressing and least scrupulous, placed him first in contradiction with himself, And then involved him — 'and it may be said, also, the other ministers — in an inconsistent policy, and finally led him to self-willed and arbitrary measures, which accelerated the fall of the Batthyany Miuistry. It is unnecessary to charge a man with more failings and follies than he has been guilty of. Kossuth has already enough to answer for before the tribunal of public opinion respecting his political conduct, which was unquestionably the main cause of the ruin and downfall of his country. Deficient in the knowledge of men and things, in the steadfast bearing, cool judgment, and comprehensive mind of a statesman, and without the firm hand of a ruler ; setting at naught all sound calculation, while be played a game of chance and staked the fate of the nation on the cast (A a die; encountering danger with hair-brained temerity when distant, but shrinking from it when near ; elated and overbearing in prosperity, but utterly prostrate in adversity ; wanting that strength and intrepidity of character that alone commands homage and obedience from others, while he suffered himself to be made the tool of every intriguer he came in connexion with ; mistaking his manifold accomplishments and natural genius for an aptitude to govern a country in times of trouble; and setting, in the flights of fancy, no bounds to the scope of his ambition, K,pssuth hurried away the nation into a course of 'the most impolitic measures, and grasped the highest power in the realm by dubious means ; but when scarcely in possession of it, suffered it to be wrested from his hands by the man whom he had himself most injudiciously raised to a high station, and against whom, although he had received repeated warnings, as well as proofs, of his treachery and worthlessness, he never dared openly and boldly to proceed — by the man whom he had hoped to ensnare while he crouched beneath him in abject fear, bul by whom he was finally outwitted. The generous sympathy of the English nation cannot be quashed by being told that Austria was the benefactor of Hungary, while the Hungarian Diet was a factious Assembly, and the majority of the Hungarian Ministers were a set of rebels. In doing honour to Kossutb, the English people have shown their sympathy for the cause of an unfortunate country that has been bereaved of its chartered rights and liberties, and in fomenting this sympathy Kossuth has been obliged to pay a tribute to the feajings of legality that animates even the humblest classes in England, by eschewing in his speeches the demagogical rant in which he had indulged only a week before at Marseilles. The applause of the English people was not given to the revolutionary character of the man, but to the able manner in which he brought the grievances of his country before them. Several impartial and unprejudiced English journals have already begun to inqnire how far Kossuth has a right to the distinction that has been accorded to him, and the Examiner, in particular, has cast a sharp glance on his past career, and on the presumption with which he launches into his new one. It is not, however, for the English people to settle his right as to the position lie" is to hold airong his own countrymen. This right belongs exclusively to the latter, and not to those who are scattered over the'world in exile, but to those in whom reposes the will of the nation at home. Meanwhile, my n"" decided opinion on the subject is thi? — that Kossuth has not the least rigb* t0 sel himself up as the sole and exclusive representative of his country — not theleast right to reassume the title of Governor and the funcI tions of Dictator, as be does in his address ! from Brussa to the citizens of the United States; and that it is a most unwarrantable, as well as most illogical, proceeding on his part to contend, as be does in the same document, that the Hungarian nation could not legally enter into any engagement or adopt any measure that would be incompatible with the act by which be was raised to the dignity of Governor ; it being obvious, even if he had not resigned this dignity, that when the nation was re-constituted< "on its former constitutional basis, its legal representatives in Diet' assembled would have "the right to act inwhatever way they might deem the mo&t conducive to the welfare of the country, lam also of opinion that, so far from following a sound policy in wishing, as he does, to remodel the reformed constitution of 1848' and engraft on it principles of republicanism and unleavened democracy — principles which are at variance, with, our national laws and institutions, as well as with: the manners, customs, and genius of the people — hewould have acted more wisely and rendered a more essential service to bis country, if, after

• his liberation from the thraldom of detention he had appeared before the world in the simple character of a private individual. The conspicuous part which he took in the affairs of his country, and his subsequent misfortunes, would have sel cured him general respect, while the. modesty of his demeanour, by effacing from the minds of his countrymen ibe recollection of the faults and errors he committed, and through which Hungary has been brought to her present state of misery and servitude, would have given him a precedence by courtesy among his companions in exile, and placed him in a position to receive that useful advice and assistance which they would have gladly offered him for the purpose of hereafter repairing by a course of sound and moderate policy the injuiies inflicted on the land of their birth. But, instead of acting in this manner, he has set himself up as the Dictator of his countrymen. It is, therefore, the sacred duty of those who, although far from wishing to fetter his activity, are not disposed to admit his claims, publicly to protest against his proceedings. Without dwelling any longer on the weighty motives for caution which may be deduced from his past car«er, I will merely observe that bis pretension to be still regarded as Governor is the more barefaced from the. circumstances attending his resignation. The circumstances are these: — He was summoned by Gorgey and> three mem-, bers of the Ministry to resign. He instantly complied, and resigned the Governorship withoutconvening the Council, of State, that he was bound by law to consult on every important occasion. He resigned without intimating his intention of doing so to the three other Ministers (of whom I was one) and who were, consequently, quite unaware of the fact. He did not resign his authority into the hands of the Ministers — as under such circumstances he was bound to do — but into the hands of Gorgey, He even invested Gorgey with a power and authority with which he had not been invested himself — viz., the Dictatorship. He delegated a power which he only held himself personally, and, in fact, provisionally, by a direct mandate of the Diet. He resigned in the name of the Ministry, which he had no right whatever to do. Although it may be safely affirmed that he was in a state of moral and physical -coercion when he gave in his resignation, it must be borne in mind that be voluntarily confirmed this act when he was free from all restraint, and could never be persuaded to reassume his abandoned power, nei- | ther at Lugos, in the midst of General Bern's army, nor subsequently at Behadia, when Bern j urgently requested him to do so, and try the last chance that remained of success, to which request he again returned a negative answer in writing. By thus acting he abandoned Hungary to her fate, and exposed all those who had taken part in the war to take vengeance on Austria. " He confirmed his avowed intention of retiring into private life by crossing the frontier and entering the Turkish dominions before the capitulation of Villagos could possibly be known to him, and while there were still fortresses and armies in Hungary by which the national cause could have been sustained. In his letter of refusal to General Bern he in fact suggested the expediency of calling together some eminent men in order to form a Provisional Government. On his arrival at Widdin he again publfcly declared (in a letter since published) his resolution of retiring into private life — a resolution which, for a short time, he acted upon. Leaving the public to judge how far those facts are reconcilable with his present pretensions, I have the honor to remain, Your obedient humble servant, COUNT CASIMER.BATTHYANY. Paris, Hotel de Paris, Place Ville l'Eveque, December 10.

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Hononga pūmau ki tēnei tūemi

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/NZSCSG18520612.2.8

Bibliographic details
Ngā taipitopito pukapuka

New Zealand Spectator and Cook's Strait Guardian, Volume VIII, Issue 716, 12 June 1852, Page 4

Word count
Tapeke kupu
4,803

THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION. [From the Times, December 30.] To the Editor of the Times. New Zealand Spectator and Cook's Strait Guardian, Volume VIII, Issue 716, 12 June 1852, Page 4

THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION. [From the Times, December 30.] To the Editor of the Times. New Zealand Spectator and Cook's Strait Guardian, Volume VIII, Issue 716, 12 June 1852, Page 4

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