THE FUTURE IN FRANCE. [From the Quarterley Review.]

New Zealand Spectator and Cook's Strait Guardian, Volume IV, Issue 329, 23 September 1848, Page 4

THE FUTURE IN FRANCE. [From the Quarter ley Review.]

There are at present three persons whose families have, within the last forty years, occupied the throne of France — the Duke of Bourdeaux, the Count of Paris, and M. Louis Bonaparte. We may perhaps underrate this last gentleman's chances, but — having just shown ihat we have not forgotten him, nor the party that would adopt him as the most legitimate candidate — we beg leave to decline drawing any horoscope for the hero of the <tame eagle. We will suppose the choice to Jie between the legitimate and- the .quasi-legi-timate, and we can have no hesitation in pronouncing an opinion for the former — for reasons always powerful, but to which this last revolution gives, we think, additional and unanswerable force. If France returns to a monarchy, it will be because she is wearied of revolutions ; and she has seen by two recent examples that an intrusive dynasty carries within itself the seeds of dissolution and disorder. The Empire, that stupendous scaffolding of glory and power — went to pieces like a broken toy, only because it was a usurpation. It never entered into man's mind that the victories of Eugene and Marlborougb could, in the worst extremity, have dethroned and exiled Louis XIV ; and, in the instance of Louis Philippe, we have seen the personal talents, the private virtues, the allegiance of a powerful army, the apparent good will of a great majority of the people, could not save him from a series of bloody struggles — in one, and at first the least formidable, of which the edifice of quasi-legitimacy which he has been for seventeen years endeavouring to consolidate, was overthrown in half an hour. And, like the baseless fabric of a vision, Left not a rack behind. Louis Philippe, the quoique Bourbon, was nothing but a symbol — a drapeau — and that they chose to change their flag ; he had consented to accept the Crown from a mob, and the mob have turned him out. He was like one of their " Trees of Liberty" — transported by the hands of the people to a conspicuous position which did not belong to him, and where he had do roots, be stood as fine as crowns and gar-j lands could make him, but, having only a quasi hold of the earth, the delusive pageant was blown down by a gust of wind that would not have damtged a sapling growing in hs native soil. Louis XVI. was ignominiously murdered, Charles X. indignantly expelled, Henry Y. exiled from his cradle, but there we thousands and tens of thousands in France whose eyes fill and whose hearts beat with loyal emotions at the thoughts of any of those

illustrious Unfortunates — while Louis Philippe after seventeen years of a reign profuse of honours, favours, and flattery, and distinguished, as we have said, both by personal merits and several kingly qualities, does not seem to have left one-single soul in France who lamented the change otherwise than as an inconvenient political event, or who felt more for the loss of the King than the change of a Pr4fet ! Yet what was wanting to this security 1 That which can neither be won by courage nor forfeited by weakness — the inherent hereditary birthright of legitimacy. This principle may be scoffed at by the revolutionist, and even by the theorist, as absurd and irrational ; but the history of the world, particularly the history of France for the last forty years, proves that it has a strong hold on the hearts of mankind, and, we think, on their reason also. Why, they ask us, submit to the rule of a woman or a child rather than select the fittest man ? Because, in the first place, experience has shown that nations may be great and happy under women and children. When was England more powerful than under Elizabeth and Anne ? When was France happier than when Fleury directed the councils of young Louis XIV ? And this objection has become still weaker in the modern exercise of constitutional monarchies by responsible advisers. But there is another and better reason, it is safer to accept from the hand of God the risk attending a woman or a child than to incur the spontaneous danger of cutting one another's throats in deciding who is the fittest - man. We have already no less than three hereditary pretenders to the throne of France, and we know not how many more candidates the revolution may bequeath to us ; and in this embarras de choix we are disposed to think that the descendant of Saint Louis is likely to be at least as good a constitutional King as Louis Bonaparte or even Louis Blanc. There is still a stronger reason. The evil to be guarded against, in the supposed- case, is instability — popular delusion — popular inconstancy, and we, therefore, adopt the providential circumstance of birthright exactly because it is what the people can neither confer nor take away, and Which for that very reason they are the most disposed to reverence. The crow n that is given may be taken — but the rights to a crown derived from a long line of ancestors and the acquiescence and sanction of many generations of the people, can never be extinguished in the recollections and feelings, or, if you v. ill, the prejudices of mankind. Whenever, therefore, France shall again desire to close the bloody career of revolution in the stability of a constitutional monarchy, the safest course will undoubtedly be to recognise the natural and indefeasible rights of the heir of the throne of Henry IV. and Louis XIV., whoever he at that time may be. If the reaction should be very early ; if the attempts of the Communists to fulfil the behests of Louis Blanc and the National, by a real extinction of the bourgeoisie, should arouse the upper and middle classes ; if the more respectable portion of the National Guard, now (in Paris at least) overpowered and swamped, should retrieve any weight or consideration, and should unite in the sentiments of order and duty that we believe animates the majority of the army ; if, we say, this should be the course of events, it is very possible that in the present ferment they might again turn their eyes to the House of Orleans. If it were not for Louis Philippe's abdication, his age, and the consequent loss of that energy which was so essential a part of bis power, we should not have despaired of seeing Louis Philippe himself invited back as tbe readiest means of arresting anarchy. Failing him, however, it is possible that tbe Count of Paris may be thought of as a symbol of order. The times are not perhaps ripe for Henry Y. The revolutionary spirit, even if so mastered, will be still so strong that the friends of peace and order, of whatever political party, would be glad to compound with it for whatever they can obtain ; and as the Count of Paris would we suppose, be, from the very defect in his title, more acceptable to the revolutionists, he would have the best chance at this moment — or any early one : and yet we indulge a hope that his friends would have the prudence to reject the dangerous offer. It would be at best only an adjournment of the difficulty — the crown so bestowed would be still held of the revolt, and be found to have even less security than his grandfather's. But if the present crisis should pass without a call for the Orleans branch, and the opinion, which every one one seems to entertain, of the impracticability of a durable republic be ultimately realised, then we are convinced by evidence and reason that the restoration of the constitutional monarchy in the direct line is the most probable solution of all these complicated difficulties, the happiest fortune that could befall the house of Orleans itself, and the best guarantee for the progressive prosperity of France, and the future tranquillity of Europe. But while we are thus prematurely, and it may seem idly, speculating on the futurity of

France, the horizon of all Europe is thickening around us. Even as we write, every hour j brings alarming tidings — the oldest monarchies totter, the wisest and boldest statesmen cower; and Europe seems threatened with various forms of anarchy, copied, as if they were the cut of a coat or the shape of a head-dress, from la mode de Paris. We cannot deny that all this is very awful, and that it threatens all the ancient monarchics — we hope we may safely say except our own — with the visitation of a hurricane, to be more or less severely felt, according to local circumstances and the tempers of nations. But we confidently trust, under the providential dispensation of Heaven, that out of the extent of the danger springs the omen of saftty. This French revolution, starting full armed from the brain, not of Jove, but of M. Louis Blanc, is so causeless in its origin, so wild in its principles, and so impracticable in its purposes, that we have no doubt that it is destined to be, not the temptation, but the warning of mankind. It will fail utterly — whether with more or less disaster — at home, and will cease, when brought to any practical experience, to be morally formidable abroad. The storm it creates may clear the heavy atmospheres of nations that require such a purification — But storms and earthquakes break not Heaven' • design ; and, although we do not 'promise ourselves that there may not possibly be here and there throughout Europe deplorable calamities, we are satisfied that, if the example of France has led to the agitation, her example also will afford the best remedy. For ourselves at home, paradoxical as it may seem, we gladly confess that we feel less alarm than we have done for the last sixteen years. The governing power had suffered so deeply by the inroads of the Whigs on the old constitution, and by the division of the Tories into anti-pathetic sections, that, while France exhibited the successful and apparently prosperous result of an iusurrectionary and, in principle, democratic revolution, we trembled at the example, and could not overcome our apprehensions that we were destined to the same experiment. These apprehensions are now greatly diminished — that revolution has signally and calamitously failed, and so we are confident will this — much sooner and more completely ; and the result will 1)3, nay, we think that it has already been, to strengthen the hands of our government, and to rally round the throne of our Queen a warmer feeling of loyalty, a stronger constitutional zeal, and a more determined spirit to maintain those institutions which have for nearly two centuries realised for us all the civil and religious liberty, all the political and social blessings that the rest of Europe are now with so much doubt and danger groping after in the smoke of cannon, and through kennels running with blood. We must, however, add that our conviction of the security of the British Crown and Constitution requires two postulates :—: — First, that the Government will entitle itself to the cordial support of the real friends of our institutions, by abstaining from any further violation of their principles, and by taking speedy and effectual measures to suppress that chronic rebellion which now palsies and perils the empire under the pretence of repealing the Irish union ; and Secondly, which will be a consequence of the former, the re-union of the whole Conservative party, of whatever shade, in giving that strength, vigour, and consistency to her Majesty's councils, which in great crisis we — the humble echo of the most powerful feeling in the nation — tell her Majesty and her Ministers — respectfully but frankly and confidently, cannot be derived from any other source { and none of us, high or low, should for a moment forget that if we by weakness or dissension or indiscretion, forfeit our ancient position, Europe has now no hospitable refuge left for us— no Holyroods or Claremonts for our princes !