THE COMING WAR IN EUROPE. [From the Spectator, January 9 ]

New Zealand Spectator and Cook's Strait Guardian, Volume III, Issue 196, 16 June 1847, Page 4

THE COMING WAR IN EUROPE. [From the Spectator, January 9 ]

The year opens with geneial presentiments of war in Europe ; and, for all our predilections in favour of peace, we cannot deny that the balance of probabilities is against its continuing much longer. Some of our readers may have heard and some may smile to be told, that England's patient obstinacy in maintaining peace has been calculated, by men deeply versed in the science and practical application of numbers, to last only till the year 1847 ! Certainly the actual posture and tendencies of affairs are not pacific. It is no part of a wise policy, to shut your eyes to manifest signs of coming events. The question of peace or war does not rest with the peaceably disposed. The combativeness of ruder nations seeks an outlet. It bas been observed that one generation scarcely feels the horrors of a war sustained by the preceding generation, and therefore does not fully value the blessing which it has in peace. Monarchs still take pride in wearing the costume of the soldier's profession ; and it is not to be supposed that those vast armies which have been prepared in the North and East have fought their last battles. , The question remains, at what point will war break out, when ii does come 1 This question, of vital importance for Europe and the progress of civilization, involves not only the difference between that which is inevitable and that which is not inevitable, but also the difference hetween what would be a gratuitous and unmitigated calamity and what might be a rough road to better things. In England and France, power has learned to accept public opinion as arbiter on disputed points : the proper function of war, therefore, is superseded in that region, so long as public opinion retaius it due supremacy ; and a return to the ruder process would be most criminal folly. Nothing could be gained by it ; it would be a merely retrograde act. And in the same region, by a due use of legitimate influences — namely, those of mutual understanding and public opinion — statesmen have the power to prevent war. In other regions the cjse is very different in both respects ; that is to say, war is neither to be prevented nor perhaps wholly to be deprecated. Russia, the empire which subsists on the most rude and naked basis of main force, is the grand depository of warlike menaces ; and the advance of her encroachment has now reached such a point that the next step seems certain to involve Europe in a war of resist-

ance. The same unchecked progress which has brought Russia to that point must have taught her commanders a fatally delusive lesson of impunity. Every step has been successful. Province after province has had the Russian mark placed upon it, and has been seized, with an advance as steady and as undisputed as that of the backwoodsman with his axe into the forest. The Russian boundacy has been pushed not only to Pers ; a, but within Persia : and Persia herself is undergoing the double process of being enclosed by Russia and of being Russianized internally. Russia has set her *' Pansclavonian" mark on the Christian provinces of Turkey. The Times has been publishing a remarkable correspondence, of the year 1815, in which Lord Castlereagh remonstrated vigorously, but unsuccessfully, with the Emperor Alexander against his aggression on Poland ; and among the rest, is quoted an extraordinary avowal, from a memorandum addressed by Count Pozzo di Borgo to Alexander. The Count is arguing against concession of Polish nationality in deference to the claims of Europe — " The destruction of Poland as a nation forms almost the whole modern history of Russia. The system of aggrandizement on the side of Turkey has been merely territorial, and, I venture to»say, secondary to that which has been carried on upon the Western frontier. The conquest of Poland has been effected principßlly in order to multiply the relations of the Russian nation with the rest of Europe, and to open a wider field and a more exalted and conspicuous stage for the exercise of its strength and its talents, and for the satisfaction of its pride, its passions, and its interests. The great scheme, which has been crowned with complete success, admits of no division in the unity of the empire." This " great scheme" has been fully consummated in 1846, by the annihilation of Cracow and the absorption of Warsaw. Russia has extended her frontier to its utmost so far as merely " multiplying her relations with Europe," and can go no further without advancing into Europe. She has her German frontage, and cannot push it on except by taking a bit of Germany. But why should she stop, since perfect impunity and success have hitherto attended her advance? A moving bog after swallowing the field, might as well entertain scruples on coming to the village. It is true that the next step, whenever taken, must be different fiom all befor- ; but what difference is there that Russia can perceive 1 Her past successful impunity she will impute to her own cunning and her immense resources in brute strength : those she still posstsses, and what difference can she see ? Russia, then, will go on. She has approached the crisis of her doom, and the next step is pregnant with a new train of consequences ; but it is not given to her to see the altered presencfi in her walks. A strong impression prevails in London, that Russia is about to pounce upon Austria. Austria, the great embodiment of Absolutism, has begotten the still more monstrous Endriago of Absolutism which is to destroy it. Possibly. Austria is weak on every side ; her walls have a practicable breach at every point of the compass. When Russia seizes the Christian provinces of Turkey, the aggression will be upon Vienna rather than upon the Porte. Hungary is a dependant that keeps Austria in terror. Pansclavonianism again, threatens Austria's ill-gotten Polish provinces. All Germany is indignant with the once supreme Austiia for the Cracow blunder. Switzerland, weak and small, is tempting Austria into suicidal projects of intervention, if not of partition. Switzerland is a principle, and I toucbiug that Austria will have more to coni tend with than the Swiss ; but what does Austria know about principles ? In Italy Austria is threatened with multiplied dangers. So much without. At the centre sits a cretin on the throne, and, ruling in the name of that cretin, the old decaying minister of an old decaying empire — the old husband of a young wife. Prussia trembles. Overreached by Russia, the hesitating, trimming, martinet pedagogue, who takes himself icr the workman when he is only the too], is placed between two fires. The screen afforded by Poland razed, he is brought into dangerous contact with the rude and unscrupulous power of the North — a fencing master with foil and compliments exposed to the career of the wild Cossack. At home, he wages with growing opinion a dangerous tantalizing contest of procrastination. The turning of a straw may force Prussia into a military attitude, in which she would have to purchase an army at the cost of popular concessions ; or self-provoked troubles at home may force her to buy Russian forbearance on Russian terms. The peace of Italy is a tenant at will, with many landlords. Liberalism never raised its head so high, nor behaved with so wise a discretion. The accession of Pius the Ninth began a new volume of her unwritten history. The native princes are said to .contemplate a [ league against alien domination — a federal

consolidation of Italy in order to her independence. Austria willthen pour in armies. Again, a great main railroad into Italy is sanctioned, most wisely by native princes ; it will open a highway of wealth for them, and to immense popular advantages for their subjects; Austria is jealous, commercially and politically, and not without reason ; Austria will probly resist, but English capital is not apt to be baulked of its legitimately sanctioned investment, uor to be vanquished. There is growing up in this region a clear identity of native sovereign rights, of popular lights, of French and English interests. But on the threshold stands inevitable war. We have rapidly glanced over the volcanic regions on the map of Europe. In all of them war is imminent. We perceive a number of conflicting influences, growing too big for a co-ordinate occupation of a common territory, but possessing no common intelligence or test by which to supersede the trial of strength ; and therefore the trial of strength raus,t come. Absolutism alone would incite war, because it has yet some lessons to learn in that shape, which it is incapable of receiving in any other shape. But, we say, Europe has a lively interest as to the pai ticular site where war may happen first to break out. It touches those countries which most improve peace, that the crater should be broken in as remote a region as possible. But that is a small consideration as compared with some others. The contest may be more or Jess productive in good fruits, accordng to its mode and place of eruption. The case of Prussia, for instance, might be ruled by the result of a struggle in Italy : a war in Italy therefore might supersede certain imminent troubles in Germany ; and it would be more likely to do so if it were not a fight between peoples and princes, (which would provoke sympathetic movements) but one between native and alien princes, w th a contingent recognition of popular claims. Again, should the Italian contest be anticipated by the next step of Russian encroachment, that one act might supersede all special contests, in part if not altogether. Russia cau crush Austria ; Austria is not worth saving as she is, and no one would take the trouble. But Russia cannot be suffered to absorb into her rude morass a constituent and recognised part of Europe — to swallow up a living state : the advance of Russia on Europe, therefore would provoke a war of Europe on Russia. Such a war is not to be avoided at the will and pleasure of European states : war depends usually, on the ruder and therefore most quarrelsome state — it depends here on Russia : Russia, however, is not likely to see the consequences. Such a war would probably involve the unsettlement of the whole Russian and European system, and, were the opportunity duly improved, would leave Europe in a better state : it would be the healthful storm, which, while it destroys purifies, and so vivifies. For such reasons, these portents of choler may be regarded less as visitations than as opportunities. How far they might be made to bear the best fruits, would mainly depend on the acuteness and discretion of the most active promoters of opinion in the several countries concerned. All might be lost by aiming at too much. For instance, were Prussia forced into a position for making concessions to popular claims, the efforts to snatch a republic would be merely vain ; and the resistance it would provoke might prevent the attainment of what would be quite possible, because the people are quite prepared for it — a constitutional monarchy. In Italy again, if the native princes were engaged in a contest with alien rulers, it would be a matter of choice for the people to support their princes, or to go for separate objects : but the most surely profitable step would be, to make a compact alliance between peoples and native princes. Rightly understood, the power of the people always increases with the power of the state, and vice versa. In short, the amount of profit to be gained from opportunity depends upon the degree in which leading actors aim at the things next attainable, rather than at remote and precarious objects.