Eastern Question.

New Zealand Mail, Issue 310, 30 March 1878, Page 8

Eastern Question.

THE OPENING OF THE STRAITS OF THE DARDANELLES AND BOSPHORUS. A writer in the Spectator says:— The necessity for keeping closed the Straits of the Dardanelles to the armed vessels of foreign Powers has been now for so long a period assumed, that it is very, difficult for Englishmen to contemplate the prospect of their being opened with any other feeling than that of dismay. Yet a very little reflection on the subject ought to satisfy every reasonable person that the danger to this country of such a proceeding is more imaginary than real. I ' propose in the present letter to try and show that while there are very good reasons for not making futile objections to what, whether we like it or not, is very likely, and in a short time, to become an accomplished fact, there are really none worthy of much consideration, either on the score of policy or of strict right. We should bear in mind that these straits connect the Mediterranean with the Black Sea —that two-thirds of the coast of the latter sea forms an integral portion of the Prussian Empire, and that except through these straits it is impossible for Russia to send her ships-of-war thence to her northern ports, or to send her Baltic fleet, or any portion of it, on any emergency, to the Black Sea. The result is that it obliges her to maintain two fleets, neither of which can ever afford au y assistance to the other. We should further recollect that it is an arbitrary abuse of power, and utterly opposed to the wise and liberal principles of the Law of Nations, for one country to arrogate to itself the right of closing straits which a wise Providence has created, with, one might almost assume, the special object of connecting such seas with each other. The right claimed, therefore, has no moral, foundation, because its assertion seeks to thwart the designs of nature. Its political foundation rests solely on the continuance of the power by which it is put forward and supported, and if this power is destroyed, the right—founded solely on might—equally disappears. If this is true—and there is hardly a writer on international law who has ventured to question it—in the case of straits connecting seas which are the common property of mankind, it is still more true of straits which connect one sea which is open to all with another sea two-thirds of the coasts of which belong to the country other than that which possesses the land on either side of the straits. The latter country may, if it has the power, close such straits, and may justify the act by demonstrating an overwhelming necessity, springing from considerations of national safety; but the right exercised will only rest on the power to maintain it, and it will ever be a legitimate object with the country whose natural rights are invaded and prejudiced thereby to destroy that power on the first opportunity. So stands the case as between Turkey and Russia. The natural right of Russia to the full use and enjoyment of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus is clear, the political right of Turkey to limit or destroy the rights of Russia rests simply oil her ability. As between England and the other European Powers and Russia the case connot be put on higher grounds than those on which it rests as regards Turkey, nor has it been sought to place it any higher. By the Treaty of Paris the conditions imposed were for the benefit of Turkey, and were assented to by Russia, but that treaty was the outcome and result of a war in which Russia had been worsted, —not by Turkey but by the allied Powers, and although it may be said that treaty is still binding as between Russia and the other Powers, it is only binding on points which do not affect Turkey, for as between Russia and 'Turkey the war has destroyed the treaty. This view may very much weaken the value of treaties, when concluded between several Powers, because in the event of war breaking out between any two of the signatories to them little is left binding between the other parties and either of the belligerents ; but it is the correct view, and has been almost invariably the one acted on. Indeed, any other would involve complications and absurdities. England may regard the destruction of the treaty between Russia and Turkey by the act and operation of the war iu which they are engaged with displeasure, but it would be waste of breath, as well as ridiculous, to tell the belligerents that no matter who comes off victorious, the exact relation which existed between them when the war broke out, must be resumed, and as one consequence of such must, the Straits of the Dardanelles must remain closed, when perhaps Turkey may have purchased peace aud safety at the price of their being opened. If such was to be the effect of treaties, the result would be that wars would never cease until one of the parties was wholly and utterly destroyed. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Turkey is obliged to yield to the will of Russia as regards the opening of the straits, how does it become England, either alone or in conjunction with the Powers of Europe, to resist? ft has been shown that the closing of them, by

whatever means accomplished, was in derogation of the natural rights of Russia, arrh' that' the opening of them, if they are opened,, will! be the result of the transfer of the material' power which effected their closing from-' Turkey to Russia. It cannot be urged that either England or any other Power possesses or can claim any right, founded on necessity or arising out of the possession of land on either side, to close them,, as against Russia; such right, therefore, must rest on treatystipulations, which stipulations were wrung from Russia as part of the price with which she purchased peace. As regards Turkey, the stipulation has become of “ no account f it may, however, be urged that it continues 15c* endure between Russia aud the other co-signa-tories; but as it was introduced for the benefitand safety of Turkey (the pride of the otberv parties preventing them from saying that itwas also necessary to their safety), and Turkey has been compelled to forego both, as the price of deliverance from destruction, and as it was in its inception but a right resting solely on might, by might alone can it be maintained. It becomes, therefore, a question whether it is expedient to resort to might—in other words, to war—to maintain it. AVo know that, at least, three of the European Powers; are not going to insist on it. Is it worth our' while, then, to do so ? No country has a greater interest in supporting the natural right of free navigation than England. With more than one country she has insisted on it,, and gone to war to enforce it. AVitliin a few years; she forced Japan to concede the opening of tiny Inland Sea, a broad strait, lying between two' of the three islands forming the Empire of ; Japan; and she also insisted! and obtained theopening of the northern strait which connects the Corean Sea with the Pacific. The opening of neither of these straits was necessary to her, iu the sense in which the opening of the- Straits of the Dardanelles is necessary to Russiax. England is also insisting that the Suez Gauail —which is an artificial and not a natural! strait, and therefore stands on quite a different; footing—shall be kept open for the benefit of'' all nations, but notably in her own interest, even in time of war, and she has been and still is endeavoring to procure its neutralisation in such time. AVhether she is wise in taking the latter step is questionable, but it bears with some force on the position she has assumed, or it is feared may assume, on this question of the opening of the Dai-clanell'es, If England means by it that the Canal shall line open to belligerents in the sense in which fcbe--sea is open and neutral ground, without its; user by either or any belligerent foi-ming any ground of complaint against Egypt, within whose tex-ritory it is situated, the wisdom of her endeavors is not so particulai-ly open to objection ; but if she means that neither belligerent shall use it, then, indeed, she is fdi'ging a weapon which will inevitably strike her with greater force than any enemy with) whom she may be engaged. If she seeks? now to confine the southern fleet of Russia; within the Black Sea, or its northern fleet—should it ever happen to be in’the Mediterranean—from fleeing to it as a harbor of refuge, she may, indeed, be cutting off her nose to spite her face. Let us suppose that England, having obtained the neutralisation off the Canal in the sense last explained, is engaged in a struggle in the Mediterranean,, and that it is expedient that she should without delay summon that portion of her fleet which is in the Indian or China Seas to her assistance in the shortest space of time, or that she should without delay call to her assistance a portion of her Indian army, how bitterly would she regret that by her own act she had closed the Suez Canal against herself ? But a step fui-ther. If the exigency of her position required it, how long would she regard the paper conti’act that forbid her ships and troops from coming to her assistance ? She might, indeed, invoke, in extenuation of her conduct, “ dii'e necessity,” and trust to the vex'dict of posterity and to the impartial pen of the historian for acquittal ; but the bare possibility that she might be so situated as to regret hexwant of foresight, or be compelled to avoid ruin by disregai-ding her plighted word, should at least cause her to paxxse before she forces or aids in forcing another, and at this moment a friendly Power, to adhere to conditions and stipulations which in their nature are an improper and unnatural limitation of natural rights. If it is xxuwise to insist on Egypt closing the Suez Canal to belligerents, and if, as it has been suggested, it would be far better to give to it the character of the sea, open to all, and subject only to the condition—which in the case of ports has been universally , imposed and l-espected—that it should' not be made the theatre of war, or be wilfully damaged either by obstruction to its cui-rent, or by injury to its banks or the country on either side of it, it is equally unwise to insist on the Dardanelles being closed in the event of war breaking out between other countries, in which Turkey itself takes- no part. To do so would be simply to force her against her will and interest into a position in which she might become a victim, for of a sxxrety the belligei'ent whose interests the closing of the Dardanelles prejxxdiced woxxld look to her for au indemnity, which, rightly or wrongly claimed, woxxld, as soon as the power and opportunity to exact it were sufficient, be demanded and obtained. It would not only then be inexpedient for England to support Turkey in refusing to open or keep open the straits, but it woxxld also be impolitic to offer any impediment to an agreement by which they shoxxld be opened. That Russia will insist is evident. That her right to insist is no violation of the Law of Nations is at least au open question, in which the preponderance of authority is in her favor ; and that she is not debarred from so insisting by any stipulation in the Treaty of Paris, if she succeeds in her stirnggle with Turkey, is certainly cleai - , so fax-, at least, as any determination to prevent her would plunge Europe iuto war. LTuder these circumstances, and in the face of tlie fact that the damage likely to accrue to England fx-om the opening of the straits

is—for generations, at any rate—relegated to the realms of imagination, it is sincerely to be hoped that England will, following the example of one of her wisest Sovereigns, retire from a doubtful position with a good grace, since the probabilities of succeeding in maintaining it are about as visionary as the injury to her material interests.