ORGANIC VERSUS ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS.

New Zealand Mail, Issue 53, 27 January 1872, Page 11

ORGANIC VERSUS ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS.

It appears in some quarters to be taken for granted that the •' new Constitution" Bill which Mr Vogel promised the House the Ministry would introduce next session, and which the successive tinkerings the Constitution Act has been subjected to by the Colonial Parliament, aud the altered circumstances of the country, are supposed to have Tendered necessary, will abolish the existing Provincial Governments and boundaries, introduce the elective principle in the constitution of the Upper House, and aim to secure a simplification in the Government, and a greater uniformity in the legislation of the colony, than that which obtains at present. The whole of these objects appear at first sight to be extremely desirable, and, for this reason, a Ministry which endeavored to secure them would receive the cordial support of the country from one end of it to the other. Its public works policy has obtained for it a larger majority inside the House than any Ministry before could command, and its new Reform Bill will tend still farther to increase its popularity out of doors. Still, we think, it admits of a doubt whether constitutional changes would prove so advantageous as the introduction of measures having for their object greater administration, efficiency, aud responsibility; and whether the former changes can be wisely introduced at this particular stage in the history of the colony, seeing that the whole attention of the Government and of the people is concentrated on the measures designed to promote its material rather than its political advancement. We consider it doubtful, moreover, whether the organic changes said to be in contemplation would secure the objects professed to be desired. We are persuaded that many of the evils which have been ascribed to the provincial system originated in other causes ; while other and much greater evils would have arisen had not some such system in the earlier days of the colony been established. Evils, the same in kind if not in degree to those which are sup posed to have been engendered or perpetrated by the diusion of the colony into provinces, now prevail, more or less, not only between the two islands, but between different portions of the same province, where no artificial, arbitary, or political divisions have been instituted, and which are united not only under the same Government, but constitutes part and parcel of the same electoral district. For example, there is as little harmony in feeling, and unity in action, and more petty jealousy existing between Wanganui and Wellington, and even between one part of the electoral district of Rangitikei, or Wairarapa, and another, than between any of the provinces of the colony. Such evils can only be banished by the cultivation of a more cosmopolitan or national spirit, and the diffusion of more enlightened views. They are in part owing to a narrow selfishness, fostered by an isolated mode of life; in part to the natural difficulties which have heretofore existed to inter-com-munication ; and in part to the manner the country has been colonised, and with which political or provincial boundaries have had but little to do. It has been frequently remarked that those who object to provincial institutions have never been prepared with anything else to supply their places; but it might with still more pertenancy be urged that those who dwell so fondly upon the evils of the Provincial system never once refer to the evils that system has prevented, to the direct benefits it has conferred, or to the mischief which would be sure to result from the establishment of a purely centralized system in a country like New Zealand. The General Government has not been famed for its wise, efficient, and economic conduct of affairs, while it has been constrained to delegate certain of its powers to provincial authorities. And the General Legislature itself has already found that it has more work to do than it can satisfactorily perform, without undertaking that which has heretofore been confided to the Provincial Councils. We should not, for our part, object to some such modification of the existing system as that recently suggested in the leading columns of the Independent if we did

not feel persuaded that administrative reform was more needed than any such organic changes, and if there was no danger of Parliament and the country mistaking the shadow for the substance. Any reform in the constitution of the Upper House which is unaccompanied by a reform in the representation and mode of electing the Lower House would prove delusive; while the latter, if wisely planned, would probably render for the present a second chamber unnecessary. As for uniformity and simplicity, though desirable in themselves, it is not desirabe that we should have recourse to a procrustian policy for their attainment. " All free governments" says Webster, " are necessarily complicated; the simplest governments are'pure despotisms." New constitutions require something more than care in their elaboration : they must be allowed time for growth and self-development. Because a particular form oi' Government is found well-suited for one country it does not follow that it would prove equally well-suited for those that are placed in-wholly different circumstances. Even the Parliamentary Government of England has not worked very satisfactorily in Ireland; and the cry for "home rule" now heard in that country would, if Provincial Councils were abolished, be heard also, and to more purpose, in the Middle Inland. " Bad workmen blame their tools," and our colonial statesmen ascribe to the Oonstition Act the results of their own bungling. It is not so much constitutional changes as efficient administration which the colony at present noeds;.and the principle which has been rfound so effective in Prussia, in the attainment of this end, would probably pro»ve equally as effective in INew Zealand. That principle, being deeply rooted in human nature, and not a mere art-contrivance, like French constitutions and other human systems, will be found equally operative in all countries where no artificial hindrances exist to> its full development and exercise. The principle to which we refer is that of individual responsibility in the performance of public duties. It is that, we are informed, which has, more than anything else, contributed to the power and greatness of Prussia, and which distinguishes the bureaucracy of that country from the system existing m Italy, Russia, and France. '"' For a considerable period," says Karl Hillebrsind, in the last number of the " Fortnightly Review," " there was nothing to in-sure the integrity and assiduity of a Prussian official beyond the supervision of tho central power. A new and powerful principle —that of individual responsibility—wasintroduced through S item's reform. Henceforward the Prussian bureaucracy has distinguished itself from that of France, Russia, and Italy, not only by its hardworking capabilities, superior education, and independent opinion, but by this principle of individual responsibility. Stein strictly prohibited any recourse from subsdterns to their superiors, either for advice or instructions. While a French Mayor is utterly incapable of taking a resolution, adopting a measure, or even granting a request, without having previously communicated with the sub-prefect, who, in his turn, thinks it his duty to confer with the prefect, and through him with the minister, each one endeavoring to shirk his immediate responsibility. Prussian officials, on the contrary, are expected to take the initiative in all decisions, and are subject to reprimand and even dismissal, promotion or recompense, according to the merits of their services and the capacity displayed." It does not require much penetration to discover which system is likely to produce the most active and honest officers*, and the most efficient administrationAnd it is necessary to remember that the circumlocutory system, here condemned, is not peculiar to bureaucraticgovernments, nor is it confined exclusively to France; as the " red tape"* system which has grown up in England, and which has extended itself to thiscountry, is equally unfavorably to the development of activity and excellence,, and equally fatal to efficiency in theadministration of public affairs. If, however, the introduction of the principle of individual responsibility has effected such a reformation in Prussia, would it not prove equally advantageous-

in New Zealand? If honest and efficient administration is what the colony requires, is it not more likely to be obtained by the recognition of some such principle as that which has been found to be so effective in the most ably governed State in Europe, than by the passing of a new Constitution Act, however carefullv and skilfully designed ?