THE “LORDS.”

New Zealand Mail, Issue 46, 9 December 1871, Page 11

THE “LORDS.”

Since the leaders on this subject, which appeared in our last two issues, were written, we have seen various articles and communications relative to the same matter in several of our contemporaries, including the “ Independent,” the “ Press,” “ Colonist,” “ Examiner,” and “ Hawke’s Bay Herald.” Most of these journals allude to the absurdity and folly of referring the point which was in dispute between the two Houses to the Law Officer of the Crown, coupled, as it had been, with the proviso that their decision shall not be binding. But, strange to say, not one of these journals, nor yet even a single member of the General Assembly, appears to have been aware that the point in dispute was referred to the Law Officers of the Crown by the Legislative Council, through the Acting-Governor, in 1854. In reply, the Secretary of State said that though the Constitution

Act contained no provision far the constitutional practice of England with regard to money bills being carried out in New Zealand, it appeared to him that the analogy of the English Constitution ought to prevail, the reason being the same when the Upper House is not elected by the people, and that, consequently, the House of Representatives ougnt to exercise without dispute the same privilege with regard to money votes as the British House of Commons. The question is not one of law, but of light • and if the Privileges Act, 1805, confers this right on the “ Lords,” it is clearly not by a reference to the Law Officer of the Crown, but by the repeal of the clauses in that act which confer a privilege of this nature upon the nonelective branch of the Legislature that the mischief can be remedied. lhe. “ Examiner” doubts whether the bieanneral system is a law : of nature. Perhaps not, but it accompanies the Anglican race like the common law. Not only has the system of two Houses historically developed itself in England, but it has been adopted by the United States, by all. the separate States and territories which are comprised in the Union, and by all the British Colonies where local legislators exist, while the attempt to establish a single House in Pensylvania proved a failure. The excellence of the system, as it exists in America, does not rest in the representation of different interests, but upon the different inodes of composing the Houses and their different duration. Nominally the members of our Legislative Council are appointed by the Crown; but really they hold their seats by indirect election. They are elected by the Ministry } for the time being, that Ministry having itself been first elected, and at the time enjoying the confidence of a House directly chosen by the people. If, however the members of the Legislative Council held their seats by direct election, the analogy which now exists between the Imperial and Colonial Parliaments would no longer prevail ; and, consequently, the strong reason which can now be urged why the Upper House should not be allowed to interfere with money bills and questions of taxation, would no longer have any applicability and force. Besides, in the event of a dead-lock or conflict occurring belween the two Houses, they can now be brought into harmony by the simple process of increasing the number of members of the Legislative Council; but manifestly this could not be done if both Houses were elected. If, moreover, a high property qualification were imposed on electors and elected, as under the Victorian Constitution, what reason is there to anticipate that the personalle of the Council would be altered for the better, and that it would be rendered more truly liberal and enlightened, more democratic or popular, or less selfish and obstructive than it is at present ? Only the other day the Upper House in Victoria, though an elective chamber, came into collision with the Legislative Assembly, when the Premier directly accused the members of the former of prostituting their public position in order to advance their personal interests. He announced that the time had arrived when once and for ail the question should he determined' as to which of the two Chambers called coordinate should determine upon questions of public policy. But as the “ Argus” points out, he did not say how this was to be done. Certain amendments had been made in the Fencing and Impounding Bills, in the interests of large sheep-farmers and pastoral tenants of the Crown ; just the same as our Legislative Council would have acted if our House of Hepresentatives had afforded them the opportunity; which is not likely to happen, seeing that on such important subjects the majority of the two Chambers are “ tarred with the same brush ” If, however, the same results are obtained whether the Chamber is nominated or elected, it would matter but little which mode was adopted, if the elective system did not, in effect, render the Upper House more powerful, aud better able to thwart the wishes of the t Lower House than it would be composed exclusively of nominees of the Crown. The great objections urged against the constitution of the Legislative Council are, that it is

useless and powerless, as well as obstructive and costly. There may be reasons for dispensing with it altogether, but none for making it more powerful, costly, and obstructive; and this it would become if elected by a restricted suffrage, however wide might be the constituency. While we admit with the Independent that the Legislative Council has thwarted nil attempts at legislation in the direction of progress, we cannot ignore the tact that other journals complain that it is utterly powerless as a check upon the legislation of the House of Representatives, and that on all great questions it dare not do more than passively record the decrees of the latter. Tfcence they advocate the elective principle, not to make the Upper House more popular, but to render it more powerful ; not to render it less a check on blind* legislation, but to enable it better to dominate over the House of Representatives.