UPPER CHAMBERS.

New Zealand Mail, Issue 44, 25 November 1871, Page 12

UPPER CHAMBERS.

Before the Legislative Council had adopted a line of action with reference to some of the most important bills which were brought before them during the past session, outside of their proper province, and beyond their constitutional functions, the question of a reform in the mode of conferring seats on the members of that Chamber had been more than once mooted in the House of Representatives. Indeed the early possibility of such a reform being effected was openly, coolly, and complacently referred to on more than one occasion by several of the members of the nominee branch of the Legislature themselves. It also cannot have escaped observation that, at about the same time, and for somewhat similar reasons, a cry for a reform in the House of Lords was being raised in England, which it is said will not be allayed until the demand has been complied with. This cry there has been frequently heard before, but it has recently acquired more volume and force, owing in part to the natural growth of the democratic element, and in part to the hostile action which had been taken by the Press relative to the abolition of the purchase system in the army, and the adoption of the principle of the ballot in the election of members of Parliament. For a number of years the presence of the Bishops in the House of Lords has been an eye-sore to the great body of English nonconformists ; while their expulsion has been occasionally advocated by the more advanced members of the liberal party. A reform has also been sought to be effected by the creation of life peerages. This would be accompanied by many obvious advantages, and has only been objected to on the ground that it would constitute a serious innovation on the existing system. It is seen that, though it would give strength to the House of Lords, it would have a necessary tendency to weaken this political power now enjoyed by the hereditary aristocracy. But a far more sweeping reform than either of those just mentioned is now demanded. The news received by the last mail is to the effect that several very large and enthusiastic meetings had teen held, at which not merely the reform, but the abolition, of the House of Peers was openly and warmly advocated. The one held at Birmingham on the subject received the countenance and support of a late distinguished Minister of the Crown, and other leading members of the House of Commons. Mr Bright, though still too unwell to attend the meeting himself, and to support by his vehement and masculine eloquence the object of its promoters, telegraphed from the north of Scotland to say that he approved of. the move ment, and cordially wished it success. Under these circumstances, and in the face of the action recently taken by our own Upper House, it has occurred to us that as the question of a reform of the latter has not yet become a party one, it might now be discussed on its merits without the possibility of exciting those deep-rooted prejudices, and angry feelings, which its agitation in England has occasioned. Moreover, as it is still fresh in the public mind, and is sure to crop up again in the House next session, the present appears a most opportune time for its calm and candid consideration. Before entering into the question whether a reform in the constitution of the Legislative Council is, or is not desirable, we will glance for a moment at the causes which have led to the agitation in England relative to a kindred matter, as it may tend to throw some light on the path along which we intend to conduct the reader. It may be remarked at starting, that it is very doubtful if the reform demand in England will be so likely to be accomplished by the direct and revolutionary mode so warmly and rudely advocated by the leaders of the movement there, as it would be by the slow and silent operation of the measures which the House of Lords had declined to sanction. One of these measures has since been carried into effect, in spite of the opposition of the Lords, by the simple exercise of the roval prerogative, and the other will be sure to be carried into effect next session in order to prevent worse consequences. The abolition of the purchase system in the arm/, leading as it will to the general adoption of the principle of appointment by merit, and the adoption of vote by ballot in the

election of members of Parliament, will, together, go far to destroy that prestige, and shake the foundations of that influence which the hereditary aristocracy ot England has so long enjoyed after it had faded away in aristocratic circles on the Continent. If this will be the case, if the two measures the Press rejected, , would be at all likely to have this effect, they judged rightly in coming to the conclusion that they had less to fear from the cry that they foresaw would be raised against them, than they had from the operation of the measures they had been so urgently requested to sanction. The abolition of the purchase system itself will prove a mine driven under the edifice of an aristocracy based on privilege, patronage, and primogeniture. In effect, the last is the parent of the two former. It gives to the eldest sons the possession of the soil, while that possession enables them to confer upon their younger brotheis lucrative appointments under the Crown. For this reason the latter heretofore have been found as warm partisans of the principle of primogeniture as the former. But when the system of com petitive examinations for offices and appointments becomes general, then the compensation which the eldest sons have now to offer to their younger brothers will be withheld. This lias heretofore constituted one of the main supports of the principle of primogeniture. The younger sons of great families then, by ceasing to be provided for at the expense of the public, will unite with the rest of the nation in demanding the abolition of laws and customs which deprive them of their natuial inheritance, without, as formerly, conferring upon them in return any compensatory advantages. As regaids the ballot, that has been all along opposed by the aristocracy, chiefly and expressly on the ground that it would diminish their influence over votes for membeis of the House of Commons. So far from damaging tho existence of any such influence, they have always gloried in it. They honestly and conscientiously be lieve that, in nine cases out of ten, the elector will act wisely in permitting himself to he influenced by the acLicc of his landlord ; as the influence of property in such circumstances is the influence of reason, intelligence, and experience, guiding the less enlightened to their common and inseparable advantage. They maintain, fuithei, that if property had not this sort of influence, it could have none at all, and con sequently no security. Thinking thus, it is not surprising that tho .House of Peers have so strong an objection to the ballot. And, it must be admitted, that so far as secret voting will be fatal to aristocratic influence at elections, so far must it tend to undermine the power now possessed by the English aristocracy. They would probably less object to a reform of the House-of Peers itself than to a measure which would do indirectly, but surely diminish the influence they now have over elections foi members of the House of Commons. Possibly the effects of the abolition of the purchase system, and of the adoption of the ballot, have been over-rated; but this we think is certain, that it is by silent and unseen agencies, lathei than by noisy and violent methods, that the most desirable reforms have been effected. This at least has been emphatically the case with regard to those changes and improvements which the British Constitution has undergone. It is impossible to predict in what direction a reform in the House of Lords will take; but we doubt if it will be in the direction which those would desire who are now advocating a reform in the mode of filling seats in our Legislative Council. They wish to deprive the Government of the power of nominating members, and to confer it, in effect, upon a few wealthy and privileged citizens, by the imposition of a high property qualification, both in electois and the elected ; hut we doubt whether anv such proposals would receive in England such a measure of support as would be necessary to render it successful. No. Odious as the Bouse of Lords may become, easy as it may be to excite against them the popular feelin", we are persuaded that a House elected exclusively by the monied classes would be considered by the people of England as still more odious and intollerable. Notwithstanding recent events the two most deservedly popular men in

England are members of the English ' aristocracy—the Earl of Shaftesbury! and the ‘Duke of Argyll—who hold opinions on political, social, and scien- j tific subjects far in advance of those held by any members of our Legislative Council, while they are far less exclusive in their intercourse with their fellow men. This is the case with scores of other Peers, besides those we have mentioned, who are alike ornaments of then order and of their country. In truth, though the two Chambers in the two countries occupy somewhat an.alagous positions, the character and position of the members of the two, as well as of the two countries, are so widely different, that no comparison between them can be fairly instituted. Those who, whether seriously or derisively, in jest or in earnest, designate the members of the Upper House “ the Lords/’ are not sufficiently alive to the magnitude of this difference. The analogous position and character of the two Houses has prevented it from being at once recognized. In a subsequent article we shall endeavor to show that it is not by the adoption of the elective principle that the objection to the action taken by either can be remedied.