CONFEDERATION OF THE EMPIRE.

New Zealand Mail, Issue 26, 22 July 1871, Page 3

CONFEDERATION OF THE EMPIRE.

The following letter, we have authority for stating, was written by the Hon. the Colonial Treasurer and has attracted much attention at home :—-

Sir, —A few earnest men appear to be determined ere long to raise the question of joining, in a Federal union, Great Britain and her colonies. I have been told that some able papers on the subject have been published in reviews and magazines; but I have not had the opportunity of reading them. I have seen, also, that Mr Macfie, the member for Leith, has ventilated the question once more, and with the usual result, in the House of Commons. At the present time, therefore, a colonist's views on the subject may not be uninteresting.

Those who have studied the relations between Great Britain and the colonies of late years must have concluded that they are approaching a condition in which a definite solution of a very uncertain position will be a necessity. It can answer no purpose to address one's self to the school which made, or thought it had made, the discovery that the colonies were rather a source of weakness than of strength to the mother country ; nor would it be fruitful of good now to inquire how far the gift of constitutional government to the colonies arose out of difficulties which the Colonial Office naturally felt in dealing with local matters at a distance of so many thousand miles, nor how far it had its origin in a dim perception that the time might possibly arrive when it would be thought desirable to sever the colonies from the parent country. Interesting as such inqiries would no doubt be, in order to a discussion of the whole subject, I am not now able to dwell upon them ; nor can I stop to inquire whether the consolidation of the British North American provinces was not brought about, in large measure, by those who aimed at constituting those provinces an independent kingdom. It was not until last year that the subject of the future of the colonies was fully brought before the nation. Then the question was naturally asked throughout the country, does the removal of the troops from the colonies mean merely an effort in the direction of economy, or is it a step intended to be in the direction of the disintegration of the empire ? I am tempted, since I have referred to this question, to say that the colonists do not understand the alleged reasons for withdrawing the troops. There is present to the minds of the colonists a feeling or conviction that in times gone by it would have been thought essential to a mere sentiment of Imperial possesion that the British Hag should wave over some barrack or place of lodgment of some Imperial troops in each colon}', and that her Majesty's representatives, the governors, should not be left without one British soldier to do homage to their position. Nor can the colonics realise the idea of a great nation not having a few troops to spare for its great dependencies, governed by its own nominees. The colonists do not understand that the fact of troops being in the colonies can involve so direct a pecuniary appeal to the taxpayers of Great Britain as it is said to involve; because it appears from the colonial point of view, that a nation like Great Britain, having possessions all over the world, can scarcely deem it prudent to trust so much to the good nature or forbearance of foreign powers, as to dispense with all that can possibly be called spare soldiers in times of peace. Supposing that during such times there were no more soldiers belonging to the empire than Great Britain required for her own protection or dignity, the colonies might surely be regarded as useful depots for purposes of training and discipline. However, this is foreign to the question of confederation. Indeed, it is to be observed that one of the conditions of federation would virtually be to release the British taxpayer from payments on account of colonial purposes. To return to the main subject. When, as I have said, the question was fairly mooted last year, whether the government really did propose a policy leading up to the dismemberment of the empire, an authoritative announcement was made that their actions were misunderstood. I do not wish to raise the issue whether this meant a change of policy or was but an explanation of a policy which

had been misapprehended. There was, in fact, an official announcement that the mother country would, in the event of war, protect her colonies to the extent of her last shilling, her last ship, her last man. At first hearing this seemed a large and comprehensive declaration, But the colonists have a knack of looking below the surface; and when they did so in this case, it became a very general question with them,' Is there really any meaning in such a declaration? It seemed to the colonists that as long as the British flag was flown in the colonies, it was really not left to the choice of the mother country whether or not she should defend those colonies. Obviously, wherever her flag was attacked she would be bound to defend it. On the declaration of war Great Britain could not haul down her flag in any one of her colonies, and so say to the power with whom she was at war, " We call that place one of our possessions, but we do not mean to defend it, and so with that portion of British territory you may do what you like, or what you can." Much more to the purpose than the ' last shilling' declaration —much more intimately connected with the real question as to the future of the colonies —was what I may be allowed to call the sinister-announce-ment that Great Britain would never again fight in order to retain a colony against its will. To many colonists such an announcement of policy—supposing that after proper discussion it should be ratified by the general feeling of the country —meant the breaking up of the empire at a time more or less remote.

I shall address myself more particularly to this position, because upon it appears to me to hinge the necessity for confederation. The understanding, not ratified, but not combated, is, that the colonies may cease to be portions of the empire whenever it suits them. Is that a position which a great nation should accept? Great Britian without Canada, Australasia, and South Africa, for example, to say nothing of other colonies would, in the scale of nations, be a vastly different country from, what she might be with them. And to strengthen the argument it must be remembered that were the colonies absolute and inseparable provinces of the empire their progress would receive an enormous impetus —the enterprise of Great Britain would naturally flow towards them as it would towards some new island contiguous to Great Britain, were it possible that such could arise from the sea. It should also be borne in mind that should secession of colonies once become fashionable it might extend even to India and the West Indian Islands.

The clay cannot be distant when Great Britain must decide what she is to be. She cannot long continue in the position of being able to assert herself one of the .greatest nations of the world, or of laying herself open to being considered one of the smallest. For many reasons the question raised must be determined. It would be idle to pretend not to see in the measures before parliament a plan of general armaments. The policy now being shaped by parliament means that England is commencing to do what other nations in Europe did some time since—namely, to place herself in a condition to fight effectively, if either she should be forced or should please to do so. But when a great nation is seriously considering the putting of her armaments into what can be deemed, in the light of events, a proper condition, does it not seem preposterous that she should omit from her scheme a vast proportion of her territory which is specially open to attack? Although, as we have seen, Great Britain would, because of her flag, be bound to attempt to defend her colonies if that flag should be attacked, yet, as matters stand at present, the force which the colonies could supply would be quite independent of her control. Again, it is, to say the least, a singularly irrational arrangement, that Great Britain should be liable to incur immense expense for the defence of colouies, any one of which, on the day after war had ceased, might elect to leave the empire. I fail to understand how it can be consistent with the dignity of a great empire that outlying dependencies of that empire should be expressly placed in the position of being able to deprive the mother country of extensive territory. That Great Bri-

tain and her colonies now really constitute one empire is far from what we are entitled to assume ; but assuming it, for argument's sake, then the colonies constitute some portion of the wealth and power of the nation as a whole ; and is it to be tolerated that small communities of colonists, some of them occupying large and important territories, should have it in their power, whether as a matter of caprice or of policy, to cut up the empire at their pleasure? Yet that is what is really involved in the declaration that England will never again fight to compel colonies to remain connected with her.

The colonies themselves occupy at present a position which is so anomalous that it cannot long continue. Their populations, gifted with a large amount of local power—themselves having resources which bid fair to give to them the importance of great nations —they are really neither parts of Great Britain, nor are they independent nations. Indeed, as far as other nations are concerned, the British colonies are to a great extent outside any recognised pale of nations, or parts of nations. They are often reminded that they have powers of self-government ; they are at times encouraged to the utmost to exercise those powers. Yet they are shut out from those high concerns which affect their outside relations with the world. When the mother country bestowed upon them the gift of self-govern-ment, it was surely a natural deduction that she meant in time to give them also some voice in the affairs of the empire, that she meant to train them to the exercise of such voice. Obviously, it must have been impossible to overlook the consideration that in giviag the colonies quasi-independence that was being given which must lead them, sooner or later, to feel that they were entitled to a share in the decision of those questions which affect them externally. Their position would be one of humiliation if they were to be free merely to govern themselves internally, but to be subject to the vicissitudes consequent upon a policy of the empire from all voice in which they were to be excluded would be intolerable. In short, the colonies have been educated up to a natural assertion of their right, either to take a part in the affairs of the empire, or to be told that the empire desires that all connection with them shall cease. There is, again, a singular anomaly in the fact that whilst Great Britain is in direct relation with each one of her colonies ; yet, beeause of the want of a confederation, the colonies have no sort of direct relation to each other.

Other reasons might be given in proof that this great question of disintegration, or consolidation, demands a settlement. At present it might be dealt with calmly and comprehensively ; hereafter, in face of a pressing emergency, it might have to be dealt with hastily, and without reference to the large interests involved. To those who are apt to reduce everything, every national greatness, to a mere money question, I am quite free to admit that disintegration means more wealth, less risk, less responsibility, less, in fact, of all those cares which accompany greatness ; but I say that it means also that Great Britain is to be a shrunken second-rate power, the day of whose influence in the affairs of the nations will soon pass away. The choice lies between an empire, mighty for all time, and a little stale, powerful after a fashion because of its wealth,and because of its extreme desire to avoid all war, and to make all things agreeable to all nations. If disintegration is to be the choice of the people of Great Britain, then matters colonial may be left to their own course ; the break up of the empire will sooner or later be a fact, and once commenced, it will proceed very rapidly. But if, as I believe, disintegration, or the policy that leads to it, will be the choice of none but that small section of the people which subordinates all national questions to pecuniary considerations, then let us see what remains to be done.

There must be an end to the principle or the policy that it shall be in the power of any colony at any time to secede from the empire. America must be no more quoted as an instance of how a colony became free, in spite of the empire, though it may well be quoted as an example of the folly with which Great Britain misgoverned a colony which, if ordinary prudence had been

shown, would have been as reluctant to separate herself from-the mother country as would be any one of the great colonies of the present day. If an example from America is wanted, let the country take that grand one she sets to the world, when she refused at all hazards, and regardless of all cost, to allow the union to be broken up. If a further lesson be required, let it be considered how mighty a position Great Br tain would occupy if America were still one of her dependencies. Even Spain can afford us a great example, for in the midst of all her difficulties she has never consented to part with Cuba. I have no doubt that to many of those persons who dread that Great Britain should interfere with anything with which she is not absolutely forced to interfere, it may seem terrible that she should undertake the responsibility of conserving her own territory. But how can we expect that national hardihood and vigor will survive a constant policy of nervous dread of the consequences of pursuing the plain, straightfordward ways which nations much less powerful deem to be inseparable from the preservation of their national character.

1 am very sorry that the colonies have to such an extent been led to consider themselves at liberty to leave the empire whenever they choose. Yet so distinctly has it been held out to them that their future was that of independent nations, that if Great Britain promulgated a constitution, the cardinal point of which was a federal union between the colonies and the mother country, the question might be raised whether she had not been guilty of bad faith. That a small section of the colonists do look forward to such a future, I believe ; and that some of those who would dread anything of the kind, and who would pronounce in favor of confederation if they were consulted would yet bitterly complain about bad faith, if any measure of confederation were forced upon them, I can understand ; but the difficulty, after all, is one that could easily be met. I am confident there is not a single British colony in which the great majority of the people are otherwise than favorable to a continuance of union with Great Britain; and all ground for pretence of bad faith would be cut away by an act of parliament promulgating a federal constitution, but leaving to each colony the option of accepting it within a stated time, or of seceding from the empire. I have no doubt that if such choice were offered, of becoming members of a federal empire, or of ceasing to be a dependency of Great Britain, the colonies, without an exception, would chose the former, greatly preferring to remain integral parts 01 the British empire. Let us look at the option from a colonial point of view. It would be recognised that any colony which chose to secede must for a long period be but a very small and powerless country. It would not only be exposed to the inconvenience of constant disputes with its neighbors, but there would certainly be also risk of its being drawn into actual war. In very rare instances only would there be amongst the people of seceded dependency such an agreement as to the form of government to be adopted as would prevent irritating discussions respecting that form, or as would even guarantee against civil war. For the money which it would require to borrow in foreign markets an exBritish colony would have to pay some such rate of interest as South American republics have now to pay. The value of the security which as a colony it could offer must be immensely depreciated by secession. A very important, if not a very numerous section of its populatian would certainly object to what they would regard as playing at independence, no less than they would object to a direct transferance of allegiance from Great Britain; and such objectors would realise their property and go elsewhere. The case would be very different from that of America where, in the very act of secession, a new patriotism was built up. On the other hand, were the colonies federated, and parts of the greatest nation in territorial possession, and, unquestionably, the mistress of the seas, the colonist would feel that there was a larger destiny for his adopted home and for himself. The colonies once recognised as integral parts of the British empire, they could borrow money much cheaper than they are

able to do while they occupy their present uncertain position—there would be an end to the doubt which now recurs whenever a colony goes into the money market—" How long will it remain part of the empire?'' Such a confederation of the empire would undoubtedly throw upon the colonies some expense for federal purposes ; but I believe that such expense would be as nothing compared with the increased value of colonial property which would follow directly from a declaration that the colonies were, and would remain, integral parts of the empire. Besides, colonists would not object to making reasonable contribution towards the cost of purposes really national, if they had a voice, however small, but relatively fair, in deciding as to the manner in which the money should be expended. I must repeat my conviction that, if Great Britain were bold enough to grapple resolutely with the question, and would promulgate a federal constitution, leaving to each colony to decide whether it would come within that constitution or would cease to be in any sense part of the empire, every colony would elect to remain, and the mightiest empire of history would be an accomplished fact. It may be said that the details of such a constitution would be very difficult to work out; but I cannot believe that it would be as difficult for Great Britain to frame a federal constitution, to be applicable to her own dependencies only, as it was for Prussia to frame a federal constitution to apply to a number of independent nations. The leading points to be kept in view would be—(l.) So to regulate the federal power that it should not interfere in the internal affairs of the members of the confederation while securing to the parent country all the executive power she ought to exercise. (2) To provide that what are now called " colonial questions" should be left to the federation. (3.) The establishment of a federal fleet. ('4.) That each member of the federation should be liable, in case of war, to provide a stated land force, which force it would probably be found convenient, in most cases, to retain within, or near, the territory to which it belonged. (5). The federal expenses to be contributed by the members of the federation, upon some stated basis, such as population; or there might be one fixed federal tax running throughout the empire. (6). There should be two Chambers, one directly elected by the people, the other by the local legislators. The former might be elected upon a population basis, and any colony not having the stated number, might be allowed to return a member who, until the population sufficiently increased, should be empowered to vote upon particular questions only. Following the German plan, it mightbe found desirable to give to some members of the house a plurality of votes. The executive power ought tojbe jealously vested in the Queen and her Ministers; and, still further following the example of Prussia, the Minister for Foreign Affairs might be made Chancellor-of the Federation.

I almost regret that I have entered at all upon details. I do not profess to have made anything but suggestions intended to break ground—to get rid of that extreme dread of details which makes the working out of a great plan seem vastly more difficult than it really is. My suggestions are, no doubt, crude; but I shall hope they will prove sufficient to prevent that " damning with faint praise " which is so often meant to smother unpopular questions with the scarcely-hidden sneer, " Idea very good; but decidedly impracticable." I plead for some consideration for this question. It is painful to think that the traditions which have made the British nation powerful, not only because of her internal resources, but because of the energy and enterprise which have secured her the position of supremacy on the seas, should be in process of gradual extinction under the withering influence of a utilitarian policy, which which meets with &cui bono? everything that does not promise a pounds, shillings, and pence profit. An AngloSaxon confederation is the legitimate crown of the energy and the enterprise which have made Great Britain the centre of dependencies, amongst which are to be found the finest countries on the face of the earth ; but that policy which leads to the dismemberment of the empire is at once an ingratitude to those who have built up the

past of the nation—a treason to the living generation, a vast majority of whom are wholly unconscious of the direction affairs are taking—and a bitter wrong to the generous unborn, whose inheritance it is dispersing. We look abroad to see that national confederations are the grand features of the age. It is said that the tendency in this country should be entirely in the opposite direction; and it is singular that the inclination to secession should be coincident with a period when the means of communication have been so greatly improved that the most distant colonies are virtually nearer to England than were some parts of Ireland less than a century ago. Will you, in conclusion, allow me to place upon record the conviction, which I am sure hundreds of thousands of colonists will share with me, that if ever and whenever secession becomes a fact, the conditions which make it so will owe their origin to the actions and the faults, not of the colonists, but of the mother country. —I have, &c, . London, May 9. J.V.