WAR "TO THE LAST MAN AND THE LAST ROUBLE."

New Zealander, Volume 10, Issue 885, 7 October 1854, Page 2 (Supplement)

WAR "TO THE LAST MAN AND THE LAST ROUBLE."

[From the Morning Chronicle, July 3,] The decision of the Emperor Nicholas is at length known. In perfect consistency with that self-willed and untouchable obstinacy which has, from the first, scouted the monitions alike of prudence and of justice, and defied both the opinions and the force of the civilized world, the Jaggressor peremptorily rejects in all essentials, the last appeal of those Powers who have anxiously sought to reconcile their duties to Europe with their traditionary friendship for the disturber of its peace. The summons of Austria and Prussia for the evacuation of the Sultan's territory is answered by an unequivocal negative—ltussia will resist " to the last man and to the last rouble." We are well content that it should be so. We have never led the public to expect that the unbridled ambition which has plunged Europe into war, would submit to any restraints but those of armed force ; and it is well that, with characteristic infatuation, the aggressor lias not even sought, by diplomatic chicane, to pervert the judgment, perplex the councils, or delay the action of the Powers whose hostility he defies. It is ft singular and suggestive coincidence that the challenge which the Czar has thus finally thrown down to Austria and Prussia, exactly completes the year which commenced with his invasion of the Sultan's dominions. The despatch of our Berlin correspondent, communicating this important intelligence, is dated on the anniverversary of the crossing of the Pruth ; and in entering on a second year of the history of European resistance to Russian aggression, we are naturally led to review the events which liave gradually defined the position, and fixed the purposes of the parties to this now momentous struggle. The changes which the past twelve months have witnessed in European opinions and policy are truly rcmarkcble and instructive ; and the most experienced statesmen have been taught some useful lessons, which had, however, long been familiar to those who, standing apart from immediate contact with affairs, were less exposed to disturbing influences. Not even the Menschikoff mission effectually destroyed that personal confidence in the Emperor Nicholas which, from a fashion, had grown into a belief entertained by almost every Cabinet in Europe. Students of history, who dwelt on the uniformly aggressive character of Russian policy, were generally slighted as pedants by the shallow oracles of society. The socalled party of Order on the Continent, together witn their adherents in this country, still looked with confidence to St. Petersburg ; and the deliberate falsehood of the representations which had been made by the Imperial Court as to the military preparations of the previous winter was only known to the ministers. The invasion of the Principalities, while it excited just and general public indignation, was regarded in certain higher circles with that supercilious tolerance which too often excuses the misdeeds of the great and powerful.

The Ministers of the Sultan never doubted for a moment as to the true character of the outrage which had been [committed. It was with difficulty that Lord de Redcliffe, acting on his own responsibility, persuaded the Porte", by temporarily waiving j,its right of to secure an interval which might be employed simultaneously in active preparations for war and in negotiations for peace. Both armies were, at that time, comparatively weak, for the invader had expected no resistance, and the Ottoman armaments had scarcely commenced. The prudence of the counsels given by the English, ambassador is scarcely open to dispute. Few persons imagine that Omar Pacha could have forced the aggressor to re-cross the Pruth; and even had he achieved a temporary success, he would not have been able to hold the plains of Wallachia against the reinforcements which would speedily have arrived from the interior of Russia. The prescience displayed by the framers of the treaty of Adrianonle, in depriving the Turks of the fortresses on the left bank of the Danube, was fully vindicated by the unopposed advance of the invaders; but the three following months were turned to admirable account by the Turkish Government, in levying au army which, with all its defects, has

hitherto succeeded in maintaining the indepependenca of the Sultan. The political reasons for delay were even more stringent. It was necessary, before the commencement of the war, to exhaust all experiments of negotiation, to rouse the national feeling of England, and to convince all the Great Powers that resistance to Russia was an unavoidable duty. The religious pretexts adroitly put forward by the agressor had not altogether failed of their eSectin this country, although it is a remarkable fact that no Continental Government ever thought fiction so flimsy and transpareent worthy of the slightest notice. The progress of events has, however, gradually reduced to silence the cant winch for a time prevailed among the dishonest and feeble. It is now universally admitted that there is no especial reason for encouraging a crusade against Mahometanism at a moment when the professors of that mistaken creed are defending themselves against an unprovoked invasion; but the English nation, which unanimously engaged in the war in the spring of 1854, would have been divided and doubtful had hostilities commenced in the summer of 1853. Tile passage of the Pruth—while it cemented still more closely that intimate union of council and action which had happily marked the policy of France and England from the date of the Menchikoff mission, and which history will signalise as one of the most remarkable and important characteristics of the past eventful twelve months —effected an immediate change in the policy of Austria. Count Buol at once proposed a conference of the Four Great Powers, for the purpose, of terminating the dispute without any infringement of the territorial integrity of Turkey. The transfer of the negotiations from Constantinople to Vienna was, occasioned by the prudent desire of the Western Governments to conciliate a new ally, who was every day entering more heartily into the common cause. The result of the change was, perhaps, at first unfavourable. The project of the Vienna Note indicated a desire to secure peace, even on objectionable terms ; but the best excuse for that document is to be found in the opportunity which it afforded of detaching from ltussia her most trusted and formidable ally. The fortuuatc rejection, hy the aggressor, of the Turkish modifications of that proposal led to a new phase of the struggle. The Porte, with equal prudence and vigour, determined, notwithstanding remonstrances on the part of the Great 1 owers, to bring"matters to a crisis by the declaration of war. It was, indeed, idly remarked that the step had been taken in opposition to the advice of the Sultan's best friends ; but the events which followed clearly proved the wisdom of a bold and manly course. At the beginning of November, Omar Pacha crossed the Danube at Kalafat, and shortly afterwards he gave his troops various opportunities of engaging in combats of secondary importance, which almost invariably terminated to the'T advantage. The old and embarrassing treaties between Russia and the Porte were disposed of the first shot which was fired; and by the middle of the winter, popular opinion all over Europe had icarned to respect the military qualities of the 'Turks, and to anticipate the possibility of their successful resistance to the invader.

When the negotiations recommenced, at the end of the autumn, with the formal establishment of the Conference, the position of Russia was visibly changed for the worse. The Four Powers no longer required the Sultan to sign an act of submission, but they obtained his assent to a proposal which, in all material respects, amounted to a renewal of peace on the terms of the status quo ante helium. The acceptance of the new project would have involved a virtual acknowledgement of failure on the part of the aggressor, for a wanton attack upon a neighbour would have terminated with a retreat not purchased by any substantial concession. Few persons were surprised that the Czar preferred the alternative of persevering in an enterprise which, as he probably hoped, the Western Powers might hesitate to resist by force of arms.

The attack on Sinope, a d the consequent entrance of the allied fleets into the Black Sea, precipitated a crisis which would, in any case, have been unavoidable. As Piance and England visibly approximated to an actual state of war, Austria, and even Prussia, became stronger in their remonstrances, and more williDgto publish their concurrence in the principle of the demands which the Western Governments were preparing to enforce. The withdrawal of the Russian Ministers from Paris and Loudon was immediately followed by a summons from France and England for the immediate and unconditional evacuation of the Principalities. The movement of troops to the East had, however commenced sometime before the formal and final rupture took place. With the exception of the episode of the bombardment of Odessa, scarcely any armed collision of importance has yet taken place between the forces of the Western Powers and the enemy. The allied armies are, however, already present at the seat of war, where their influence has been sensibly felt in liberating a portion of Omar Pacha's forces from compulsory inaction at Schumla, andia precipitating the retreat of the invaders. Large reinforcements have sailed, or are about to sail, both from England and France ; and thejflags of the two countries remain in undisputed possession of the Black Sea and the Baltic. The fruit of thirty campaigns has been lost to Russia by the evacuation of the Circassian fortresses ; while the injuries sustained by the Turkish army in Asia during the past winter have not been attended with any substantial gain to the enemy. The retreat of the Russian forces towards the Sereth and the Pruth forms the last portion of the military history of the year. The gallant and successful defence of Silistria has justly inspired the Ottomans with fresh confidence, while it deprived the Czar of an opportunity —which, however, it is now very doubtful whether he would have used—of displaying a prudent magnanimity in the form of concessions to Austria. The result of the diplomatic and military transactions which have taken place is, thus far, unfavourable to Russia. The general belief in her irresistible power has been shaken, and even the satellites of success are beginning to incline to the cause of justice.

It is under such circumstances that the Czar opens the second year of war, by contemptuously repelling the friendly, though urgent, appeal to his prudence which Austria and Prussia had addressed to him while the issue cu the campaign on the Danube was still doubtful. With his best generals disabled, his armies discomfited and disheartened, and the prestige of invincibility which has hitherto so powerfully supported both his diplomacy audkis arms; irrecoygrably

lost, be invites and compels the hostility of powers who, bat a year ago, were united with him in the closest alliance and amity. In this insane defiance of the united force of Europe, this almost judicial blindness and fatuity, which the heathen moralist would have interpreted as a divine malediction. we cannot be wrong in reading the presage of that fat e which the law of nations awards, to its contumacious and high-handed violator- With France and Engl land identified in councils and in arms, the issue of the struggle was already beyond the reach of doubt ■, and with tie vast armaments of Austria added to the European League, we may reasonably hope that the aggressor will speedily receive the chastisement and humiliation which his crimes so loudly demand.