THE PROGRESS OF THE WAR IN INDIA. [From the "Times," July 19]

New Zealander, Volume 8, Issue 692, 1 December 1852, Page 3

THE PROGRESS OF THE WAR IN INDIA. [From the " Times," July 19]

The further operations of the British forces, now engaged in hostilities against the Burmese empire were confined, at the departure of the last Indian mail, to a successful attack upon Bassein and the exploration hy the Phlegethon of part qf the main channel of the Irrawadd)'-, 60 miles above the fortified positions we had taken. Wherever our troops appeared they had dispersed the enemy, and wherever our steamers had been able to direct their irresistible fire upon the stockades of the Burmese the result had been the destruction of those boasted defences with vary small loss of life to the British army. The Bassein branch forms the extreme western branch of the delta of the Ircvnvaddy. A similar attack was directed against it in the war of 1825 under Major, since Sir llobert, Sole; and it was known

that ships could not ascend by thi* cliannel into the mainstream ; but then, as on the present occasion, 'the town was captured and destroyed The present Governor of Bassien, Malm Thomiendan Rajah, had taken a more prominent part than became his position in the discussion with the British officer on the Burmese coast at the commencement of the war. Commodore Lambert, in her Majesty's ship Fox, had proceeded to the Diamond Island, in Basboin River, and established a blockade there in the month of February last. He was warned by the Governor not to anchor within the outposts of Negrais in the Ba&sein district, " which is guarded by upwards of thirty military posts," and some of these stockades fired on his ship. No notice could be taken at the time of the Governor's representations because Lord Dolhousio had addressed himself directly to the King of Ava, and no fvrthcr communication could then be held with inferior officers. But it was necessary to show that this silence was not due to any inability to force the position and destroy the stockades, and, accordingly, an expedition was despatched, which has performed this coup de main with great promptitude and success At the season of the year at which this war was begun it was not to be expected that any decisive results could be obtained in the interior of the country before the commencement of the rainy months j and we confess that we never shared in the Ivope expressed by Lord Dalhousie in his minute of the 23rd of March, that "a power lul blow struck promptly now might reduce the Burmese to reason, obtain compliance with our demands, and avert war upon a more extended | scale at the end of the coming monsoon." This i is stated to have been the leading principle of the | Indian. Government in their instructions to [ General Godwin, and it dictated the rapidity of their operations, and the moderation of their i demands for redress at that period. The terms required after the capture of Rangoon were to be , the payment of 15 lacs of rupees, with three lacs | additional for every month that should elapse from the Ist of May to the satisfaction of our | demands. But in all our previous relations with j the Court of Ava it has been found extremely | difficult to establish any direct communication with the Sovereign, and even to convey to him a correct notion of the losses he had already sustained. The Burmese resemble the Chinese in their unscrupulous misrepresentation of facts ; and during the last war it was ascertained that every defeat was recorded as a victory ; and even the advance of the British army to Prome was described at Ava as the triumphant return of the Burmese forces, laden with the spoils of European captives. As long, therefore, as such operations are confined to the coast, it is extremely doubtful how far they arc known at all in the interior of the country; and General Godwin's position is not unlike that of Sir Henry Pottinger in the Chinese war, which could only be successfully terminated by the assent of the Yang-tsi-kiang. But, in the meantime, our steamers have already proved that the river Irrawaddy can be ascended to a considerable distance ; and it is not improbable that our increased facilities of conveyance will obviate the necessity of the harrassing march of an army along the jungle on the banks of the stream. Our position at Rangoon is incontestably superior to what it was at tho onset of the campaign of 1825. The facilities of intercourse with the Indian Precedencies are far greater ; the sick may be removed, if necessary, to more healthy quarters ; reinforcements can be sent out in 48 horn's ; and a guard of steamers can be maintained on the river, which will effectually disconcert the stealthy approaches of the Burmese under cover of the rainy season. In general, it appears that the sanitary condition of the troops at Rangoon, and on other points of the coast, was satisfactory, after the first outbreak of fever and cholera which had followed the labour of the attack on those places under excessive heat. -They had succeeded in cleansing their quarters from the filth and impurities of the natives. The framework of suitable wooden dwellings for an encampment was on the way to Rangoon ; and it may reasonably be hoped that at the close of the monsoon tho army will be found in a state of undiminished efficiency, if operations are then to be resumed, considerable reinforcements will no doubt be required, and the naval squadron in the waters of Rangoon will at that time be considerably augmented. The advance upon Prome and Ava would then be rapid and decisive, and it will become necessary for the Indian Government to determine on such j conditions of peace as may preclude the renewal of thsse onerous wars. But in the meantime we remain, and we probably shall remain for some time in ignorance of the intentions, and even of the real condition of the King of Ava. A rumour, which we can only trace to the Delhi Gazette, mentions the death of this Sovereign,, "but this intelligence is not confirmed. It is a favourite part of the tactics of the Bur* mese to profess at all times the utmost readiness to enter into negotiation, and oven to discuss the terms of peace, while they evade by every possible subtoifuge the conclusion of the agreement and the performance of its conditions. Even, therefore, if an answer should be returned to the demands of the Governor-General of India in a favourable and pacific tone, it is by no means certain that this overture would lead at once to the termination of the war; and, at any rate, the British forces must be prepared to the very last to insist upon every advantage they have gained. It is only by the most stern, prompt, and peremptory conduct that so haughty and so ignorant an adversary as the Court of Ava can be "brought to acknowledge a defeat. Not so, however, with the people. The Peguers on the coast appear to have placed themselves, again without reluctance under the British flag, as they did when Sir Archibald' Campbell offered to acknowledge a chief chosen by themselves from their own nation ; and there is every reason to suppose that the British forces will be provided with local supplies, and rather assisted than opposed by the most ancient inhabitants of the country.