ON NATIONAL DEFENCE IN ENGLAND. [From the Times.]

New Zealander, Volume 8, Issue 668, 8 September 1852, Page 4

ON NATIONAL DEFENCE IN ENGLAND. [From the Times.]

As Englishmen are noted for their businesslike habits, their general coolness of judgment, and their sound common sense we now submit to them in their national capacity a plain statement of facts and probabilities respecting a question of infinite importance. It has often been said that we were exposed to ruin from a French invasion. Panics have often been created, and as often subsided in the absence of any actual visitation, but we are not aware that the case has hitherto ever been stated in a clear, dispassionate manner. Such a statement, however, we now introduce to the reader — a statement drawn up with as much preciseness of calculation and as great an indifference to the interests involved as is shown in the purchased report of a professional accountant. The Baron P. E. Maurice is a native of Switzerland and a Captain of Engineers in the service of the Confederation. As a piece of military practice he has computed and tabulated the probabilities of the case before us with elaborate minuteness, as far as the rules of science are concerned, but with no more sympathies than a naturalist might feel in a fight between a polecat and a buzzard. We shall do our best to imitate his serenity, and present the reader with a plain exposition of this national affair. Some points, it is evident, will hardly come within the scope of an arithmetical estimate, but the chief of them admit 'of being stated with the same perspicuity and the same reliance upon vouchers as the report of an ordinary railway companj'. We shall first crive the Baron's calculations in his own form, and then remark upon them in detail. Captain Maurice alleges, and is at the pains to prove by summary that the French army musters 453,984 men of all arms, 96,901 horses, and 1236 guns ; that this number could be doubled under strong inducements, out of soldiers who have served their time, and that the existing stores in the arsenals could be readily augmented by an annual supply of 330,000 muskets, and 1000 cannon from specified manufactories and foundries. He further states that the French navy comprises in vessels actually afloat, 224 sailing ships, 100 steamers, and 4 sail and steam ships compounded. Referring us, in continuation, to the map of France, he observes that in the 550 miles of coast between Brest and Boulogne there are 26 ports, which he enumerates and describes, of various t izes and capacities ; and he remarks that the base operations constituted by the coast-line between these two points possesses, in respect of the security and facility of its communications, every strategetical advantage that could be desired, being fortified by three lines of citadels on the continental side, and by Paris itself at its apex. Assuming, then, an invasion of England to be decided upon, Captain Maurice estimates the requisite strength of the invading army at 151,800 men of all arms, including 110,000 infantry, 22,000 cavalry, 13,750 artillery, 3000 engineers, and 3050 for the waggon-train. Applying the proved rules of military science to the equipment of this force, he adds 57,806 horses, 7,376 carriages of all kinds, and 536 pieces of cannon, field and siege. Into the particular composition of the different brigades and equipages we need not entei", nor are we called upon to do more than state very simply, that quarters could be found for such an army between Brest and Boulogne. TJie succeeding question, as Captain Maurice acknowledges, is both difficult and novel, concerning as it does the ascertainable capacity for transport possessed by ships of war. He says, however, that he has " good authority" for computing that such vessels could carry for short distances, in addition to their own complements, something like the subjoined number of troops, according to their respective rates :—: — Men with arms Guns. and baggage. A ship of 120 800 <« 90 to 100 700 " 74 to 90 600 " 60 500 " 40 to 60 350 to 400 A corvette, Ist class 250 " 2nd class 50 to 60 War sfeameis, 450 lo 640-borse power.. 1200 to 2000 " 220 to 320 " 400 to 600 «< 160 to 180 <' 300 He further states that these steamers could, by taking a somewhat smaller number of troops, carry 100, 60, or 20 horses with their equipments respectively, that a merchant steamer could embark 76 horses with their riders, and a merchantman of from 500 to 800 tons, 60 horses and 10 carriages. A steam-frigate, he adds, can tow two ships of 90 or 100 guns at a slow rate, and a ship of 800 tons at a moderate speed. Finally, he observes, as a species of test for these calculations, that 6 steamers of the first class abovementioned, 2 of the second, and 1 of the third, with a couple of transports in tow, did, in 1849, embark at Toulon, carry to CivitaVecchia, and there disembark, with their whole materiel and baggage, 10,000 men within 10 days of the receipt of the order from Paris. Applying these results to the question before him, Captain Maurice shows that the strength of the French navy, as given from the returns, would suffice, if augmented by 291 mei-chant-steamers and 366 sailing-vessels of the same description, to transport across the Channel 151,800 men, 43,572 horses, 3,646 carriages, and 536 guns, leaving 22,830 horses and 4,023 carriages to be supplied "by requisition" from the resources of the country invaded. There exist, therefore, in France, both the forces for composing an army of invasion, and the means of carrying them over the water to the opposite shores. In what way, then, might an invasion be conducted with the best prospects of success? To this question, after admitting the " openness to disputation" of most of the points involved, Captain Maurice gives the following reply. He says that the powers of hteam would enable the French to take a much broider base of operations than could be attempted by Napoleon, mid that the whole coast between Brest and

* Isy Baron P. E. Maurice, Cnpit.nne dv Genie de PEt.it, Major de la Con fed (-ration Suissp, &p. Tnin>--lnted by Captain J.E. Adciison, Adjutant nnd Sccretiity to the Eovnl Military Asylum, Clielbea. London : Paikcr, FurmvnJ, ami Paiker. Ibo?.

Calais might be thus employed. He assumes, however, Brest and Cherbourg as the two points of departure, and since from these points the distances are to Plymouth 166 miles, to Bristol 270, to Eye 138, and to Portsmouth 84, he sets the longest time required tor passage at 30 or 34 hours. For poinis of debarc.ition he selects three _ places — Bristol, Plymouth, and Rye— at eacl^ of which he would land a division of the invading army, which, by this separation, would not oiily obtain horses and means of transport more easily .but would still further damage the weak pomt _ of the defence ,by compelling the English to divide their already inferior forces, To the " Army of Bristol" he assigns 32,161 men, 11,108 horses, 1,194 carriages and 100 guns, to be conveyed from Brest in 4 ships of the line, 10 frigates, 26 steamers, 66 merchant-steamers, and 78 transports. The "Army of Plymouth" would comprise 43,137 men, 18,012 horses, 2,814 carriages, and IG6 guns, to sail also from Brest, in 10 ships of tlrtSline, 19 frigates, 30 steamers, G6 merchant di^to, and 85 transports. From Cherbourg would depart the "Army of Rye," mustering 70,502 men, 28,686 horses, 3,368 carriages, and 270 guns, embarked upon 10 ships of the line, 9 frigates, 124 smaller vessels, 38 transports, 45 steamers., 159 merchant ditto, and 199 sailing vessels of the latter description. Supposing these squadrons to have crossed the Channel, with or without encounter, the Army of Bristol would establish itself at that point, and operate from the Avon to the Thames, thus cutting all comunications between the northern and south-western counties of England. The army of Plymouth would disembark in Whitesand-bay, collect engineering materials from Dartmoor Forest, and commence the siege of Plymouth from the land-side, the fall of which town would place Devonshire and Cornwall with all their secondary ports and resources at the command of the invaders. The Army of Eye would operate directly upon London, from which it would only be three marches distant, and the general movements of the three corps would be so concerted as to allow them to advance concentrically on the metropolis. After taking Plymouth, the second division might appear before Portsmouth on its march, and " we have little doubt," writes Captain Maurice, " that an army debouching by the Southamptonroad on the peninsular terminated by Gillioka-point, and extending itself from Elson to Alverstoke, would succeed in forcing Gosport, the defences of which are weak, and Portsmouth, with its docks and arsenals, thus taken in reverse, must necessarily be surrendered or burnt." Such is the plan of invasion drawn out by Captain Maurice, and we have been careful in specify ing its details, that our readers might verify his calculations according to their respective opportunities. But is England to be idle all this while? Far from it. Captain Maurice proceeds to estimate our means of defence, and not illiberally, as will soon be seen. He gives us 480 ships of war and 187 war steamers. He computes our cavalry upon an average strength at 12,311, our artilery 11,041, and our infantry at 126,794; and, after deducting 39,600 for troops on foieign se vices, he assumes a general disposable force of 110,546 for the defence of the Brttish isles, or of 73,698 for Great Britain only, one-third being deing detached for Ireland. He notices also our great facilities of railway and. telegraphic communication, and specifies all our small fortifications with great attention. On the alarm of invasion he considers that the Guards, to the amount of 6,568 men, horse and foot, would be retained in Windsor and. London, and that the garrisons of Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Chatham must needs take 8,000 troops more. Revising, therefore, his calculation by the latest estimates, and taking account of the pensioners and dock yard brigades, he allows us a disposable army of 64,432 trained soldiers. These, he presumes, must be divided into three corps to encounter the three invading forces, and he reckons accordingly that on the signal being given, three British armies of 21,477 men and 84 guns each, would be despatched to Bristol, Plymouth, and Rye as fast as steam could carry them. But how fast is that ? Here also Captain Maurice has entered into most elaborate reckonings. Each of our corps d'armee would weigh, he says, 12,000 tons, and the whole of them would require either 456 trains and 600 locomotives, or 129 trains with 344 locomotives, or some number between these figures, according as the amount to be conveyed at once was or was not sacrificed to speed. Allowing then time for the assembly of the troops and the distribution of the battalions, and computing the performance of the locomotives by the usual data, he says that the several armies of relief could only reach BristoL, Plymouth, and Eye in 9, 10, and 9 days respectively, but these days, we should observe, are reckoned at only 12 hours each. Hence he infers that, in any case, an advanced guard of the invading army could disembark on the coast before the army of defence could arrive, and either take up the rails or prepare at leisure a masked battery to play upon the trains as they arrived, destroy the engines, and make the whole , cargo prisoners. As to what might come of the actual shock of war, Captain Maurice contents himself with observing, that each of the English corps would be inferior in numbers to its opponent, and that we could " scarcely bring into the field the necessary force of artillery." " Scarcely," indeed ! Now, let us coolly examine these several conclusions. In the first place, have the resources or chances of an invader been overrated? Up to a certain point evidently not. Captain Maurice brings his invading army, without the smallest error, to the very water's edge. That France could march to the coasts of the Channel 151,800 fighting men, with all their munitions, in a few weeks or days is what nobody will dispute. Neither could there be the slightest difficulty about embarcation, if vessels were only in readiness. What can be performed by 10,000 men can be performed just as easily by 100,000; in fact, the whole thing was done once at Boulogne under Soultfs eye in less than thirty minutes. But could vessels be in leadiness for this enormous mass of passengers ? We very much doubt it. Captain Maurice, it is true, provides in his scheme the desired means of transport, but to do so he assumes that evevy single vessel in the entire French navy, steamer or sailer, and every s-ingle merchant steamer belonging to the country, over and above 366 trading ships, are pressed into this service. There is not to be in any port, or on any station, home or foreign, one solitary man -of- war left for any purposes whatever! On this point we think we need say no more. Now comes the ciitical question of all. Could these squadrons, or any such, succeed in crossing the Channel without material damage in despite of the English cruissrs ? The enquiry clearly admits of no absolute reply, but the chances seem to be less in our favour thnn we have been used to think. As to positive surprise, such an event is surely impossible with armaments of such magnitude as those we have been describing. Granted that 10 or 12 steam -frigates, eaoh carrying 2,000 men, might slip across unseen under favour of fogs or night ; how different in all respects is the case of three expeditions averaging 330 vessels each, one-third of" which is in tow, and all heavily laden ! Suppose, however, that one or more of them were actually encountered, could the main j body of transports be prevented from effecting a landing ? Captain Maurice thinks not. In giving us the benefit of every doubt, he assumes, surely with some touch of satire at our arrangements, that "the Eye squadron" might be met by 11 the home service squadron, which in 1845 consisted of 6 line-of-battle ships, 6 frigates, and several war-steamers," and against this he fairly sets off the ten line-of-battle ships, 9 frigates, and 7 large war-steamers of the invading force. But Avith a navy of 600 fahips of war, could not Aye make rather a better show in the Cbannel ? < On the whole question, he is of opinion, and in this he

is confirmed by the almost uniform testimony of of our own officers, that considering the great extent permitted by steam to the practicable base of operations, and the concert which might be made to pervade every portion of the plan, it would not I be possible oven for a very strong Channel fleet to prevent, with anything like certainty, either by blockades or cruising, ihe passage of hostile armaments. A " South Saxon," therefore, is precipitate in concluding that the union of our detached squadrons on our own coast would " convince even the most timid of their security." But if Captain Maurice has favoured our opponents in estimating their chances at sea, he has, at least been equally liberal to ourselves upon land. He gives us, after deducting guards aand' garrisons, three armies, for Great Britain _ only, of 21,477 men each, trained soldiers, on which computation we will only remark that the last estimates laid before Parliament showed a grand total of 31,161 cavalry and infantry stationed throughout Great Britain, guards, garaisons, dep6ts, and recruiting companies all included. Neither can we well see how a " pensioner," if fairly such, can be reckoned an "effective soldier too. A& to the "84 guns" which each of our divisions is to carry into the field, we can only say tliafcthe present artillery resources of the whole united kingdom together could not furnish the guns for a single one of the corps, nor do we conceive that more than 20 could be immediately despatched from all the available strength at Woolwich. Nay, it is a point, we believe, on which military men profess no doubt, that as far as any effectual op* position on our side is concerned, a body of 10,000 or 20,000 men could be thrown on our coast?, could establish themselves, throw up intrenchments, and keep us at a respectful distance with their guvs until a second or third reinforcement had been ferried across the Channel. To turn now to what we may call the moral side of the question. Is a French invasion probable in the present state of public opinion, or is it more probable than ordinary under the present conditions of politics? To the first of these inquiries we may conclusively reply, that an invasion of these islands from the opposite coast is exactly as probable as a declaration of war — neither more nor less so. Mr. Cobden, we recollect, used to speak of such a "bueaniering expedition" as a thing too savage to be apprehended \ but, if England and France are even at war it is almost a moral certainty that the former country would be invaded by tKe latter._ Not to mention the purely military considerations, it is obvious that, even in the very names of peace and humanity, such measures would be preferred as would terminate the war at the earliest moment by forcing the enemy to terms. To suppose that France, being at war with us, would punctiliously avoid striking a blow at the heart and confine herself to fields where all the risks would be her own, is simply absurd. If war were once declared, nothing whatever but the requisite preparations would keep a French army from attempting an immediate descent. But is war more probable just now than usual ? The ruler of the French people (we can venture on no more distinctive appellation for him) has shown himself both unscrupulous and daring ; he is under obligations to the army ; he is likely to be driven to straits, and, above all, he is surrounded by Ministers who have little reputation at stake. But for this last consideration we might perhaps acknowledge that the conduct to be expected from Louis Napoleon, under the given temptations, is not very different from that which might have been expected from any who during the last 20 years have filled his place. It should be observed, howevei', that an invasion just now would, be destitute of all that support which the most audacious campaigners usually desire to find in the enemy's country. Napoleon reckoned on the aid of Radicals ; Lamartine 4 flattered the Irish ; M Louis Blanc would have looked out for Socialists ; and General Cavaignac might have counted perhaps in 1848 on a small contingent of Chartists. But who upon British earth is to fraternize with Louis Napoleon ? Lastly, though no ruler of the French ever commanded, perhaps r a stronger or a more willing army, none certainly ever had so much occasion for his army at home. Louis Napoleon's army supplies his Ministers, his agents, his police, his constituents, and his people. It holds France down, and what would become of France if it were transported to England ? Granted that the "glory" of the thing would be dazzling, but is it to be soberly concluded that the " last-cartridge-of-Waterlpo,' sentiment has such a gripe of the French people that they would, for the sake of hearing that London was burnt, abstain from all those opportunities of recovering freedom and administering retribution which the removal of the army would put in their power? True, the French military force is prodigious, but so are its duties. Little less than the " army of England" is required for the garrison of Paris alone. To sum up the case, we may recapitulate these points as virtually established. The French could ' detach a force from their army, which, if it were transported across the Channel, could reach and occupy London. The passage of the Channel ' could not with any certainty be prevented by an i English fleet ; but the presence of this fleet would greatly increase, in proportion to the strength of its composition, the risks of the attempt. This refers to armaments on a large scale. As to smaller expeditions, an army exceeding in numbers the entire military force in Great Bi itain could, in all human probability, be lodged in a fortified camp on our shores within a week after the declaration of war. Finally, the hazards of a maritime expedition are so great, and the consequences of a miscarriage so terrible, that nothing but the strongest chances of success would ever be likely to bring one about. All opinions, from all quarters, concur in this proposition, that if any single obstacle offering a show of effectual defence were interposed between Paris and London, the | invasion would never be dreamt of.

Audi Aljeram Partem. — A letter in the Daily News, signed " Amelia Bloomer," puts the fol owing pertinent question: — " May I be allowed, in your columns, to ask why the British public are so horrified at the idea of women dressing in trousers, seeing th it ihey have for many 33 r ears tolerated a number of men (fiom the North of the Tweed) in wearing peticoats — and shockingly short petticoats too ?"