THE RECALL OF SIR HARRY SMITH.

New Zealander, Volume 8, Issue 645, 19 June 1852, Page 3

THE RECALL OF SIR HARRY SMITH.

The following copy of a despatch from Earl Grey to Governor Sir 11. G. Smith, Bart., G.C.8., is printed among the papers on the Caffre Avar, recently presented to both Houses of Parliament :—: — Downing-street, Jan. 14, 1852. " Sir, — I have received and laid before tho Queen your despatches of the sth and 19th of November, reporting the results of the operations of the war sinco the date of your despatches by the previous mail. " 2. I learn from these despatches that another month of this distressing warfare has passed away and though tho force at your disposal lias been increased to a very considerable amount, no advantage of any real importance has been gained over the enemy, while the loss of Her Majesty's ti'oops has been exceedingly heavy, that very distinguished officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Fordyce, being included among those who have fallen. "3. I have said that no real advantage has been gained, because, while you state that positions of extraordinary strength have been stormed, and it is clear that the most determined courage has been shewn by her Majesty's troops, these successes (if they can bo called so) have been entirely barren of useful results ; and it appears from' the reports of Major-General Somerset, and particularly from his despatch dated the 9th of November, that the ground thus hardly won could not be retained, and that the position ! which was carried at the price of such heavy loss to the 74th regiment on the 6th of November, was only held until the Major-General 'withdrew the troops in the afternoon)' when it would seem that there was no obstacle to its being reoccupied by the enemy, and that in fact it was so. "4. For several months your despatches have been of a similar character. You have described to me operations which I have constantly been assured had been attended with success, and had inflicted heavy loss upon the enemy, while there could be no doubt that the troops had fought with their accustomed gallantry ; but at the same timelam quite unable to discover that any ground had really been gained, while it was obvious that the enemy, far from being discouraged by their supposed defeats, were from month to month increasing in boldness and determination : and the list of casualties but too clearly proved that the loss they had inflicted was at least as certain, and boro no small proportion to that which they were believed to have sustained. "5. It was impossible that I should continue to receive intelligence of this description by many successive mails without being led to entertain very serious doubts whether the war had been conducted with the energy and the judgment which were necessary to bring it to an early and successful issue ; but, distressing as was the anxiety which these doubts occasioned, I have not hitherto allowed them to induce mo to deprive you of that support which I know it is of the utmost importance to tho public service that those in high military commands should bo able to rely on not having withdrawn from them by the advisers of the crown, when, in situations of difficulty and danger, success does not at once attend their exertions. 6. But the information I have now received has convcitcd what was before onty a very serious doubt into conviction ; and it i&my painful duty to inform you that, having consulted my colleagues on tho subject, they have concurred with me in coming to the conclusion that, upon a careful review of tho events of the war and those which preceded its breaking out, there is evidence, which it is impossible longer to resist, that yon have failed in showing that foresight, energy, and judgment Avhich your very difficult position required, and that therefore we should not be justified in shrinking from tendering- to the Queen our humble advice that the Government of the Cape of Good Hope and the conduct of the war should be jjkeed in other hands. It has accordingly been my duty to submit to her Majesty my advice that Major-General Cat heart should be appointed to relieve you, of which her Majesty has been pleased to approve, and that officer will * very shortly proceed to the Cape for that purpose. " T. I need hardly assure you that I cannot make this communication without great pain and sincere reluctance, and that nothing but a sense of imperative duty would have led my colleagues and myself to take t lie course we have felt ourselves compelled to adopt. "We do full justice to the ardent zeal for her Majesty's service which you have uniformly displayed ; we have not forgotten how greatly you have distinguished yourself on former occasions, and what a high military reputation you have deservedly obtained ; but we have been compelled to believe that, perhaps from tho failure of \our health, and your being no longer able to exercise as close a personal superintendence as formerly over the conduct of affairs, you have failed m giving, either to your military operations or to your political measures bearing upon the Avar, Hint character of vigour and judgment Avhich arenecessary fo inspire confidence in the inhabitants and troops and to command success. I must remind j on th.it the fhst en or a\ Inch was committed, and to which I believe the failure of a, policy otherwise sound, and the calamity of the w.ir, an 1 mainly attributable, a\.'s Hie promainio i eduction oi the JJritKhroreeundoi'yourt'ommiind.

I must take upon myself a shave of the blame for this mistake, inasmuch as 1 had probably too often and too strongly pressed upon you the importance of reducing" the number of troops ns soon as this could be safely done. Still your discretion was unfettered, you were left to decide for yourself when the troops should be sent home, since tliis was a point on which a judgment could only be formed on the spot ; and the error, therefore, was your own of supposing that a large proportion of the force which you found in the colony could without danger so soon be dispensed with. "8. I must also remind you that, up to the eve of the actual Incaking out of hostilities, you continued to send me the strongest assurances that there existed no real danger, and that the apprehensions expressed by the frontier farmers were unfounded. Even when the war began you were so little aware of its true character that you made no application to me for additional force, and neither in your public nor your private letters did you give me the slightest intimation that such aid was required : and the reinforcements which were immediately despatched, as well as those which have been subsequently sent, have all with the exception of the last, anticipated your demands for them. It is not for me to express any opinion on the detail of your military operations ; but it must strike even an unprofessional observer that, by the employment of means which you considered adequate for the purpose, no serious impression appears to have been made on the enemy. It follows that you have either been entirely mistaken in your judgment, and have consequently led Her Majesty's government into error, as to the character of the Avar and the amount of force required, or else that you have failed in using with effect the force at your disposal. "9. With regard to the political measures bearing uyon the result of the war, I must refoi you to the despatch which I have been compelled to address to you by the present mail on the neglect of the precautions obviously required in order to obstruct the supply of ammunition to the enemy. The fault in this respect must no doubt be in part attributed to the Colonial Secretary, whom you had left in charge of the Government at Cape Town, but if you had intimated to me that Mr. Montagu could not alone adequately discharge the arduous duties which devolved upon him in your abscnge, I should not have failed immediately ta h.ive afforded you further assistance, by the appointment of a ct\i\ Lieu-tenant-Govei'nor, to reside at C.ipe Town dining the war — a step I propo.se adopting now that the necessity for it lias thus been disclosed to me. " 1 must albO observe that you have, I believe, truly represented to me, that if you had had the Caft'res only to contend with, the war would long since have been brought to a close ; and that which lias made them such formidable enemies has been the assistance they have derived from the rebel Hottentots, too many of whom had been trained as solclicis in the ranks of the British army. But if thi.s is, as 1 believe, a comet view of the stibject, I must regard it as a most fatal error that the first instances ot treason among tin's class of inhabitants of the Cape were not dealt with more promptly and more severely. I cannot resist the belief that had this been done, the contagion of disaffection would have been stayed, cvs the- prompt punishment of the real traitors would have calmed the fears naturally excited among the w liite inhabitants by seeing their impunity, and would thus have prevented the colonibtsof European descent from being led tocntcr-ta-in and display that indiscriminate jealouoy of their coloured fellow-subjects, which has been, as there is too much reason to fear, the means of driving into disaffection many of the latter who were not oaiginally inclined to it. "11. Lastly, I must legard it as a grcvions error that you have allowed the administration of the Orange ltiver territory to remain too long in the 'hands of an Officer in your own opinion unequal to the task, and that by this and other mibLikei* in yuui management of the Dutch inhabitants of the frontier districts, you have failed to conciliate that important class, by whose cordial co-opeiatiou there can be no doubt that you would have been enabled to bring the war to a much earlier termination than thcie is now a prospect of; "while, on the contrary, by the distracted condition of the sovereignty, your difficulties in Caffrai ia have been very seriously increased. The manner in which, by judicious management, Mr. Pine has succeeded in 'Natal in securing the confidence and attachment of the Dutch formers, as described in your despatch No. 193, clearly moves that, if properly treated, they may be rendered loyal and useful subjects of the crown. "12. It lias been with much reluctance that I have entered into this review of the errois which you seem to me to have committed, but 1 h.T\ c thought it due to your position and to your high reputation to shew that Her Majesty's servants have not determined to advise the Queen to supersede you in the midst of the war without sufficient' cause for doing .so ; and for thi.s reason, painful ns it has been to me to write to you in such a tone of censure, T have been compelled t 0 point out the errors into which you have bec n

betrayed. It is, however, some satisfaction to mo to Ijc able to add, that I have no doubt it has been your judgment only which has been m fault, and' that, to the best of your ability yon have endeavoured to acquit yourself of duties of no ordinary difficulty ; nor do I doubt that in more regular warfare against a civilised enemy, and if your military operntions had been less complicated by political difficulties, you would have achieved the same success by which you had formerly been so much distinguished. « (Signed) Grey. " Licut.-Gen. Sir 11. G. Smith. Bart."