THE WAR IN THE PUNJAB. (From All en's Indian Mail, June 25 )

New Zealander, Volume 5, Issue 377, 24 November 1849, Page 3

THE WAR IN THE PUNJAB. (From All en's Indian Mail, June 25 )

Amongst the paperi just laid before Parliament, by command of her Majesty, relating to the Punjab, is a despatch from the Governor-General to the Secret Committee, dated so late as the 7<h of April, which enters very fully into the history of the war, and into the leasons which have dictated the policy pursued by Lord Dalhousie in deposing the Maharajah of Lahore, and annexing the Punjab tt the British dominions. This important state-paper, though necessarily Ion?, is perspicuous in its narrative, succinct in its arguments, and simple in its style, presenting a contrast, in all these respects, to the general cUsi of Indian documents. The Governor-General observe*, in the outset, that the question of the future relations of the Punjab with the British rinpire in India had formed, during the whole progress of the war, the constant subject of his anxious consideration. When upon the first outbreak ! at Mooltan, in April, 1848, the Resident at Lahore called upon the Durbar to take measures for punishing those who hod committed so gross an ourrige against the British Government, the Sirdars, after a long consultation, informed him that their troops, and especi»lly the regul ir army, could not be depended upon, nnd would not obey their orders to march against Mool.aj. The Resident, thereupon, suggested to the Commander-in-Chief the importance ot commencing military operations against Mooltan immediately, but Lo'd Gaugh replied that operations at that time- would be " uncertain, if not impracticable,*' and gave his decided opinion against the movement, in which the Resident concurred; and, the Governor - General in Council, after full deliberation, confirmed the decision. The reasons of this determination are set forth at some length. The question, his Lordship observes, was difficult and perplexing. On the one hand, if there had existed in the minds of the people a desire to rise against the British power, delay might encourage and spread that deiire ; on the other hand, extended military operations at such a season would endanger the health and very existence of European troops, who would have had to c irry on the siege of a formidable fortress in the worst district of India, and a failure of the operations through such a cause would have given greater impulse to risings than their postponement. "It was a choice of difficulties — an alternative of evils ; and the Government of India selected that which appeared to be the lesser evil of the two :" that course being in accordance with the opinions of the highest militaiy authorities in India and in England, as well as of the home Indian Government. The worst that can be alleged against the delay is. that it precipitated the crisis, which sooner or later must have, taken place. His Lordship then relates the detection of the attempts to seduce our sepoys at Lahore ; the complicity of 'the Maharanee in these intrigues— the riling of

Bhae Maharaj Sing in the Reechna Dosb, and the operations of Major Edwardei, whose gallantry and energy, aided by the Bhawulpore troopi, restricted the outbreak at Mooltan to the limits of the province. | At this juncture, the Resident at Lahore directed the movement of a British force, With a siege train, to reduce Mooltan ; and thej Govenor - General, " on receiving intelligence of the order having been publicly issued," confirmed it, and operations against the city commenced. The narrative then relaets the defection of Sirdar Chutter Sing and his troops in Hazara — that of Shere Sing, at Mooltan— the junction with himj.of all the troopi of the State from arross the Indus— the union with Chutter Sing at Peshawur of the rest of the Sikh army — the disbanded soldiers and the people from the Manjha, and the appearance of proclamations calling upon all to make war upon the British. This crisis was one, Lord Dalhotisij says, which he wd3 convinced required the exeitiou of all our resources, the Sikh army being strong in numbers, and j especially in artillery, and we had had experience of their courage and skill. The result has shewn that his cstimafe of their power was not fallacious. The preparations of the Indian Government were upon an extensive scale, and before Christmas there was assembled in the Punjab an army ot 38,000 effective men, with 17 ) pieces of artillery. After tracing the events of the campaign, the Governor- General describes the position in which the British Government and the Sikh nation stood towards each other at its close. The former had rigidly observed the obligations imposed by the Treaty of Lahore and the Agieement of Bhyrowal; whereas, on the part of the Sikh s> every one ot the main pr ovisions of the contract had ue en evaded or violate,}. Of the subsidy of twenty.t wo fo^g per annum, to be paid for the a ,d o f British troops, not a rupee had been received; even the loans advanced by the British Government to discharge the arrears of the discarded tro ops, had not been repaid, and the debt of the State of Lahore to the British Government exceeds fifty lak» s ' The directing and controlling authority of the Bri'ish ReiiJent at Lahore, recognised by the Treaty, was disregarded; and " ultimately nearly all the army of the State, j mied by the whole Sikh people throughout the land, as one man, rose in arms against us, and carried on a ferocious war, for the proclaimed purpose of destroying our power and extfrminating our race." Admitting that these have been mrr^ly the acts of a lawless soldiery, against the will, and in spite of the opposition, of the sirdars, what justification, Lord Dalhousic asks, does this furnish for them, or what security dees it affjid us ? Our objects are, peace — a fiiendly and well-governed neighbour in the Punjab— a frontier which does not demand a perpetual garrison j of 50,000 men. If the council and sirdars cannot control their army, of what value to us, as a state, is their impotent fidelity? But the fact is otherwise. The sirdars who signed the Treaty, even the members of the Council of Regency, have been the leaders of the mutinous troops and the rebellious people ; and the Regency, during the troubles, gave no effective assistance to the British Government. The Governor-General presses, and very properly, the important fact, that the riling in the Punjib was not against the Maharajah ; on the contrary, the Sikhs have constantly professed their fidelity to him, proclaiming that it was against the British alone that the war was directed. That the destruction of the British power and the expulsion of the British themselves, were the real objects of the war, was avowed by the Sikhs in their letters and proclamations. A proclamation of Shere Sing expressly declares that the object of the insurrection was, on the part of the Maharajah Dhuleep Sing, " to eradicate and expel all th" tyrannous and crafty Feiingees;" and enjoin? the the people of the Punjab to " murder all the Feringees wherever they can find them." The bitterness of their enmity to the Brilibh induced the Sikhs to court the alliance of the Affghans; they invited Dost Mahomed Kbap, prdmuing him the province of Peihawura— a p ssession which the Sikhs Valued beyond all price, having gained it with the best blood of their rae".— • The object of securing Affghan co-oparation against the British tempted the Sikhs to forget thdir strongest national animosity, and in their eyes compensated for Mahommedin insults to their religion. " Such" observes Lord Da'housie, "hare been the acts of faithlessness and violence by which the Sikh nation has, a second time, forced upon us the evils of a costly and bloody war. If the grossest violation of treaties —if repeated aggression, by which it« national security is threatened, and the interest* of its people are sacrificed—can erer confer upon a nation the right of bringing into neresiary subjection the power that has so injured it, and is ready to injure it again, then has the British Government now acquired an absolute and undoubted right to dispose, as it will, of the Punjab, which it has conquered. The British Government has arquired the right, and in my judgment that right must now he fully exercised. I hold that it is no longer open to this Government to determine the question of the future relations of the Punjab with British India by considerations of what is desirable or convenient, or even expedient. I hold that the : course of recent events has rendered the question one of national saf ty, and that regard for the security of our own territories, and the interests of our own subjects, must compel us in self defence to relinquish the policy which would maintain the independence of the Sikh nation in the Punjab." He proceeds to argue, that experience has shewn fhat a strong Hindu government, capable of controlling its army and governing its own subjects, cannot be formed in the Punjab — that the materials for it do not exist; and if they did, tbe object for which such a government was desired by us would not thereby be accomplished — namely, the existence of a friendly power upon our frontier, which would be a barrier and defence to us. It was hoped that motives of prudence and s-lf-mterest might counteract the feelings of hatred to us on the part of the Sikhs on political and religious grounds i but events proved that this hope must be abandoned. <• There never will be peace in the Pubjab so long as in people are allowed to retain the means and the opportunity of making war ; there never can be now any guarantee for the tranquillity of India, until we have effected the entire subjection of the Sikh people, and destroyed their power as an independent nation." The Governor-General then shows that any policy short; of this— such as maintaining the pageant of a throne, and really governing the country by a British functionary, thereby keeping up a mockery of independence, — would neither be advantageous to our inte-ests nor creditable to our name, whilst it would ; serve as a nucleus for constant intrigue. From the doctrine that the present dynasty in the Punjab cannot with justice be subverted, since Dhuleep Sing, being a minor, can hardly be held responsible for the acts of hit nation, he entirely dissents— as untenable in prin ciple, and as having been heretofore disregarded in practice, even in the case of Dhuleek Sing himself, in 1845, when he was made to pay the penalty of the I past offences of his people ; and, on being duly warned that he would be held responsible for their future acts, he gave this reply: "If, in conseqnenca of the recurrence of misrule in my government, the peace of

the British frontier be disturbed, I should be held responsible for the same." Lamenting the necessity of deposing a successor of Runjeet Sin;, Lord Dalhousie declares that he cannot permit himself to he turned aside from hit duty to millions of Britislx subjects by a feeling of misplaced and ill-timed compassion for the fate of a child. He then sums up the arguments upon the question*, Having a second time been involved in war with the mosfe formidable enemy we have ever encountered in India, joined by the Ameer of Cabul, as the apostle of Islam, who made a direct appeal to Mahoinedan India, having met and crushed this danger ; if we do not hold as our own every foot of Sikh territory, and deprive that people at once of power and existence aa a nation ; if concession or compromise be made, we [ shall be considered throughout India as having been worsted in the strnggle. Moderation, though wise and politic before, would be feebleness now. Hesitation would be regarded not as magnanimity but as pusillanimity, and attributed not to forbearance, but to fear ; it would encourage dorman* hopes of restoied supremacy in British India ; it would insure the certainty of a renewal of the struggle, and has'en the time when the British power in India might, perhaps, be contested on other fislris than those of the Punjab. The possession of this teiritory he regards as not seriously difficult for u 9 to maintain, or financially unprofitable. A large portion of the inhabitants, especially the Mahomedans, will hail t!ie change ; the Sikhs, warlike, turbulent and brave, are not mare so than the people of Rohilcund once were. Dis'urbancs and outbreaks may be expected ; but there is no reason why a rule of justice, combined with vigour, should not make the Sikhs as harmless as the Rohillas. The financial branch of the question Lord Dalliousie treats of in general terms. The levenucs, ho observes, are tery considerable in the aggregate, and a large amount, which has been diverted from the public treasury in ja»heers, wi'l be recovered by confiscation of those of the rebellious chiefs. The province of Mooltan will materially add to the revenue, which will be further augmented by developing the resources of a rich and productive soil. In short, bis Lordship has no hesitation in expressing a confident belief, as the result of the examination he has made, " that the Punjab will at no distant time, be not only a secure, but a profitable possession/ In conclusion, he says : " While deeply sensible of the responsibility I have assumed, I have an undoubting 1 conviction of the expediency, the justice, and the necessity, of my act. What I have done I have done with a clear consciense, and in the honest belief that it was imperatively demanded of me by my duty to the State." No one will dissent from this conclusion, and very few will dispute the strength of the reasoning upon which it is founded.