THE NATIONAL DEFENCES.

New Zealander, Volume 4, Issue 223, 19 July 1848, Page 3

THE NATIONAL DEFENCES.

The following is a copy of the letter addressed by the Duke of Wellington to Sir John Burgoyne : "Stratfieldiaya, 9th Jan. 1848. " To Majou-Gen. Shi John F. JJukooyne, X.C.8., &c. &<\ 44 My dear General, — Sonic days have elapsed, indeed a fortnight has, since 1 received your note, witli a copy of your observations on the possible results of n war with Franre, under our present syktem of military preparation. You are aware tlmt I have for years been sensible of the alteration produced in maritime warfare and opeiations by the application of steam to the propelling of ships at sea. This discovery immediately exposed all parts of the coasts of these islands, which a vessel could approach at all, to be approached, at all time9 of tide and in all seasons, by vessels uo propullcd, fiom all quarters. We are in fuct assailable, and at least liable to insult, and to have contributions levied upon us, on all parts of our roast ; that ih, the (oust of these, including the Channel Islands, which to this time, from the period of the Norman Conquest, have never been successfully invaded. " I have in vain endeavoured to awaken the attention of different udminiatialions to this state of things as well known to our neighbour** (rivals in power, at least, foimet' adversaries aud enemies) us it is to ourselves. 1 hope that your paper may be attended with more success than my representations have been. 41 1 have above, in few words, repicsentcd oui danger. We have no defence, or hope of defence, excepting in our fleet. We hear a great deal of the spirit of the people of England, for which no man entertains higher respect than I do. But unorganised, undisciplined, without systematic subordination established and well understood, this spirit, opposed to the fnc of musketiy and ennnon, and to sabrts and bayoneti of disciplined troops, would only expose those animated by such spirit to confusion and destruction. Let any man only make the attempt to turn to some use this spirit in a case of partial local disturbance ; the want ot previous systematic organisation and subordination will pieveiit him even from communicating with moie than his own menial servants and dependents, and while mobs aio in movement thiough the country the most powerful will find that he ran scarcely move from his own door. ] "It is perfectly tiue, that as we stand at present, with our nuval aiscnaU and dookyaids not half gam- i soncd, 5,000 men el all arras could not be put under arms, if required, for any Bervice whatever, without leaving standing without iclief all employed on any duty, not exceptii.g even the guatds over ihe palaces and the person of the Sovereign. I calculate that n declaialion of war 6hould probably find our home garmons of the stiength as follows, putticulaily considering that oncol the most common accusation! against this country is, that the practice has been to commence reprisal ai sea simultaneously with a declaration of war, the order for the Cnst of which must have been issued befoie the last can huve been published. " We ourjliL to be with gainsona as follows at the moment war is dcrlmed • — Channel Islands (besides the militia of each, weil organised, tiaiucd, and disciplined.) 10,000 men Ply month ...... 10,000 men Milford Haven 5,000 men Cm-k 10,000 men Poitsmouth 10,000 men j) over , 10,000 m«i Sheemcss, Chatham, nnd the Thames . 10,000 men " I suppose that one half of the whole regular force of the country wou'd be stationed in lieland, which half would fiive the q trrison for Cork. The remainder must ba supplied from tho half of the whole force at home stationed in Gieat Britain. The whole force employed at home in Gicat Britan and Ireland would not allord a sufficient number of men for tho mete defence nnd occupation, on the breaking out of war, of the works const meted for the defence ot the dockyards und naval a sou Is, without leaving a single man disposable. "The measures upon which I have earnestly entreated did rent Administrations to decide, which is constitutional, and has been invariably adopted in time of pence for the last eighty ycais, is to raise, embody, organise, and discipline the militia of the same numbers for each of the throe kingdoms united as during the late war. This would give a ma«s of organised force amounting to about 150,000 men, which we might immediately set to work to discipline. Tins alone would enable us to establish the strength of our nrmy. This, with an augmentation of the force of the regular army, which would not cost XJ400,000,X J 400,000, would put the country on its legs in respect to personal force, and I would engage for its defence, old as I am. But as we •tand now, and if it bo true that the exertions of the fleet alone are not sufficient to provide for out defence, we are not safe for a week ofter the declaration of war. u I am accustomed to the consideration of these questions, and have examined and reconnoitcred, over and over again, the whole coast from the North Foreland, by D Vdr, Folkstone, Beachy Head, Brighton, Arundel, to Sehey Bill, near Portsmouth ; and I say that, excepting immediately under the fire of Dover Castle, there 18 not a spot on the coast on which infantry might not be thrown on shore, at any time of tide, with any wind, and in any weather,and from which cuch body of infantry, so thrown on shore, would not find wi hin the distance of five miles a roid into the interior of the country through the cliffs practicable lor the march of a body of troopB ;— that in that space of coast (that iB, between the North Foreland and Selsey Bill) there are not less than seven small harbours or mouths or rivers, each without defence, of which an enemy, having landed his infantry on the coast, might take possession, and therein land his cavalry and artillery of ull calibre, and establish himself and h"> commuuication with France. The nearest part of the coast to the metropolis is, undoubtedly, the coa&t of Sussex, from the east and west side of Beachy Head and to Selsey Bill. There are not less than twelve great roads leading from Brighton upon London, and the Ficnch army must be much altered indeed, since the time at which I was bcitsr acquainted with it, if the-e are notjiiow belonging to it forty chefs d'etat major general capable of sitting down and ordering the march to the coast of 40,000 men, their embarkation, with their horses and artillery, at the seveial Ficnch poitu on the coast ; their disembarkation at named po nts on the English coasf, that of the artillery and cavalry in named ports or mouths of rivers, and tbo assembly at named points of the several column* ; and the march of each of thesti from stage to >tui;e to London. Let any man examine our maps and road books, consider of the matter, and judge for himself. I know of no mode ot resist ince. much leH3 of piotcction from this danger, excepting by au aimy in the field cajablc of

mi cling and contending with its formiduble enemy' aided by nil the me ins of fortification winch experience, in war and bounce ran suggest I slmll be deemed lonlh.udy in ciif^im;; for the defcice of the empire with nn auny compooid of sut l» a force of milita. 1 may be bo. I ronfeis it. 1 hhould mliuitcly prefer, mid should feet more (.onli icne in, an army of regular troops. Hut/ f/nnw thar I shall not have these. I may have the otltms, «ud if -m addition is made to the exihtng rcgnlm army tillctted tor home defence, of u force which will rout £'<i') 0,000 a yt-ai, tlieie would be a sufficient disciplined foice in tho field to enable linn who should command to defend the rminliy. "This is my view of rfnr danger and om resources. I w<is avrire that our mtignzines and mseiidls wci every inadequately supplied with ordnance and eariiiigi's, arms, Rtores of all denominations, and ammunition. Tin; deficiency has been occusioncd in pait by the, s.ilo of arms, and of mnous descriptions of oiduance stney, since tho teiiuination of the late wu 1 , in order to diminish the demand of supply touirryou the pore; service of the ordnance, in part by tli 1 : conll igra'iou of the uibcnal which occurred in Ilie Tower boine je.iii ago, and by the difficulty under winch all Govtriimeuts in this country labou in prevailing mum I'ai liame.nl, m time of peace, to lake into con&idcratiuu nieu-'Hrcs necessary for the safety ol the country in time < f war. The state of th ; ordimncr, nrms, nmrnu»itu>n, &<"., in magazines, is in part th<: question of expense, and perhaps in some decree ono of time. I would reiommciul to have an alphabetical list of ihe stoics examine I by a committee, and made out in form, ns upon the enclosed half Bhcel of p:>per, by aiecilniniiig wh.t there was in 1804, and what there i> in store now, of each article, and the dill n rice between the two accoui'tw I have taken the year ISO I as (he stiuul.ud, as thai w,is the year in which the i:i\ isi"i\ was threatened. It was previous In the einploynient of" the armies in the, Peninsula or North Anienoa ; in bhort, - t \\ neuily as poisible similar to the political circumstances in which wo stand at this moment, excepting that we aie now at. peace wi h France— \va wore then at wai, A fourth column would bo the estimate, of ths expense of biiuging the magazines to i he state in which they were in 1801. With this in'ounition before him, the Master General could give the Government accurate infoim ition of the wants of oidunuce, aims, ammunition, and stores in the magazines ot die country. "You will see from wlnt I hw wiittpn that I hay« contemp luted the danger to v.hich you h ive refcrtcd. f have done so for years. I liavediawn to it the aticn ■ tion of difFereut ndminibtiations at different linn's. You will ob-crve, likewise, that 1 have, coiibiilciod ot the measures of prost)c< tive Lecuiity, uud of the mode and cost of the attainment. # * it ■# " I havo done more. I have looked at and considered these localities in great detail, and Irwe madj up my mind upon the details ol their ilelcucc. 'lh-se are questions to which my mind hag not be n n unu:customed. I have considered and provided for the defence, the successful defence, ol the frontiers of many countries. You are confidential head ol the principal defensive part ot the country, I will, if you and the Master General of the Ordnance choose, converse or otherwise conimunic.ite confidently [confidentiully ?] with you upon nil tho dctaita of this subject ; will inform you of all that I know, hiivo teen, and think upon it, and what mv no ions aie of the det.iU ot the defensive system to be adopted and eventually cairicd into execution. " I quite concur in all your views of the danger ot onr position, and of the magnitude of the stake at issue. I am equally sensible of the ceit.unty of failure if we do not, at an early moment, attend to (he incdEiirefl necessity to be ta'ten for our dsfeiue, and of the disgrace—- he indelible disgiacc of sucli lailine ; putting out ol view all the oilier untoi tuuatj consequences, fciich as the loss ol the political and social position ol this countiy niiioug the nations of Europe, of all its allies, in concert with and in aid of whom it lius in our own times contended successlully in arms for ils own honour and bafety, and the independence and freedom of the world. When did any man hear of allies of a countiy unable to defend itself? Views ol economy of 6oiue, and 1 admit that the high views of national finance ol others, induce them io postpone those measures absolutely necessary for mere defence und safety under existing circumstances, forgetting u'togethci the common piartice of successful armies, in modern times, impobiug upon Ihe conquered enormous pecuimry eontiibutions, as well as other valuable and ornamental piopcrty. " Look at the course pursued by France in Ituly and llusbia ! at Vicma lepeatedly, ut Ueihn, at Moscow— the contributions levied, besides the subsistenan c, maintenance, clothing, and equipment of the army which made the conquest • Look at the conduct of tho allied army which invaded France, and hud possession of Paris 1111815! Look at the account of thu pecuniary sncnfices made upon that occasion, under, their different heads ot contributions, piymunt (or subsistence, and iiMintuinancc of the invading aimies, including clothing and other equipments, payments ot" old repudiated state debts, payments of debts duci to individuals in war in the different countries of Europe, repayment for coutrihiv ions levied, and moveable and immoveablc property sold in the couibe of tho revolutary war. But such nn account cannot be made out about this country. No 1 but 1 believe that the means of some demands would net be wanting. Are there any claims of a fleet at Toulon, in 1 783 ? None (or debts left unpaid by British subjects in France, who escaped from confinement under cover of the invasion, in 18H', by the allied vi inios? Cm ny man pretend to limit the amount of the demands on the account of the contributions dc (jiicrre ? Then look at the conditions of the treaties ol Paris, 1811, IST). Franco having been in possession of neaily eveiy capital iv Europe, and hating levied contiibuUons to each, ami Germany, and Poland, is icduced to its terntonul limits as they 6tood in 1702. Do we suppose th.it we should be allowed to keep — more than the islands composing the United Kingdom, e.iding disgracefully the Channel Islands, on which an invader iiad ever estuhl'shed himself since the period of the Norman Conquest ? •• lam bordering upon seventy-seven }cars of age . passed iv honour. I hope that the Almu;h!y may piotect me from being the witness of the tragedy which I cannot persuade my contenapoiarieb to taki measures to avert. " Believe me ever yours sincerely, " WiaLINGION."

Ireland. — There have been no fewer than one hundred deaths during the neck ending on Monday Inst, (Feb. '2l,) m the pooi liouic, i;a )1, and hobpuals of Ciulway. In .C'onneiiiiird it is quite übinil for bodies to remain utiinterred loui, five, mul even six days, no one being found to take the trouble o( intoning them. Four persons have been convmtte.l to prison in th.it county town (or stealing a filly, of which they were lound eating a portion. Mayo. — The Btate'of Mayo Is not less deplorable than that of Galway. The nami's ol a^VLiitLen l>erfloiu whose deaths Bttirvatiun b.ul tnngeJ, are gi^cu. M ihe Mayo Tdcjuiyh of tho l'JtU Fck