HOW TO BELL THE CAT.

Nelson Examiner and New Zealand Chronicle, Volume XIV, Issue 73, 8 December 1855, Page 4

HOW TO BELL THE CAT.

[From TAe Examiner, Jute 9, 1855.] A woodcutter and snake agreed to live together, and did so for tome time with only the usual wrangles m such cases of cohabitation. It fell out, however, unluckily, one day, that m chopping some wood the man's hatchet slipped and diced off the snake's tail. The woodcutter made a thousand apologies, and protested that nothing was further from his intention than to take any liberty with his fellow-lodger's tail, but the snake, taking up his hat, moved off to the door, saying: — " What you say may all be very true, and Ido not question your sincerity, but I have made up toy mind not to live with, a man who keeps such a dangerous tool as a hatchet m the house." Sebastopol is the hatchet of the present question, and at Sinope the snake's tail was chopped off. Can there be any security, then, for the fellowlodger m the Euxine while the Russian keeps the hatchet m his hand ? We confesH that we have no reliance on the expedient of limitation. The stipulation for a •mailer hatchet ia certainly one which a snake of any of the wisdom of his kind would regard as a very poor security for tho safety and integrity of bin person. It is only better than the counterproposal of hatchets for both sides, between which there would be sure-to be mischief. Sir W. Moletnvofth, m a speech of equal spirit and ability, has urged with great force, and distinctness the objections to the Russian proposals, but he hardly shows cause for his reliance on the limitation of the strength of the Russian fleet. The Russian terms would, if we did our duty, impose upon the allies a permanent war establishment add a permanent war expenditure m the East ; or, if we did not do our duty, they would put Turkey immediately at the mercy of Russia. According to our term*, Russia would be bound not to maintain m the Black Sea more than a certain specified and moderate number of ships of war — a number not exceeding our ordinary force m the Mediterranean, If she were to attempt to exceed that specified number, we should be entitled to ask for explanations, to remonstrate with her, to remind her of her treaty obligations, and, if all this were vein, we should be entitled to denounce her to Europe as a treatybreaker, aad alone, or with the aid of our allies, to compel her by force to keep faith with Europe. For this put pose it would not be necessary for us to main, tain m (he Mediterranean a fleet larger than tbe limited fleet of Russia, and consequently our ordinary naval establishment m the Mediterranean and our ordinary peace expenditure would be sufficient to guard Turkey. Very different would be the case if either of the Russian proposals were adopted. We should then have to run a never ending race with Kustia m naval armaments and naval expenditure m the East. The first Russian proposition was the opening of the Bospborus and the Dardanelles •, this was unhesitatingly condemned by the representatives of Turkey, q( France, of England, and even of Austria. Alt Pasha declared that his instructions prescribed to him the maintenance of the principle of closing the Straits ; that the Sublime Porte had at all times considered this principle as a guarantee of Us independence ; that the opening of the Black Sea would, m her eyes, constitute not only a danger lo the Ottoman empire, but would also multiply the occasions for a misunderstanding between the European Powers; fo/, according to this proposal, Russia would he entitled not only to re-establish her fleet, but to increase it to eighteen or twenty more sail of the line, and to send this menacing force into the. Mediterranean. To counterbalance it we should have to maintain a force of equal magnitude m the East. It would be difficult to imßgine two such mighty ■ftett fully manned, armed to the teeth, sailing up and down those narrow seas, watching and suspecting each other, without coming; to blows; f» J&et m tuch a ifoteof things, a tattle and a great Nc/ory. ffiking a tuptriority to one or other fleet, would to artlieffrom intolerable anxiety on the. part of both nation* and of *U Eutope. The second proposition of Russia) was merely the ttatus quo ante bettum respecting the Black Sea, with the exception that the Sultan " should reserve to himself the power to open "by way of temporary exception, the Straits of the Dardanelles arid of the Bosphorus to the fleets of .foreign Powers which the Sublime Porte should think it necessary to summon whenever she should think her security menaced." That is, the Porte was to have the power to summon into the Euxine the fleets «f England and France whenever she should consider herself menaced by Russia, and on the other hand, the Porte would aUo have power to summon into the Mediterranean the Russian fleet whenever she imagined herself menaced by France or England. .Now, it is evident that, m order that this power of fleets should be of any use to the Porte, fieitstnust be at hand to be summoned; and, therefore, 'if France and England had agreed to this proposition, .they would have been at least morally bound to keep fleets fn the Mediterranean ready at once to obey the "summons of the Porte, and m sufficient force to cope at any time with the Russian fleet m the Euxine. Peace on these terms would, therefore, impose upon 'as tbe duties of perpetual police m the East, it would ,"he a peace founded upon provisions for a renewal of war, it would bind uj to be always ready for war, it jwoujd require us to be prepared to send into the .Black Sea armaments as powerful as we now maintain , there, on every occasion when the Porte was m danger, and therefore considered her security menaced. But tbe Porte would always be m danger from a re-established Russian fleet m Sebastopol, which would become again, what we have so often 'proclaimed it to be, namely, a standing menace to Turkey. . Therefore, .peace on these terms would not voij be an abandonment of the chief object for which Great Britain engaged m war, hut would permanently itnpase upon as (if we fulfilled our obligation) all •the chief burdens of war* Peace on these terms would be worse than tbe present state of things; for though at present we have to bear the burden of war, yet we have,, m fact, accomplished our object — we have pat down the preponderance of Russia m the . Black Sea, and her fleet which menaced Turkey no longer exists, the greater portion being under the .waves of the Euxine. Shall we permit her to raise ,it or rebuild it? Now that we have got it down, would it not be better to keep k down, tban to incur at no distant period, tbe risk, the trouble, and the expense of sinking it again, and of sending for that purpose another hazardous expedition to the Crimea ? .It seems, therefore, that instead of their being no difference between tbe Russian termi and our terras^ (her* fa • most - substantial difference— namely, tbe difference between tbe cost of a peace and the cost of * war establishment. We share m Sir James Graham's doubts whether tbe excess of a ship of the line or two beyond the proposed limitation, and steam craft m proportion, would ever be regarded as a casus belli, 'or, if it were, for what precise object should we again go to wßr? Wonld it be for another . limitation after limitation had failed, or would it be for thta sheer destruction of Sebastopol, so that not one stone should stand on another? If that would be the end, surely that also should be the beginning, We may be told that this wonld be no permanent security, a« the fortress might be recnnatrocteJ, but Sebaatopv) was no more built m * day tban Rome, and at least ao important perioft of time would be gained by tbe raaure of the place. .':... , Bat a new cant has been broached, that we oast beware of hnmhlihg oar enemy; as there is HO knowing to what extremity he may not be driven by thetting of humiliation. It wai .Vpltaire.if we remember rightly, who said, yob rntut flay a Muscovite to make htm feel, but a different opinion now prevails In certain quarters, and a most sensitive honour U ascribed to Russia, which, we are to be as careful not to touch as we are not to tread on a dog's tail, test he should fly at us. When we hear lectures to this effect, we think we listen to schoolboys fresh from the Samnite speech m Livy on the treatment of tbe Roman army m the Caudine Forks.

In our former wars there was none of this fear of humiliating the enemy. The great object was to give him the best possible drubbing, and to leave him ito stomach it as he might. If we ' caught him at a dirty trick we beat him like a dog, and robbed his nose m it to boot. Every great defeat is necessarily a humiliation, especially if, as has often been the ulory of England, the disparity of forces has been considerable. And m this new solicitude to spare the honour of our enemy, we are exceedingly likely most greviously to compromise our own. In his briliant speech Sir Bulwer Lytton excellently remarked : — " Oh," said a noble friend of mine the other night, "it is a wretched policy to humble - the foe you ' cannot crush ; and are you raad enough to suppose that Russia can be crushed ?" Let my noble friend m the illustrious career which I venture to prophesy lies before hixn, beware how he ever endeavours to contract the grand science of statesmen into scholastic j I aphorisms- [hear.] No, we caonot crush Russia as Russia, but we can crush her attempts to be more than Russia. We can, and we must, crush any means that enable her to storm or to steal across that tangible barrier which now divides Europe from a Power that supports the mex'tms of Machiavel with the armaments of Brennus. You might as well have sniri to William of Orange, " You cannot crush Louis XIV ; how impolitic you are to humble him ! " You might 0.1 well have said lo the burghers of Switzerland, " You cannot crush Austria ; don't vainly insult her by limiting her privilege to crush yourselves!" William of Orange did not crush France as a king dotn ; Switzerland did not crush Austria as an empire; hut William did crush the power of France to injure Holland ; Switzerland did crush the power of Austria to enslave her people ; and m that broad sense of the word, by the blessing of Heaven, we will crush the power of Russia to invade her neighbours and convulse the world, [loud cheers]. This is a true representation of the views of the real peace party, composed of the great bulk of the- nation, who are for the vigorous prosecution of the war, m order to obtain a peace of permanent security against Russian ambition. The men who arrogate to themselves the name of the peace party have no title to that description. Those who were against the war from the first, and who were and are for crouching to Russia, are Submissionists, the word submission comprehending all their argument and their policy. Their reasoning itsummed up m Swift's ironical line, which would transfer to resistance the guilt of outrage, " Why are they so wilful to struggle with men ? " Next come the Little Endianß, headed by Mr. Gladstone, who thought the war originally necessary and just, but who consider its ends as attained m the email concessions of Russia. Mr. Gladstone denounces perseverance m a war after the objects are accomplished as a great crime; but we hold that beginning a war for small aims utterly disproportioned to the cost of tvarj m blood and treasure is not loss a crime, and we assert, that if 1 Mr. Gladstone and his friends commenced the war for lh9 results only with which they would now end it, there never was a war more wanton and wicked. Were they content that thousands should perish by the sword, the bullet, and disease, only forsooth to open the Danube and the Straits ? Have they poured out all (his blood to cancel a treaty ? We contend that these men make out against themselves a frightful case of responsibility, for precisely as they lower the terms of peace, they cut away from under them the justifi cation of the war. No little differences can justify a great war; and that the differences m their view were little, Mr. Gladstone, Mr. S. Herbert, and, we grieve to add. Sir James Graham, confess, when they state the miserable terms which would now content them. These are men of great abdity m debate and m business, but they are forcing upon the public a conviction tint there is with them a levity of mind, which is the last thing to be pardoned m statesmen. They have turned and turned again. Their conversion from monopoly to free trade was hailed with satisfaction as an honed and useful abandonment of error, but one such change 88 this ia enough for the life of any man, and another change nf still greater moment wears the appearance of inconstancy, if not of something worse, They may be conscientious, but, if so, (hey have an unfortunate propensity to error, and odo part of their conduct is eet against another part m the worst antagonism. They are hot to-day, cold tomorrow, for white now, and anon for black. As i the toper m the song finds m everything a reason fair for filling his glass again, so these gentlemen discover m certain crotchets what brings them respectively to this conclusion. And this I think a reason fair To change my mind again. And this is alvays to be remarked, that the last mind is vehemently intolerant of the former mind, and passing bitter against all who remain of that mind.We must now pass to the exponent of a more consistent, but hardly more reasonable section, the Suhmissionists. Germnny, lowered as it is m the estimation of the world, stands now next to Russia m the affections of Mr. Cobden. In Prussia and m I Austria there is, m his view, no difference of opinion between the governments and tbe people as to the war. From highest to lowest there is, he says, a {feeling favourable to Russia, and rather hostile to France. Yet having thus absolutely ruled the facts according to his wont, m despite of all opposing evidences, Mr. Cobden proceeds to , argue that if we bad confined ourselves to nautical operations, we should have compelled Germany to take the foremost part m restraining Russian aggression, bat he does not condescend to explain the motive that would have conquered the German leanings toward Russia, and placed Austria and Prussia m (antagonism to the nation to which they are so well affected, and m alliance with the Power the smart of whose arms they have not forgotten. To besure, be says that it is more the interest of Austria and Southern Germany tban that of France and England to keep Russia out of Constantinople ; but for tbeir not having wagged a finger m the cause of this very interest he gives them special praise, asserting that they have taken a more enlightened and calmer view of the question than the Western Powers have done. So that German enlightenment teaches people to neglect their interests, or to leave tbe care of them to any other nation that may be ill advised enongh to fight tbeir battle. And these are the people whose example, according to Mr. Cobden, we should have followed. But we are not m a condition to do so, for we have not learnt to neglect our national interests either immediate or remote, and we do not cherish feelings favourable to Russia and hostile to France. We have not, like the quack m Moliere's farce, changed the place of our vitals— our vital interests; and our sympathies are not with those whose schemes are full of danger for us, nor are our feelings of ill will directed, on the other band, against those whose cause is common with oar own. And Mr. Cobden, who takes this really degrading view of German intelligence and spirit, blames Lord John Russell sharply for having describee) i the German Couits as corrupted by Russia, and warns him of alluding so openly and nncomplimentarily to governments, the people under which are co educated that you may bay bread m the Latin language if yon do not know German. Yet Mr. Cobden, who thus lectures Lord John on speaking so as to be heard by folks co learned as to know the Latin for bread, asserts for himself the right to speak without reserve, and as if debates were not reported, and uses this right pretty freely, and offensively, aa regards France, and the ruling dynasty.

But when Mr. Cobden has an argument m hand all principles and facts must bend to its exigencies. Ha. will soon find all virtues m despotism. He already sneers at the generous sentiments of a free people, and talks like an old Tory lord of " pothouse politicians." Why are these Germans so much wiser than we are m their policy? not merely because their bakers know the Latin lor bread, hut because they have the advantage of an institution of despotism. I say that if the English people had the conscription, as they have m Prussia, so that when war was declared every man m the country would be liable to be called out, and every horse and cart might he taken for the purposes of the war, we should be more chary how we called out for war. Our pothouse politicians would not then be calling ont for war with Russia, but we should have a Government who would take a more moderate tone than they do, for they would have required those sacrifices that bring home the miseries of war to the people. What is there, then, m Mr. Cobden's view like a military despotism for the blessed ends of peace ? If we had the benefit of a conscription we might be as averse to war as the good Germans, even though our bakers do not understand Latin, Statement is a plastic art with Mr. Cobden. He does not scruple to represent Sir Wm, Molesworth as having told the House it was to have a I six years' war. Sir William's words having been, not that the war would be of that duration, but that the country had the means of carrying on war with ease for half a-dozen years ; and he added that before the termination of that period it would be brought to an honourable close by a bold and vigorous policy. lid charge* Lord Clarendon with disingenuousness for arguing that the vast collection of materials of war m Sebastopol could only be for purposes of pggres6ion, alleging against this inference that the strength of the fortress has been created since our army appeared before it, and the ammunition and provisions have been arriving m convoys of from 500 to 2,000 carts at a time. The strength of the fortifications has indeed been increased since the commencement of the siege, but how ? from the immense &tores accumulated m the arsenel. The guns which have been forthcoming m such abundance did not travel by cart into Sevastopol, hut were there all ready for occasion. The earth works have indeed been raised since the commencement of the siege ; but the cannon to arm them had neither to be cast nor transported, but were all at hand. They belonged to preparations of a long date. Our recent successes m the Sea of Aznff make it necessary to Mr. Cuhden's argument to change the source of Russian supplies m the Crimea. If Simpheropol and Perekop had been taken, Mr. Cobden would have asked, " What's the use ? These were not channels of supply. It is from Kertch that the enemy derives his means of subsistence." But as the supplies from Kertch have been cut off, the opposite facts are ruled absolutely, and Simpheropol and Perekop are pronounced the great magazines of the Crimea. But whence come the supplies, whatever they may be, existing m those places, especially m the former ? As for Perekop, its resources lie between the Putrid Sea and a tract of desert. And how happened it that those immensfl stores of corn were found and siezerl m the Sea of AzofF. out of any tract but that of the Crimea ? Persons well acquainted with the country have stated from the first that Kertch was the main channel of supply, and certainly it is much to be regretted that what has been done at last so successfully, and with consequences likely to be so important to the fortunes of the war, wat> not more promptly executed.. Mr. Sidney Herbert has had the candour to correct Mr. Cobden's statement respecting the Russian sources of supply, and he has quoted the French authority for the fact that the provisions seized by the combined fleets weie destined fur Sevastopol.