AMERICAN PLANES

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume 77, 20 October 1942, Page 5

AMERICAN PLANES

IMPORTANT REPORT ISSUED GOOD AND BAD POINTS LESSONS FROM BRITAIN (Rec. 10.20 a.m.) Washington, Oct. 19. A warning that in the coming months battles may be lost and crushing defeats suffered, is issued in a 10,000-word report from the Office of War Information to the public. This was designed to dispel the fog of confusion concerning American planes. It said the truth lies between two extremes of adverse and favourable criticisms. The report specifically said the Curtb P4O, Bell P 39, Airacobra Psl, and Mustang standard fighters have many good points, but are definitely inferior to foreign types in high altitude combat. Improved types are in production, but have not yet been battle tested. The chief fault of American fighters is the tardy and incomplete development ol the l Allison liquid-cooled motor. For daylight precision bombing the Flying Fortress Bl7’s and Liberaloi B24's are unsurpassed. Our medium bombers, Mitchell B2s’s and Martin B26's have no competitors. The latest Navy fighter, dive-bomber and torpedo types already in action are the best carrier planes in the world. Other types of patrol reconnaissance, cargo transport and fire spotters are satisfactory in quality within their own fields. ALLIED TEAM BETTER THAN ENEMY’S The report stressed that only results in battle provide valid standards of criticism, and no full appraisal is yet possible. Alternate superiority of the United States and Britain in various types gave the United Nations, as a team, a better choice of weapons than the enemy. The report declared that the United States aircraft industry and services were steadily developing a specialised aircraft of a high, and in some eases, sensational promise of battle performance. The report cautioned that recent air victories, especially in the*South-Wes-tern Pacific, may have resulted primarily from specialised tactical situations which will not always be so favourable. It warned the possible coming defeats and said : “When we meet 1 reversals and the pull to victory seems : to grow long and hard Americans will do well if they indulge to the full their genius for critical self-analysis.” IMPORTANCE OF RAID-WARNING SYSTEM “While asserting that America lagged in developing high altitude fighter planes, the report said they were valuable weapons in Russia and North Africa, where they were needed at relatively low altitudes. The report pointed out. that in China, where the American Volunteer Group flew P4o’s, with the aid of an excellent Chinese air raid warning system, they destroyed 218 Japanese planes with the loss of 84 American. But in the February raid ' on Darwin eight out of ten P4o's were shot down by the Japanese, mostly be--1 cause of the lack of warning. Likewise : in the Philippines Army craft were : hampered because the air raid warning system was disrupted by fifth columnists before it had once functioned. Stressing the importance of an adequate warning system to the successful operation of combat planes, the report said as the battle of the Philippines worp southwards there was often none

wore southwards there was often none at all. Furthermore. American fighter pilots lacked technical equipment and detectors to prepare for the enemy's approach. Often the first notice came when enemy planes were sighted. If our fighters were already in the air they had a fair chance of getting up and battling with the enemy. More often they had to wait for the enemy to come down to them and then slugging it out. The air raid warning system employed in China for General Chennault’s Flying Tigers is one of the finest in the ( world. The report added that it must i be repeated that all credit does not go to the pilots of the planes. A great part is due to the warning system. Falling back continuously on inadequate fields and inadequate facilities all through the Japanese drive to the South-West Pacific, the P4o's performance was decidedly less than standard. TWO NEW FIGHTERS SHOW PROMISE In the vital European theatre appraisal of the P 39 and P 49 compels the conclusion that they are not right for operation under to-day's high altotude tactics. In England two newer fighter types, the twin-engined Lockheed P3B Lightning, and single-engined Republic 847 Thunderbolt are in production, and show great promise as high altitude pursuit planes. Yet the public should be warned that neither planes is the complete answer to the fighter problem. and probably no plane ever will be. Discussing the supremacy within its own fields of the Flying Fortress and Liberator bombers, the report disputes claims of superiority sometimes made for the Lancaster bomber which carries a heavier bomb load, because it is designed to fly lower and carry less gaso-

line. American planes stripped for the same job could easily increase their bomb Load. While American air-cooled engines are generally regarded as the world peers, the report said the only liquidcooled engine of American design now in mass production and in general military use is the Allison. Its development, after starting late and carried out under great difficulties, has not yet caught up with its opposite numbers, Britain's Rolls Royce and Germany's Daimler Benz. ANTICIPATION OF WAR NEEDS

In reaching for an ideal Air Force, the United States is hampered by the impossibility of anticipating the specific demands of the war. It has also been hamstrung by disagreement in its own fighting services as to the weight and power to be wielded by air power. Despite this, the United States went to war with a well-integrated Air Force not all distributed with the maximum effect. The prime specification for United States aeroplanes was the defence of our shores. This, more than any other factor, explains our preoccupation with long-range bombers. This practically explains the failure to develop a good interceptor capable of climbing rapidly at short notice. Our entry into the war without such valuable equipment is explicable only by failure to give consideration to the possibility of full American participation in aerial warfare overseas. Subsidiary explanations are the shortage of the development of funds in peacetime years and the prevalent public faith that the United States could avoid involvement in a foreign war. In the vast revision of ideas of designs since the war began in the Europe the United States owes a vast debt to the Allies, particularly to the British, and the lessons they brought to America from battle fields. —P.A. f