Nelson Evening Mail. FRIDAY, AUGUST 28, 1942 STALINGRAD IN PERIL

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume 77, 28 August 1942, Page 4

Nelson Evening Mail. FRIDAY, AUGUST 28, 1942 STALINGRAD IN PERIL

SUCCESSFUL as the encouraging Russian counter-stroke on the Moscow front has been so far it appears no more than an attempt to divert enemy strength from Stalingrad. As von Bock throws in everything regardless of cost in his three-pronged i drive on the steel city its position becomes daily more grave. Following the well-known sequence of Nazi blitz technique the Germans judge that the time is ripe to try to break the morale of the inhabitants, disrupt industries and hinder rail and river traffic by intensive bombing. In spite of anti-aircraft and fighter defence it is feared that civilians have suffered heavily. Another indication that the Germans think they are reaching the crucial stage is the employment of well-equipped paratroops to seize vantage points behind the Soviet positions, establish forward pockets of resistance and spread con- ; fusion. Meantime the German massed tanks drive on at an aston- ■ ishing pace under their air umbrella j in an attempt to deepen the wedge * already cut in the outer defences. < The Russians will fight every inch : . of the way but it is questionable whe- j ther the best that Marshal Timo- j shenko can do will be sufficient to 1 parry the blow in what the Russians 1 call their “solar plexus.” They have never minimised the danger partly t because they are realists and partly 1 perhaps with the intention of ijn- * pressing London and Washington < about the urgent need for a diversion. If a second front in the west * were to be started to-morrow it is J doubtful whether it would draw off f much of the hitting power already f in position for the Stalingrad assault. s Local diversions such as that on the Moscow sector might have a better c chance of doing so but the steel city 1 and the Volga waterway are glittering prizes from the possession of which the Germans will not now be : lightly turned aside. Unless something unforeseen happens Stalingrad J

will only be saved by fighting the issue out on the spot. Moscow and Leningrad were reprieved at the eleventh hour last year but they had much better natural and man-made defences than has Stalingrad and they were never in the imminent

danger in which Stalingrad stands a this moment. The Germans toe have improved their assault tactics this"season and Sebastopol, greates fortress of them all, was unable tc withstand the terrific mechanised battering ram which the Nazis sen against it. Stalingrad’s main defensive line was the Don loop whirl was held so stubbornly for several weeks until the latest enemy crossing in force to the east bank. Now they are making all speed to try tc prevent the siege stage from setting

in round their objective. Loss of Stalingrad and severing of tlie Volga artery would be the greatest single blow which has yet befallen the Russians. The chief armament city of the south would have gone; four-fifths of the Soviet oil supply would be cut off, for it would not need tlie loss of Baku to make its supplies unavailable to the north. Astrakan could scarcely be expected to hold out for very long if Stalingrad fell and the tankers and barges moving up the Caspian would become favourite targets for Nazi bombers. Further, the water route for Allied supplies coming through Iran by way of the Persian Gulf would become practically untenable. The food shortage would be accen-

tuated and a much greater strain thrown on remaining Soviet resources. Already they are carrying a terrific load. Half of Soviet coal is gone, three-fifths of their iron ore, a big slice of the best food-produc-ing land, some of the chief industrial centres, while now the main oil supply is seriously threatened. To lose all these sinews of war and yet maintain war potential at a high level without a tremendous amount of outside help would seem impossible. Apart from tlie diversion round .•' Rjev and Kalinin there are two other! potentially bright spots in an unpromising picture. First, industrial . reserves and the production capacity <

of the Urals region may be much greater and more developed than has been disclosed. Secondly, if Stalingrad and the lower Volga have to be yielded, Marshal Timoshenko’s forces based on this sector may be able to withdraw intact still further until winter arrives to halt or slow up the German advance. Under the most intense pressure the Russian armies have not cracked and it has always been one of the two major aims of Nazi strategy to destroy them. Painful as is the sacrifice of precious resources and lifelines, it would be preferable in the long run to the destruction of the Soviet forces in the field, for that could be decisive to Russia as a knock-out blow.