Nelson Evening Mail WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 14, 1931 INDIAN CONFERENCE

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume LXIV, 14 January 1931, Page 4

Nelson Evening Mail WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 14, 1931 INDIAN CONFERENCE

AT last something concrete has emerged from the deliberations of the Indian Conference. This is the Report of the Federal Structure Committee, in which occurs the suggestion that .the future Constitution of India shall provide that executive power and authority shall be vested in the Crown, or in the GovernorGeneral as representing the Crown, and there shall be a Council of Ministers appointed by the Governor-General.” And further “it is suggested that the instrument of instructions should direct him to appoint those persons who command the confidence of the Legislature, and it follows that they would retain office only so long as they retain that confidence.” Of course these provisions have to be adopted, first by the Conference as a whole, and subsequently by the British Parliament, and require to be incorporated by it in the Act which shall amend the Constitution of India as formulated by the notorious Montagu-Clielmsford Act. But if the Federal Structure Committee’s Report is so adopted and implemented, then the British Parliament would appear to have lost much, and the Crown to have gained a great deal, in relationship to the government of British India. Heretofore the Governor-Gen-eral has been responsible to the British Parliament, and through it to the Crown. The Federal Structure Committee’s Report appears to eliminate the British Government’s authority over Governor-General and Government of India, and to place the Crown in such position of authority vacated by the British Government, but it will have few, if any, functions to perform, since the Governor-General of India will not be responsible to the British Government, but to the King. In other words the Committee recommends that the Federal Government of India shall be given the same status as any one of the Dominion Governments, in that it shall be responsible to the Governor-General of India, who shall be responsible directly to the Crown. So far, the precis of the Committee’s Report does not say in what manner the Governor-General shall be appointed. In the case of a Dominion, the GovernorGeneral, as was exemplified recently in Australia, is nominated by its Government, and appointed by the King, who presumably may, or may not, consult the British Government as to the appointment. It will be noticed furthermore that though the Governor-General of India will appoint a Council of Ministers, who presumably shall be his Executive Ministers in the Government of India, it is suggested that he shall “appoint those persons who command the confidence of the Legislature,” and that they shall “retain office only so long as they retain that confidence.” These suggestions raise a very serious question, and make the method, of appointing the Governor-General a matter of the first importance. All would be w r ell if the Governor-General, liis Council of Ministers, and the Legislature were loyal to the Crown and the British Raj. But if by chance such people as the Ghandisls captured the Legislature, the Council of Ministers would have lost the confidence of that body, and the Governor-General would appear to bo obliged to nominate a Government composed of secessionists, in which case there would be much trouble in India. The Report definitely states that the “executive-power and authority shall be vested in the Crown, or in the Gover-nor-General as representative of the Crown,” but how is that authority to be enforced in the face of a Legislature which may be disaffected towards the Crown and the British Raj ? The Simon Commission’s Report provided that in case of a deadlock between the Government of India and the Legislature, the Governor-General, or Viceroy, should be in a position to enforce law and order. True, the Federal Structure Committee would give him command of the army, and would make him responsible for the defence of the country and for the management of its external affairs, but, so far as the cabled precis discloses, this most important question of the enforcement of authority in the face of a disaffected Legislature does not appear to have been provided for. The most salient feature of the Report is the enhanced prestige and authority of the Crown. That plainly is conceded. The Crown is visualised as the keystone of India’s federal arch. Without the Crown there can be no grand, complete, and stable federation of India; and that being so, it would naturally seem to follow tint those political elements which desire to consummate such a federation will provide fully and completely for the maintenance of the Crown’s authority in all circumstances. Otherwise the structure which they would build will

obviously be unstable, and their labours will result in weakening, instead of strengthening, the good government of India.