Nelson Evening Mail. THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 1916. WAR OUTLOOK.

Nelson Evening Mail, 21 September 1916, Page 4

Nelson Evening Mail. THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 1916. WAR OUTLOOK.

WHAT the war prospects are no man i can tell with certainty., for how long the Germans will 'be able to fight after they are beaten it is impossible to teli. Certainly they will continue so long as they have the power, for they will have no alternative, and therefore the question resolves itself into what reserve power have they got? At the beginning of hostilities the Germans were greatly superior to their*enemies in battle. Their

striking force was ready, whereas the Allies were unable to use their great strength in the field. Yet, despite Germany's overwhelming strength, she was not able to achieve definite results, and will it not follow that the Allies' ascendency will have to be most marked for decisive results 'to 'be achieved? At the battle of Waterloo Napoleon fought on after the tide had turned' definitely agaLust him, and he fought to the end apparently in the hope that something would turn up to his advantage. And there is every reason to believe that Germany will do the same. The great danger that faced the Allies 'in the early stages of the war and) in fact until the beginning of this year, was that they ' were not able to turn their infinitely superior resources into account in the field. This danger has now definitely passed. "We can now regard the future with absolute confidence," said the French Premier the other day, hut we must face the fact that the enemy are •still powerful and : will desperately resist to the 'bitter end." 'Other observers, whose views are entitled to respect, believe in a sudden collapse of the enemy. Certainly, if Germany decides to hold her present extensive lines too long there is every reason to believe that a great collapse will come; but will she not shorten them before it is too late? Falkenhayn, it was stated at the time of his dismissal, favoured shortening the lines. He had based great hopes on Verdun, but ihad failed. From a military point of view his decision was well founded, but others believed that there were still oiards that Germany could, play with hopes W ultimate success. Hindenburg was such a believer, and according to the cables he believes that a great offensive in the Balkans and on the Southern [Russian front will give results that will lead to Germany regaining the initiative. But the Germans are too late. They failed to smash Russia, they failed to break the French line at Verdun, and they will fai!l in the Balkans, for the Allies have turned their great resources to account, and are now infinitely superior. The tightening ring of steel must 'be causing the German leaders much concern, and with pressure on all sides, any tendency to rusli forces from one point to another may lead to panic and the collapse of Germany's resistance. This is what may and what probably will happen, but there is no certainty. The Allies are basing their future operations on the only sound assumption possible, that -German resistance will last for some considerable time yet. And the stronger the Allies become the sooner will the war end in their favour.