CORRESPONDENCE.

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume XVI, Issue 74, 28 March 1881, Page 4

CORRESPONDENCE.

AND AFGHANISTAN; To thb Bdixoe'ofthh "Etening Mail." « Sib,— ln the Colonik of last Thursday week there appeared an article headed .Gan&ahar; in which such peculiar charge? v ;were advanced against Earl BeacbnSfieia," iEarl Tytton^ the House of Lords and the : Afghan policy of the la-te OoVernment that I am constrained to .take up my in their behalf, especially as no one has yet stooped to pick up the gage thrown down by your contemporary. ■•.■ • <Nbw the Colonist appears to assume trial the' Afghan war was undertaken to the ambitious longings of Lord Beaconsfield ;" but there existed Reasons and arguments for embarking on that war, other than the sapient one ujamed above, which were advanced by theiflovernment and the Conservative Preos at' the time of the outbreak, and I will proceed to state briefly the nature of those reasons. It was well known' by the late Indian Government that Russia had been in constant communication with the Ameer Shore Ali as far back as 1873, and as each following year further developed, the Russian adyjmce; in Asia, bo did the relations between St Petersburg and Cabul assume aj more confidential form,, WheniEurOpean affairs reached such a crisis that hostilities seemed more than imminent , between England and Russia, the latter Power pushed forward, an. expedition in Central' Asia Hinder General Lomakin, whose division would co-operate with Kaufmarin in Turkestan, and no doubt can now remain, that the destination of the combined cbrps d'armee was either Mer.y or Herat, for on the news reaching Lomakin in August 1878 that the signing of the Berlin Treaty was tin fait accompli, the. General immediately executed a masterly retreat from his exposed and forward .position ], the military retirement for the moment became necessary, but preparations were made to despatch a large and efficient force i under the^command of General Lazareff, accompanied by a most extensive commissariat and waggon, train • in the meantime; ' viz, between the^ recall of General Lomakin and the advauce of Lazareff, which did- not take place till June! 1879; many months being occupied in preparation, the diplomatic element of the programme was being car- ; ried out with, signal success at Cabul, for no less a person than General Stolietoff- was enjoying the hos^itajity. of the Ameer, with the intention of concluding a defensive treaty between the Russian Cabinet and Shere Ali ; and it is needless for me to add that Stolietoff was most successful in attaining' his purpose. Now we have reached a definite paint. , A Russian envoy was not only entertained by the Ameer in strict opposition to our known wishes, but a defensive . alliance of the most intimate character had been concluded between them, the provisions of which were most deleterious to our interests in the present, and highly dangerous in the future. In the face of these circumstances what were we to do ? Our future was immiaently threatened by a great Power smarting under the shame of a signal diplomatic defeat received at the hands of the English Government, a Power which could take the field against us in Europe and Asia simultaneously, and I ask again what were we to do ? We have been told over ond over again what we should not have done, but a reasonable substitute for that policy which has been so immeasurably condemned has never been offered to her Majesty's late Administration. The Marquis of Salisbury showed the Government policy by -. demanding the withdrawal of Stolietoff' s Mission from Cabul "as at variance with the repeated pledges given by Russia that Cabul was beyond the scope of her political action," and the tone' of the Indian Government was no 'less decided, when Lord Lytton madej bis famous statement in the Simla j manife4tp of ,1878, that "the British! Government would not tolerate interference on the part of any other Power in the internal affairs of Afghanistan." \ This brings us to the salient feature of the) Afghan question :-— Who is to have the predominating influence in Afghanistan, England or Russia ? And that is the point. ' You_may employ the most original rhetorical phrases in denunciation of a Ministry, but you do not answer by that means the argument of Lord.jjytton, and if it is admitted that English influence should prevail rather than that of Russia, how was our moral; ; power to .be exercised in the face of the facts I have recorded, and when the Ameer Shere Ali had at his disposal 68 regiments of regular infantry chiefly armed with; modern weapons, 16 regiments of, cavalry, about 300 gunß with art immense" quantity of powder and munitions of war, and all this vast military armament to be directed by Russian officers, Russian engineering science- available for the fortification of ther asses, and the Russian exchequer to be largely drawn' upon?. Add to this the diabolical plan of Muscovite policy to send emissaries into every part of Afghanistan, and, where possible,, across the Indian frontier to raise the native population ; these were the reasons which induced the Beaconsfield Government and the Viceroy of India to advance a British army across the Indus and through the Passes into Afghanistan. To argue the question only on grounds altogether outside the causes which produced the action is to arrive at a judgment at once inconsistent and illogical. Before, however, co'mmeneing hostilities, Lord Lytton despatched an embassy to Cabul under Sir Neville Chamberlain to try and amicably adjust the great matter between us, but Major Cavagnari, the officer named by Sir Neville to proceed to the Capital was stopped by the presence of an armed force at the village of Lala Cheena in the vicinity of Fort Ali Musjid on the 21st September 1878 at the express command of the AnTeer Shere Ali, There was consequently only one course open for us to adopt, and it is needless for me to dwell on the brilliant success •whicH, .^e^ed' io^i; 'iarm's throughout the'eampaigri, but,iber<3 : ia one point of political sjjgnifipajwe deserving notice,

After the masterly victory gained hy General Roberts at the Peiwah Khotal, , why did we not take Cabtii -?. The result of the battle placed the city entirely at our mercy, ,ahd if our policy had beW one of " aggression and annexation" why, djd we not at once capture it ? The reason against doing co was simply this, that an occupation of the Capital might have caused the disintegration of Afghanistan and was diametrically opposed to the policy we all along had in view, of maintaining a free and independent Afghanistan. Jn a passage in the article in Colonist we read, "the annexation of any territory, bejyond what was asserted to be necessary ;for the rectification of the frontier, had |been repeatedly and distinctly disjavowed." Now this policy was strictly maintained until the murder of our Em- ], ; bassy at Cabul, ' The new line of frontier ceded to us by the Treaty of JGandamak was in every respect what iit has been described, "a scientific frontier," and I must remark again, in jthis instance, that rhetorical perorations form no argument against it, and though jit is urged by the Colonist that military authority has issued an adverse judgment, yet on the other hand eminent military authority has supported the treaty, and I would mention the namea of Lord Napier of Magdala, General JHamley and General Sir H.C. Rawlinisobi as being amougst the latter class. ! To defend the details of the treaty pf Gandamak would form more, (ban an' article "in itself, so I will merely on to its principal features. The Khyber Pass was to be retained by us fts forming the principal route from Cabul to India ; the Khyberis were to receive a subsidy for the performance of certain specified services. The K'hufam Valley is the next point; the IValley was temporarily allotted, to us, the positions to be pennamently occupied were to be settled by a Commission, the principle that we should only hold strategical points so as to command the valley from a military and political point of viewbeing duly considered in the $ew arrangement, The valley of Pisnin is the last frontier point of importance, and it was decided to hold this position to check any advance by way of Herat, as from this base we could anticipate any invasion from the North West, by occupying Cahdahar or if necessary Herat itself. In spite of t*he policy of annexation the Conservative party is accused of, they gave tip Candahar to Yacoob Khan. Canilahar is admitted . by all competent to jludge to be the fairest district in Afghanistan, and I would urge that, considering the admirable militaryand political rioßition we should have acquired by tne annexation of the province, the charge of coveting territory, beyond that which was necessary for, the protpction of our frontier, reiterated over and over again by the prominent member, of the Liberal party, cannot be sustained ; it was particularly pointed olufc by the Government at; the time, that if we annexed Candahar the idea ojf a united Afghanistan must be given dp, and, if the horrible tragedy at Cabul had nob occurred, the decision in regard t\> the province would have been faithfully adhered to. The murder of Sir Louis Cavagnari was the foulest act in the annals of modern Asiatic history ; our attitude was, of course, immediately changed thereby, and it would be the height; of unreasonableness to consider that we were bound by any pledges given before the assassination to Ifacoob Khan, when every principle of international honor had been outraged by his subjects, and very probably by himself also. Ifc is almost unnecessary W refer to General Roberta masterly victory on the Charasiab Heights, his rapid march through the Sbutargardan and his able administration, both in a political and a military sense, ©f the affairs o{ Northern Afghanistan. Now ijthink we shall be somewhat better prepared to give judgment upon the question of retaining Candahar than if tl c many and various elements which c( mpose the Afghan question bad not boen touched upon. The murder ot Cavagnari Bet; ua free from any declaration made upon the subject of Candahar to Yacoob Khan, and therefore to refuse on conscientious grounds td annex would be inconsistent, aa the ex-Ameer has entirely failed to perform hfe part of the compact. The state of Afghanistan at the present time is, pur ti simple, one of apparently hopeless confusion as regards good government, tbje Ameer Abdul Rahman is growing leas popular every day, his authority does not even extend to Ghazin, there is! .Ayoob Khan and the hornets' nest at) Herat ever willing to strike a blow at, his Ameerehip, a telegram may reach us at any moment that he has fled to Tasbkend, or that a revolt led by gome Baruckzai Sirdar is in operation a^ainet him. I do not say that such a j state of things will occur, but it! i» quite possible. At Herat matters are evidently in a hopeless way, (error reigns supreme, and one can only think that some safety valve must eoooer or later be found whereby tbje superfluous energy of the greet families and their adherents may find en escape; whether an attempt will be made on Ghueni or Caudahar it would be unwise (o predict. An expedition fr>m Herat headed by Ayoob Khan w iuld most probably be directed upon Cindahar on the withdrawal of our gi rriaon, and with such a title to the sovereign ty of Afghanistan as Ayoob Khan possesses, we may rest assured that, once firmly established in Candafoe.r, a blow will be struck Bt Northern Afghanistan, vrhicb, if not successful, would piuDge ibe whole country into civil war. As I have stated, our reason fo' evacuating Candahar before the ac sapetQßtion of Cavagnari was to maintain an integral Afghanistan. That id >a being at an end, and the British in mi litary occupation of Cnndabar, I may be! tfcking up, in the opinion of the Colonist, a most extraordinary position when X maintain that it is our duty an thb mightiest and most civilized nation ofitbe oge to provide for the safety and welfare of the Kacdahans and the various tribes which would come under our jurisdiction if we annexed the district. Every reasonable hope of a stable Native Government is now at an end. We have, governed Candthar with BQCceBS lot' two years, the. climate is pood, its resources are abundant, the majority of the commercial clbeß6,b are in|fayor of asj a»d there i ja 90f,

reason to suppose that the country would flourish under our rule, whilst it would always be free front those attacks which periodically visit it. Its capacity ior defence has been denounced by the Coloniti because what it terms <! Ayoob Khan's dash at Candabar" (which wwars r in reality ,a alow march) proved its exposure to attack. Then if that ja. the. case it is . necessary that suob an important position should be properly fortified by science, and it is not likely that once in possession of the district our communications will ever be allowed to be imperfect. The ordinary force would be sufficient to hold the country, and in a case of exigency/ of which there is no prospect /or some time to come (I allude to a demonstration on the part of Russia) reinforcements oould always be ordered up, and it is worthy of coßsiderati'on that the military and civilian opinion of India is in favor of the retention. Before leaving this subjeot, thereis a paragraph io the Colonist I cannot understand. Sl These incessant extensions of frontier cannot go on, or the entire. wealth and strength of the Empire would be far from luffi cient to defend them." I must admit I do not really see the force of the argument . 1 The last point touched upon by your contemporary is the audacity of the House of Lords in diacu eeing a question on which it was peculiarly qualified to judge, so many, members of both parties of the .Upper House being intimately connected atone time or another with the Indian Office or with India iteelf. Now, before proceeding further I must here reoord my protest 9gaiost the system of personal souse adopted by your contemporary ; it is impossible for me, with my respect for the Earl of Lytton as a man, to recognise the remarks I have drawn attention to The Colonist ' acoepta for gaanted that the Candahar question would not have come on for discussion in the Commons unless a motion relative to the matter bad been sent down from the Lords.; in that case it is only an argument in favor of the Upper House, for the larger portion, I might say the whole; of the great Conservative party would have had their views unrepresented, and it must be borne in mind that the Tory community advocates the retention of Candahar on the grounds of njeroy and justice, just as much as the Liberals reject it on similar principles. The House of Lords is also acoused of bringing on tbia matter before the Irish Land Bills ere passed. I believe I am right in saying that the measures will not be introduced in the Commons until the 7(b April, and by that time Candahar may be evacuated, and as drder should be maintained in Ireland before the subject of Land Reform receives the attention of Parliament, the passing of the new lavs will not signify for one or possibly two days, a!od as Mr Gladstone intends to rise for the Easter, reoess on the Bth April, the Ministry might dispense with the vacation this year, be loyal to tbeir principles, and discuss Ireland. Too SBB it is only a question of holidays after all, . Before concluding this lengthy paoer, I would like to point out that Earl Granville ia a very important and responsible element in Mr Gladstone's Cabioef, and the noble Lord replying to (he Earl of Beaconsfield'n I criticisms on the Queen's speech, said "he rejoiced Io hear that Lord Lytton intended to bring 'be Afghan question before the House." So the present, as well as theiate. Ministry, the Commons as well as the Lords, must all incur the dire displeasure of your contemporary. How could Lard Lytton refuse to speak after such a polite invitation from his noble friend the Foreign Secretary ?— I am, yours, etc, Conservative. i ;