THE REVERSE IN AFGHANISTAN.

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume XV, Issue 224, 24 September 1880, Page 4

THE REVERSE IN AFGHANISTAN.

[OPINKNS OP THE PRESB.] The "Saturday Review" says: — "Twice within a year and a half English troops have suffered serious defeats for which there had been no precedent

since the destruction of Eipbinstone's army in the first retreat from Cabul. The last misfortune recalls. the memory of Isandula ; and its effects are likely to be toore serious. The English advance icio Zululand was then delayed i for several weeks ; but the enemy made no attempt to follow up the viotory, and ultimately success was from the first absolutely certain. Tbe calamity which has now occurred may probably have wide political consequences, including tbe neoeesity of retrieving at any cost tbe military reputation which has been so grievously compromised. The Indian Government would probably have j determined upon the evacuation of Candabar, though, as Lord Hartington said on Tuesday, the disposal of the city and territory formed no part of the arrangement with Ahdul Rahman. Retirement will now be more difficult, if indeed Candabar is still in English possession ; and it ia possible that Ayoub may become a formidable competitor for the throne of Cabu). An Ameer who i 8 forced to dispense with (he possession of Herat and Candabar can scnrcely hope to be permanently acknowledged as a notional ruler. * * Tbe recent disaster will destroy for tbe. time tbe wholesome impression which bad been produced. The success of an Afghan force will be reported with exaggeration throughout the country, and it is even possible Sir Donald Stewart may be compelled to fight once more for the possession of Cabul, Even if Abdul Rahman and his supporters have the good sense to abide by the settlement which bas lately been effected, bis own position will be seriously (^acted by the success of his kinsman and ; rival." - The Spectator says :— v Men reap what they have sown. The British have undertaken no enterprise in Asia so unjustifible as the second invasion of Afghanistan, and have suffered in none so much losb or such deep humiliation. We described the country a fortnight since as a morass, from which the Government must extricate itself 5 but we ought rather to have called it a quicksand, from which extrication might prove impossible. Every step the nation takes to escape seems to land its feet in a yet more, tenacious sand. The first rush was no Sooner ' over, and a Bemblatoa of peace Becured by the extorted: Treaty OffeGrundamuk; than the murder of tha Resident compelled us to commence a second and far more extensive campaign. That was no Booner terminated, after a terrible expenditure both of money and live?, and a new Native Government acknowledged and a withdrawal arranged, than a, frightful , disaster once morerenders it imperative not only to stand fast, but to increase tha already large army which is exhausting the resources i of India in an admittedly sterile effort. Providence seems to mock at our ef* forts to' undo the mischief we have wrought, and to insist that the nation, for once, shall see and hear the full consequences of its crime. There is even a kind of dramatic Gompletenens; in the method of our punishment. ■ The nominal object of our invasion — in reality, a gross instance of buccaneering — was to force tbe Afghans to admit a i British Resident in Cabul, and [because we succeeded, because the Resident was at last accepted, we were drngged into a second war, employing 60. C00 men. We were still unwilling to retire I without something to show for all the jl lives and money expended, and therefore kept Candaharin our own hands, or those of our vassal ; and because we kept it, we have again to employ our 'whole strength to avenge a defeat which, unavenged, may turn the whole course of history." . The Times has a carefully-expressed article on the bearing of the Afghan disaster on our relation with India". * It i says:— "lt has been for Jhe cake of India that we have taken inland a distant task which .has been, a drain upon our resources, an,d nor left m bo' much the less able to Mg^rt-, ourselves with effect in any otheV quarter. L We posy say withtruth that, whatever bappens in ; almost any "part 6/ We* Old (World, itis. to its effect on Indin that pur thoughts soon turn. If R UBB i a moves either infEurope or -in Asm : we conclude at ofieViW^lfidia'most b^her objective point. Jf -our troops suffer paster anywhere, we at once whaV-tbe -effect wiftfbe upon the impressible Indian mind^xlcdia, and the communications sth IndJ B , are the key to so large a parY% ouVjoreign policy that it would Ve/^no grejrt,, exaggeration to say that they the whole of it. If England has annexed India, it ia scarcely leWtirue' that India hae annexed England. What sufficient advantage, it must be naked, 90 we receive from India in return ?: The advantages we confer are bbyious enough; but co, too, are the {sacrifices we make in conferring them." 'The time has surety come for us to realise our p'oßitio'ff.ia'lbdiaj and to see how far it really demands (ropi, us. all .that' we have been content 'to^eive'fprit.^ I Tbe Pall Mall Oai&ette Bnyi 'that the Fnglish army is teaching the Afghans' the art of war,, the) value b'fvbree'ch'r f loaders, and the use of rifled artillery. Napoleon found a Europe trained to antiquated maximß and practices of, war; be defeated army after army till a school of generals arose wha.had learned tnrougb defeat to, become victorious.Then at last the master fell under the blows of his pupils. It is' hot ; impossible that we may be gradually teaching the warliketribea hbwtoTejsist the might of civilised^ armieß. When the odds are five To one in men and six to obe in guns against us;* whehT/the,. g'untfers turn out to be well taught, .and many of tbe infantry are armed with breechloaders which they know how to use, tbe question may well arise whether we are not strengthening the Afghan nation without rendering it friendly. '■ „ ; The Qaulqis has tl c following arliJe on the disaster in Afghanistan: "(Truly Erglandhis on adnrirableicountry, which every day gives^ neWJ proofs of its sang frotd under all circumstances. The national amourpfopre is the first feeling. A very natural emotion seized the nation on the intelligence of the blow that had struck it, but phlegmatic John Bull, soon recovered self-poessssion. In any other country such a disaster would, have i ~

caused. a. fearful panic an^ a dj&tutjbance in ihe:]na|iojial cqiiUlbriufcol ■) Bat ip England there was* nothing of the kind]. , Eacfy made it a, ppoint .orf r honor totkpep his feelings to niinVelf. 'Oflicial clrolei betray no r disquietude,, and even the financial world remains calm and shows its ' cocficlenfie in allowing no attack to be mode on Eugian^s credit." ' j