WHAT AUSTRIA CAN DO.

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume XIII, Issue 101, 29 April 1878, Page 4

WHAT AUSTRIA CAN DO.

[From the Standard.]

Were Braila in the possession of the Austrians, communication by land between the invading army of Russia and its original base in tbat country would be arrested. A simple cavalry raid — to be accomplished in a day— would interrupt the western railway, and that from seven to nine days would suffice to bring & strong Austrian force within gunshot of Brails. Should Austria for any renson prefer to strike a blow further South, she could bring op troops to Kronstadt by railway, from whence a single short march would bring them to the frontier and inwith seven miles of Bucharpßt. She might undertake both operations simultaneously, thus covering the army directed on Bucharest by the nrmy marching on Bmila. In short, she would by either of these operations have Russia by the throat, and unlees the latter were soon relieved, she would, as regards the army of invasion, be strangled. The were threat of her intention to occupy the Principalities was in 1854, sufficient to cause the Russians to raise the Bipge of Silistria, and re-croas the truth in all haste.

Circumstances are certainly different now, for in 1854 the Black Sea was closed to Russia, while at present she ia Rl liberty to to transport food, stores, and reinforcement by water. Still, with her feeble marine, she could hardly succeed in accomplishing suddenly by Bhipß what Bhe has hitherto accomplished by railway. Beside?, with England straining at the leash, Austria intervening between Constantinople end Bessarabiß, and Uoumania, embittered by the treatment she is receiving the Turks might pluck up epirit and renew (he war. Id thpt ease the dieappparance of every Russian craft from the Blntk Sea would immediately follow as a matter of course, and the forceaj of Czar would find themselves in a gigantic Sedan. Exhausted as the theatre of war has been, there is no aoubt still a large supply of meat and forage to be found south of the Balkans ; but en army requires for its existence, at all events for its efficiency, much more than thaf, and an interruption for even a few days in the flow of stores and reinforcements causes severe Buffering, nn absolute stoppage means virtual destruction. The moral effect would also be Berious, and even the stolid Russian soldier would fight badly if he knew be were cut off from his country, however large the district left in hie occupation,

Besides there is no reason why Auetria, supported ns she would probably be, by a couple of British corps d'armee and the whole British fleet, should no 6 take active measures to bring the war to an end. With a permanent army of Bbout 286,000 men, capable of being extended in time of war, to 1,137,000, Austria could well spare 300,000 men for operations bo near her own frontier. 100,000 men would be ample to occupy the neck of land between Braila and her own borders. 50,000 would suffice to occupy Wallachio, for we may be certain that the Roumanians at the worst would offer no opposition } while 150,000 would be available for a march to Constantinople in pursuit of the Russian army. It is far from improbable indeed that the 50,000 men spoken of as required for the occupation of Wallachia would not be needed. The Roumanians would, as far as can be judged from the present feeling, welcome the Austrians as deliverers from the fatel patronage of Kussia, end at the very worst the Auetrians could disarm the Roumanians before crossing the Danube. It would, however, in my opinion, be unnecessary for Austria to undertake any such active operations. A similar occupation of the Braila-Kronstadt line would suffice, The Russian lice of communication between Constantinople and Beesarabia is, as the crow fiies, by land about 440 miles, and the difficulty of bringing stores and reinforcements over so great a dietance may be imagined. A large portion of the invading army ib, moreover, echeloned along this line, and the force which she could collect at any one point to ward off or deliver a blow is, compared to the paper strength of the army, very small. A single Austrian corps d'armee marching perpendicularly on the line of communication of the Rusaianß would paralyse the latter as soon as the project began to be executed. The invaders would, in fact, wither away at once, or be stricken motionless as would a bullock were a pin plunged into the spinal marrow.

Of course it will be eaid that the possibility of such & move has been foreseen and guarded against, and that Russia ib already massing troops in Roumania. Setting apart the foot that there has been no confirmation of this intelligence, we may judge from the history of the past how difficult it would be to take co prudent a measure of precaution. When the railways and rolling stock were in comparatively good condition, and bufc one single object was pursued, it was found impossible to collect south of the Danube more than 145,000 fighting men, and that number was not increased till after the end of August. Now, with the railways and rolling stock worn by long and hard usage, and a double task for the Russian War Office, it would be by no means easy to collect 150,000 men in Roumania. Equally difficult would it be to bring into Moldavia 150,000 men to fight an Austrian army, which, before their arrival would have ample time to fortify positions at the most important strategical points.

Moreover there would be the Gallician frontier to defend; It may be suggested that the Russian army iv Poland would try a counter stroke to relieve their comrades in Turkay; but the Gallician frontier is garnished by strong forts, and it would hardly be safe to denude the interior of Poland of troops. From Russia, therefore, Austria has nothing to fear, and a simple concentration of Austrian troops on the Roumanian western frontier would be a hint to retire which the Russians could not dare to negiect. The game being thus so completely in her own hands, and so easy to play without any great expense to the Empire, it will be surprising if Austria does not play it.