ENGLAND'S INDIAN RESOURCES.

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume XIII, Issue 100, 27 April 1878, Page 4

ENGLAND'S INDIAN RESOURCES.

A contemporary says:— We have before^ us a copy of « The Times of India," published at Bombay, in which the subject of war with Russia n Very ably discussed, and coming from an English pen, bearing somewhat tlie eeal of a semi-official document, we think an abridgement, and extracts from it will be perused with interest by our renders. The writer jin the » Times,*' evidently a military authority, exhibits b thorough acquaintance with the great wars. of modern times, and supplies figures and facts that are of very special interest at the present time. From his standpoint, he, of course, regards Russia as being wholly in ilie "wrong with Turkey, and defiant and insulting to.wards England, presuming on " the impression which prevails on the Continent, that England is so wedded to peace that she will submit to almost any humiliation rather than declare war." After suggesting to the Czar that his father made the same fatel mistake in 1853, he picks up the assumed difficulties in the path of. England, and characterizes them as "particular delusions" tbat "are especially mischievous to those who harbor them,"— Russia, in this case. Responding to "a notion abroad that that the British Empire, though irresistible ot Eea, would be of no great account when fighting, without allies, one of the great military monarchies on land," he claims that England has resources for war which none of the military Powerß pat excellence poseesee. and it is precisely in B war with Russia, tba.t these resources could be most expeditiously, and with the leest cost and friction brought into play. "If England bas'to fi^ht in ibis quarrel, it is certain that India will fight too, arid will fight with a will," for it is in a war with the great semi-Asiatic Empire of Russia that the limitless numbers of India could, with most certainty and effect, come into operation to counterbalance the weight in the Seld of the hordes and masses of a power so prodigal of life." "To send 60,000 troops to Varna would be useless. If a force leaves England no less than 100,000 men should be sent, and this army ahsuld be supplemented by another 100,000 from India. We shall have to deal with masses, and we must aot by masses." THE "WAR "WOULD BE POPULAR, It is affirmed by t\\e writer that a war against Russia would be highly popular in India and throughout the East. The Mogul and the Pathan would gladly enlist, and the Shiabs and the Tunis would stifle their animosities in view 'of the Russian eagle. The Moslems of India regard the war against Turkey as a monstrous act of wickedness, and from the 118,000,000 of Mahommedans in the East, England could have all the material of war only for the making of it, for the numbers procurable are practically unlimited. " England can," says the writer, "by simply willing it, put in the field such masses of troops tbat even the Northern (Colossus would have to yield to their superior, numbers. Will any one who gives the matter a moment's thought count this assertion wild or improbable ? Is it extravagant and unreasonable to declare that Great Britain, with a population of 30,000,000, disposing of a population of 240,000,000 in India, cannot assemble in camps and drill a million soldiers? Russia, with a population of 86,000,000, sparsely covering the wildest anJ most inhospitable parts of Europe and Asia, can do as much. England could, with the greatest ease, without crippling her commerce or putting any appreciable strain on tbe population which are swayed by the sceptre of her Majesty, do far more." THK ENGLISH SOLDIETJT. •' It is a mischievous delusion that Great Britain and Ireland — irrespective altogether of India and the rest of the Empire — tan only produce an army, of 60,000 men for operations beyond the sea. The number of soldiers which a population of 30,000,000 can produce is simply a question of pressure. If the need ia great, any required number can be got by a turn of the screw. The army reserve system is a' device which may succeed or fall at an emergency, but the raw material for soldiers is there in abundance. A force of 100,000 men could, with the most ordinary exertion, be got ready and sent forward to the seat of war in a very limited time, and that number could be largely augmented from month to month." THE GBEAT STKENGTH OF INDIA. " Granted that half, or even three fourths, of the population could not produce soldiers capable of meeting on equal terms the troops of Russia, does any one doubt that, led by British officers, the Sikhs, the Pathans, the Goorkhae, the Rajpoots, the Mahrattas, could not withstand the children of the Czar as stoutly as the Turks at Plevna, or in the Shipka f ass ? The martial races which do not obey the Khoran would gladly fight shoulder to shoulder with those who do in this Eastern quarrel. Their warlike in. stincts and innate love of adventure would find an outlet, and passions, which pent up are a source of danger, would thus become an element of strength for tbe Empire." .... "In a war to avert the calamity of Russian domination in Asia, the Native States would no doubt feel it a privilege to send their contingents into the field."' " ;

FEELING OF THE NATIVE PRINCES. The armies of the Native States number upwards of 500,000 mem They are badly armed^ indifferently drilled* and, M a rule, very badly officered. But 300,000 of these aoldiers, provisionally oflicered and armed by the Paramount power, would be of great service, and the Native States which lent them would feel for the first time, that they were now contributing to the strength and becurity of the Empire, and sharing in its glory. The Maharajah Schindiah could send 15,000 very very fair troops ; he might be glad of the opportunity of leading them himself. Just twelve months ago the Viceroy and Governor-General, in the name of fler Majesty, made him a General of the British Army, and gave him the title of "Sword of the Empire." Surely all that was done at Delhi in January last was not a vain ceremony ! It had a meaning and the, 1 meaning was this— that the Empire of India, its Empress, its Princes, and its people aro bound together by reciprocal duties, are sharers of a common glory and will partake of a Common fortune* " tfe must rise to the great destinies which await us, if we are not unworthy of them." ' FROM INDIA TO THE BLACK SEA. " Now, as to the despatching of an army from India, military men consider it quite feasible. We have railways to bring troops to the water's edge, and in ease and at rest in transports they would travel direct to whatever spot we might eelect to disembark them, They would have no mountains to climb on their way, no tangled woods to cut through. Freah and ready they would reach the selected spot, and being at once brigaded with English soldiers, they would 6e dangerous engines of destruction to the half-dieciplioed levies of Russia, which she must bring into the fi«ld if she means war to the death. . , . Food and ammunition cnn be procured easily, and from this port, from England and frum the Mediterranean, *a constant flow of goods, clothing, and war material could all be carried by sea at small expense. As to arms, the telegraph would soon order them from England, and our home arsenals would supply guns, while India can manufacture tents. The difficulty of sending kn army from Bombay melts into nothing when we recall the fact of the marchles made inland over mountains and through forests in Abyssinia a^d Ashantee. There would be no difficulty in getting horses; Arabia and Persia can supply all tbat would be wanted." THROUGH EGYPT. " The Suez Canal, which some have idly imagined has brought India within the reach of the brigands, has really done the very reverse. The countless legions which the organizing skill and the wealth of England can call forth from the soil of this vast peninsula may, thanks to M. de Lesseps, be conveyed to the Mediterranean, to the Black Sea, to Armenia, to Varna, to the Caucasus within a few weeks, without difficulty or danger."