THE POSITIONS OF THE TURKISH AND RUSSIAN ARMIES.

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume XII, Issue 231, 29 September 1877, Page 4

THE POSITIONS OF THE TURKISH AND RUSSIAN ARMIES.

[By" Austria," in the N. Z. Herald.] The long-expected intelligence from, the army of Meheraet AH has at length arrived. The delay is easily accounted for— namely tbe absence of the field telegraph connection* the army with . the main telegraph stations. The army, starting from Eskt-Dsohuma and Rasgrad, to arrive at the Jantra, would haye to traverse a distance of 45 to 50 miles, consequently, in the absence of the field telegraph, all reports would have to be forwarded by couriers. This as a matter of course, would cause delay ia the transmission of news. However, we know that the army of Mehemet Aii, after a succession of glorious victories at Araslar, Papaskoi, Kazelevo, drove their enemy to the Jantra, at Beita, where the river is bridged; and here, or in the vicinity, ifc appears they have again met, and the result is that the Russians are again defeated with great loss, and pursued to Baokalom on the 15th September. Terrible, indeed, must have been the struggle, and in vain has the Russian Sclav sought to stem the fiery Ottoman advance. The Turk did not again seek bis hereditary foe to be repulsed; tho flat had gone forth that he should conquer; and led by brave German aud English officers, they have routed the heir-apparent to the Empire of all the Russios, inflicting a defeat more disastrous to their arms, and more annihilating to their military prestige than' the defeats inflicted by the Great Napoleon or those of the allied armies in the Crimea. It will be my endeavor to show by the telegrams published how disastrous these battles bave been to the Russian cause. The official Turkish telegrams state that Tirnova has been evacuated, and that tbe troops bad hurried forward to reinforce tbe Czarewitoh's army at Beila. Again, in the telegram of the 10th, Nicholas is stated to have been abandoned by the Russians from strategical motives. This Nicholas evidently means Nikopi, a town about 15 miles north of Tirnova, and about 20 from Beila, so that we find that the Russians have retreated, and have withdrawn the whole of their forces from the main road to the Shipka Pass to Beila, leavfng a gup of over 60 miles between the armies of the Cz3rewitch and that of General Radetzky, or in other words, the victorious army of Mehemet Aii, having thoroughly routed that of the Czare witch, the Russians have been been compelled to abandon General Radetzky to his fate, in order to save that portion which occupied the road south of Beila to Tirnova. We may assume, therefore, that at least a portion of Mehemet Ali's army has been enabled to cross the Jantra, to the south of Beila, and that it is in this direction that Colonel Valentine Baker Is operating so successfully. The telegrams of the 18th say tbat Sulieman Pasha has silenced tha Russian batteries, and now holds Trajan's road. The Agent-General informs us in. a previous telegram that Sulieman Pasha was on the road to Gabrova. The road known aa Trajan's road, runs parallel to the Balkans from the Supul or Vid to Gabrova, at whioh place it j ends. The village of Trajan, on the Osma, is situated on this road. From Trajan a road by Kolajeritza tuds across the Balkans to Tatar-Basardschik, which is on tbe maiu line of railway to Adrianople. I have previously mentioned that this Tatar-Bazardschik was one of the main depots of rhe Turkish army, therefore it is not unnatural to suppose, that a portion of the reinforcements forwarded to Sulieman Pasha should have gone by rail to this depot, and thence have crossed the Balk-ins to Trajan, and have followed tbe road running due east to Gabrovo, only about 35 milts distant. With the possession of Gabrova and Trajau's Road there would be no enemy between him and Osman Pasha, who is invested at Plevna. General Radetzky would thus be hemmed in at IShipka, without, any, prospect of relief from the Russian main. armies, which are retreating northward; consequently his surrender is but a question of timo, and depends solely on the amount of provisions he may have at hie command. We bave yet to hear what portion of Su Human Pasha's army bus beev* enabled to cross the Balkans. If hia whole armj*, 70,000 men—a portion of tbem will most undoubtedly follow the road to Tirnova, and may yet be in time for tor the grand battle, which will most likely take place between Beila and Eboli. [The above was written before tbe arrivnl of the special telegram to the Sydney Morning Herald, which states that "a rear attack by Mehemet AU aad Suiieman Pasha is feared." This shows the movements which I have supposed above are really being carried out, uud tbat the Russians are apprehensive of an attack by the combined armies, which are about lo form a junction in the manner stated,] The situation of Plevna has strangely altered. Tbe Russians, in their telegrams of the 13th iost., stuted that tbe Turkish sorties, after the capture of the redoubts before the lines ol Pleena, were all repulsed. I ventured in my last letter to predict " that we should hear more of these sorties." That prediction has been verified, for according to the official Russian telegrams Ihe Turks re-captured ail their works on the 12th instant, consequently these sories were assaults on the very redoubts that they then claimed to have in their possession, and which were actually re-taken. Thesa facts lead me

to comment on the enormous losses sustained by the Russians and Roumanians in officers. The former, with 3000 meu killed, lost 400 officers, or one officer to about every eight man; the latter, with 1200 killed, lost 300 officers, or one officer to every four men. There can be no doubt about it, but that the officers have been obliged to sacrifice themselves. The men, who unquestionally are brave, have become, through repeated defeats thoroughly disheartened, and show no longer than elan in their attacks so necessary to success, that the officers have been obliged to expose themselves to stimulate them to fresh exertions, flow fruitless this has been, we see by the fact that they have been unable to retain that which cost them. so much to gain. The assault on the lines of Plevna and its disastrous results, will remain forever momentuous in the annals of warfare, showing what ean be done by troops in the field calmly awaiting the assault of their ground. Why this assault did take place I now venture to state : The rapid advance of the army of Mehemet Aii from Eski D,sohuma to the Lom, and the defeat of the army of I theCzarewitch in threesuccessive battles '■fin the 30th and 31st of August, caused that army to retire with precipitation to the Jantra, ond to be liable at any moment to be cut in two by the advancing victorious army of Mehemet AM, Consequently the furious bombardment and general assault on the lines on the llth inst. look plaoe in the hopes that the army of Osman Pasha might be routed, when the Grand Duke Nicholas would then have hastened to tbe assistance of his nephew. The bridge thrown across the Danube at Nicopolis is another phase to my mind of the ellect of the late victories. For should the Czarewitch's army have to retreat to Sistova it will not bs encumbered by the arrival of the disheartened troops from Plevna, who . would immediately retire on Nicopolis, and from thence to Roumania. In conclusion, I may remark that the Russian army is slowly but surely being driven back to the Danube and that the campaign in Bulgaria, as tar as the aggression of Russia is concerned, is at an end for tbis year. The enormous losses sustained by that Power, both in money, material and men, will never be compensated by the subjection, in a future war, of the land they surreptitiously endeavored to appropriate in 1877.