THE SIEGE OF PLENNA.

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume XII, Issue 225, 25 September 1877, Page 4

THE SIEGE OF PLENNA.

*' Austria " writes as follows to the Auckland Herald with reference to the poeitioD of Plevna, and the forces engaged :— A brief description of the position, investment, and army at Plevna may not be uninteresting at this critical moment. Tbe town of Plevna lies about one mile and a quarter distant on the right bank of the Supal, Vii, or Seresgul River. It id situated on a plateau of about 500 feet, above the level of the sea. The river forms a curve opposite Plevna; the hi-^h road from the South to the Danube runs through it, and crosses the river by a bridge in its rear. The river ia again bridged at Terina, about five miles to the South. Nortb of Plevna, on the river, there are the remains of three old forts, two on the right bank, and one midway between them on the left, which shows that in previous wars this position must have been considered of great strategical importance. A spur of the Balkans runs past it, and ends about the village of Pallas, about fifteen miles to the North. Therefore, from the broken and undulating couutry, it is easily to he understood what strong positions oould be occupied, as the country slopes down to the northward and eastward, from which direction the Russians are advancing. After the fall of Nicopolis, on the night of the 16th, or early moruiog of the 17th of August, the Russians, intbeir forced march to the South passed through Plevna, leaving there a corps of little over 4000 men. Osman Pasha, who was hastening to relieve Nicopolis from Wid din, caused them to retire from it, and was himself attacked there on the 21st July, and again on ths 31st, the day of the celebrated battle of Plevna. In the beginning of May, Muschir Osman Pasha, commanding the Ottoman army at Widdin, had at his disposal 80 battalions of infantry, 16 squadrons of cavalry, and 174 field guns, his chief officers being Feriks Tahir and Adil, the Liwas Kara-Ali, Assuf, Atil, Kerim, Achmed, and Hassan; at Nisch, he bad 6 battalions and 12 guos; at Sophia, three marches from the railway depot at Tatir Bassarshik, the Liwa Tsoberkess Hassan, with 30 battalions, 4 squadrons, and 24 field guns. Taking the battalion*,, at 700 men, he would have, therefore an army of 81,200 infantry, 20 squadrons of cavalry, and 210 field guns. The teles-rams mention bis present strength at 60,000 men and 230 guns.— lt is true that siuca this army took the field it has fought two battles at Plevna, one at Lovacs, another at Vladioa, besides several severe engagements around Plevna, which would more than account for the diminution of numbers given in the telegram. But we know that siuc:> last July, Osman Pasha has been reinforced by Turkish regulars, and 10,000 Albanian JSizanis and Irregular cavalry, so that the figures given in the telegrams are on no account in excess of his strength, but his army must be under-rated if the previous strength vvas correct, and, consUeriiig that the detailed statement we huve L'iveu com-s from Prussiau offi.-ers, aud was torwarded to tha Berlin military pp.'.s, it is oot not likely to oo erro-ioaus, We have, fhf-refoiv -• vied vef-"-;.-,---army of at l.>asf (10,000 tn^u wiih 2JO guns, eutreuched behiud hYid works i.t a difficult und broken couutry, their rear protected by tbe riper Supul or Vid — which is nearly impasanble, except at known crossings — occupying a position stated to possess three distioct lines of entrenchments ou the spurs of the hills sloping towards tbe enemy, the base of which is about eight miles •—capable of being provisioned aod reinforced from the whole of weßt«rn Turkey, besieged by an enemy 80,000 Strong with 365 guns. These fac s therefore raise the questions — Are the Russians iv bufiicien i force to assault an i cany by storm this vast entrenched camp? Aud if success ful, whether the suciifice entailed in gaioiug Ihis object will uot oe 100 dearly bought? 1 heaoswers to theai'ove are these: The Ruesiaus ore not in sufficient force, and if ihey do sucoee.j it must be at the cost ot nearly halt their army. For the Turks would still be able to retire behind iho Supu., occupying a position similar to thai lost. Their batteries and the tort uu tbe left bank would protect their retreat, and the river would prevent the Russian cavalry from turning the defeat into a rout.

That the Russians are not in sufcient force, and that the Herculean task they have in view is most likely to be the means of their own defeat, can easily be im »gined by a careful consideration of the telegrams from tbeir own sources on the 9:h aod 13th September. We have already drawn attention to the fact that violent cannonading hid been gbiug on for days previous to the 9b, and that on the evening of that day tho Russians had retired to a new position, Tbe inferences to be drawn ire these: That tho Turkish position was so strong find so admirably defended that th * Ru-tsian artillery could make no impt^a-jiou on -their works; — " (hat th-y were forced to rei ire," aud tbat fiey were obliged to concentrate at Z.dg, where their works could be carried on unobserved. To construct worksat a distance which could not be observed from the "heights" of Plevna, and which must be useless from the very distance in the bombardment, means, no doubt, that the Grand Duke and his advisers are already thinking of securiog their retreat, as Zdig will be found on the road to their bead-quarters at Bulgrareni. Again, the Russians, in their telegrams of the 13th, say that the Turkish sorties were repulsed. We shall yet hear more of these sorties. Those who are versed in the waya of Turkish tactics, will know that the making of these sorties generally denote their consciousness of their strength, and that they invariably retire after accomplishing their object. The siege of Silistria is a good illustration of the same. It is impossible to give the names of the Russian corps operating; against Plsvna. We know that General Krijdener, with the entire Ninth Army Corps, is present, and the Fourth Army Corps has since joined, but fche different army corps are so broken up in reinforcing the army in the Balkans and on the Lorn, that the regiments and brigades as they cross the Danube, are forwirded to different armies as they may be required. But one fact remains patent: if the Russians, reinforced by the Roumanians, bave not more than 80.000 men before Plevna, their losses from sickness and disease must indeed be terrific, and no wonder that they are desirous of striking a blow ere the effects of the concentration of a vast body of men at one spot for a lengthened period tell mora forcibly on their ranks. The Russian official despatch, dated Bombay, 12th instant, refers, no doubt to the heights taken on the south side on the Bth instant, in which they lo3t 500 men and which has already been before the public. We are informed that the Russians have thrown another bridge over the Danube at Nicopolis. This will of course, aid them in getting supplies but I may point out thit it in no way aff -ct3 the military positiou, Nicopolis being to the east of Plevna. The news which we shall receive in a few days from the forces now contending on iho Jautta will* show whether the Russians are capablti of holding their own during this yoar iv Bulgaria; for, if the Tuika succeed in forcing (he J.'intra, the final r.'-treat of tha Rus-duns will be bu-'. a que.itiou of time.