PLAN OF THE CAMPAIGN.

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume XII, Issue 96, 25 April 1877, Page 4

PLAN OF THE CAMPAIGN.

PROBABLE LINES OF OPERATION. \(Aimy and Navy Gazette) \ Colonel Evelyn Wood " considers that a careful review of the circumstances ]teads;to Tcreata a belief that; the Russians will meet witb no insuperable difficulties in their march to the neighborhood of Constantinople, but that there they will be brought to a standstill by the lines planned for the defence of the. capital— that is to say, if these lines are constructed !in time. He asserts, however, that as yet not a spadeful of eart has been removed. In our opinion, his views of the probable success of the invaders - are somewhat too sanguine. But' let us examine his facts and speculations. He aaserts that the Russian army at Kiecbeneff numbers 274,600 infantry, $2,330 Cavalry, and 245 gtms. This may be the aulhdri.ed establishment of the corps assembled , but from the information which we have gathered from various sources we are disposed to believe that, though such a force exists on paper, its efficient strength did not, up to a week ago, exceed 200,000 of all ranks, including non-combatants, We do ffot, however, deny that, though large bodies of troops must be left in | the Caucasus, in Pollaad, and as garrisons of the Black Sea fortresses, it would be quite possible to mass on tbe Pruth an army as strong as that which Colonel Vincent asserts is there assembled. Enormous deductions must rbe made. In the first plaoe, in the march tb the' Danube' a large number will be removed by sickness, for the waste of a Russian army is notoriously great. Ia the second place, the left flatikj atall events must Jbe guarded, for the Roumanian army would have quite enough to do to protect the right flank, •: Tho Dobrudschen forms a qafienfc point from which a small body of ttsfen could inflict considerable damage on the, Russian communications, and especially that portion of the railway whfeh runs from jGalatz for several miles parallel and close to the Danube. Mr Vincent says that tbe Turks have no pontoons or other means of crossing the river? but it is inconceivable that there should not be fishing boats, arid materials for makiog rafts, or flying bridges. '; It "is very possible that the Turks Would be unable to piss over a large army. But a large army would not be needed to- cut the communications. Even half a dozen men could, during a few hours of tbe nigbt, temporarily interrupt the railway traffic, and a hundred horsemen would hamper the passage of provision trains moving by road. Besides, there are seven Turkish gunboats in the Danube, and there is no reason to doubt that an enterprising naval officer could, in spile of torpedoes and batteries, run up with a flotilla of other gunboats and small steamers, v Colonel Vincent says tbat the gunboats now in the river would goon be destroyed by the Russian;artillery, since^ there are absolutely no creeks io which vessels could be sheltered from guns placed oa the northern banks c It is not, however, to be imagined that the ; gunboats would remain stationary to be fired at, and the northern batik is in many places so marshy tbat guns could not be; placed in position, even if .it were to grant that the Russians could spare a sufficient number of batteries to line the entire length or the fiver. If the Turkish gunboats be properly handled, we believe : that they, will play an important part, both in obstructing the passage of the Danube by the Russians, and in facilitating the crossing of small bodies of. Turks, destined to operate against the invaders' communications. Everything, indeed, will be against the Russians when they seek to pass into Bulgaria, for the southern is higher than the northern bank, and there is an litter lack of laternal communications on the latter!' '. Nevertheless, we should ignore all the teachings^ of ' history if We .believed the Russians' would not eventuaHy cross the river. Before, however, that operation can be attempted, it will ba ...necessary, first, to move a large army through. Roumania, and thia process, we imagine, will be more difficult than Mr Vincent anticipates. He says that the railway which ru&B from Odessa via Kiscbeneff, Jassy, aod Bucharest, to Giurgevo, will be abjki to move the invadiog army, keep it supplied with food, stores, and reinforcements, and carry back the eick and woooded, He considers that ihe narrowing of the gauge at Jassy is a fact of no importance, for the Roumania rolling-stock is abundant, good, and specially constructed for the transport of troop?; moreover, the space between t§6 wheels of the Russian carriages could be soon and easily narrowed. This opera-don would however, diminish greatly the means of moving men and Btoresas far as Jassy. We have read tbat the Roumanian rolling-stock, too, is by no mesne abundant and good. Making, however, every concession to Colonel Vincent, we feel convinced from the experienced of the Prussians in 1870 71, that a single railway would be taxed beyond its capabilities, were it reqnired to trauepprt fighting men as wellas stores and sick. We agree with Mr Vincent in thiukiug tbat the direction of the railway indicates tbe points of passage; and that, probably, the latter will be attempted at points opposite to Kuatchuk Turkestan, nud Silistria. These fortresee are, we are told by Mr Vincent, in a very- ioelficieut state, and weakly garrisoned, but it is proable that during the last few weeks these defects have been partiaily remedied. It must be also borne in mind that in Turkish fortresses not only is there a numerous Artillery

Militia, but that every adult male may be vieved as a fighting man. The tpwns in question wouU, no doubt, be ultimately taken, bat the sieges of Turkish fortresses are generally costly and slow and their resistance wonld not delay an advance: but help to diminish Iho strength of m th@ invaders. As to the subsequent operation-?, it is obvious that the passage of the Balkan could not bo attempted till both Varna J*nd Sohumla bad been either taken or blockaded. We shall, therefore, be astonished if the Russians find themselves; in a position to cross the Balkan before the commencement of the second campaign. As to the passes, they are, some of them, traversed by different roads, are easy to defend, and £onld undoubtedly be strongly fortified, gut here, again, we believe that J the Russians, if victorious in the open field, would eventually succeed in accomplishing a passage. We however, ground oor belief on the prolonged, if not eventually successful, resistance of the Turks, on the difficulties of supplyand finding transport for even 100,000 men in the Balkan peninsula, and on the fact that the Turks possess, and and are likely to retain the mastery of the Black Sea. As long as they are superior in naval power any chance of a coup de main against, or ever a rapid advance to, Constantinople is, in our opinion, out of the question. After all, however, the chief reliance of the Sultan must be on his army, and, if tbat is badly handled, it is tolerably certain that Adrianople will once again be occupied by the legions of the Czar."