THE FRENCH SITUATION.

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume V, Issue 240, 11 October 1870, Page 2

THE FRENCH SITUATION.

(/Vom ike Times, August 13. ) It is three weeks to-day since the Emperor issued his proclamation to the French people, calling Heaven to witness that, he had been forced into war by the aggressive pretensions of Prussia, which had unsettled all international relations, and turned Europe into an armed camp. It is little more than a fortnight since he arrived with his son at Metz, and promised his army that nothing would be able to resist their courage. Who would have ventured to think that the Emperor would, at the end of a fortnight, be again at Metz, attacked instead of attacking, besieged, instead of besieging, and vindicating his denunciations of the aggressive spirit of Prussia by becoming its victim ? Yet; such is the astonishing sequel of his owa policy. No man ever had a fairer opportunity of refraining from a campaign. The Hohenzolleru candidate had been withdrawn, and withdrawn in consequence of tha energetic remonstrances of the French Court. Had the Emperor beeu content with this advantage, he might have boasted that the supremacy of France was still practically acknowledged, for when France intimated her will the proudest military power of Europe quailed before her. But the Emperor was not content. Ii a spirit of assumption, which is now seen to have had so little solid foundation that it appears a visitation of judicial blindness, he would not let the Prussian King go before he consented to abase himself iu the sight of Europe. The demand was unendurable. The German people rose to resist it, and the Emperor, despite the valor of his troops, has been forced to recoil before the irresistible impulse of a free and united people. When we look at the actual condition of France, and compare it with the opniiiog of the war, we are bewildered at the contrast between promise and performance It may be urged tbat the Emperor himself was more modest in his anticipations than his courtiers and followers; and this is true, but the Emperor only spoke of obstacles that might retard, but could never arrest, still less reverse, the course of advancing victory. " The war we are now commencing," he told his soldiers, " will be long and severe," but what reason did he suggest for this grave apprehension ? The war was to be long because it was to be fought in a part of Germany " teeming with fortresses and obstacles," although ifc would be found that nothing was too difficult for soldims tried in the four quarters of the globe. The Emperor never doubted, any more than the most confident flaneur in the Boulevards, that before a fortnight had passed, he would be investing Mayence, with the Bavarian Palatinate subdued behind him. The army was promised the sight of the glorious memorials of their fathers as they advanced beyond the frontiers of France into the enemy's country. But it is plain that there are obstacles the courage of the French army, great as ifc is, cannot overcome. Without administration, and without generalship, mere courage can avail nothing. Friend and foe alike agree iu praising the devotion of the French soldiery; they are ready for any effort and will encounter any difficulties ; but friend and foe also agree in what is, in fact, the necessary complement of their first declaration, that the leadership of the French army in the preseut campaign has

been such as to destroy all the effect the dash of the troops should have produced. A single illustration may show how bad is the administration of the French army, and, unfortunately, nothing is wanting to prove the bad strategy of its leaders. It is announced from Metz that the supplies are running short; that, in spite of every exertion, there is an insufficiency, and a reduction has been made in the returns of officers and men. To be in Metz on the defensive is in itself a portent, but to be in Metz with the whole reserves of France in the rear, and not to have enough to serve-out the regular rations to the army, denotes a mismanagement no hypothesis can explain. * * * * In one short fortnight Napoleon 111. has undermined his throne more effectually than all the energies of the opposition of every class combined together could do. He sat secure, and the ready adhesion of the Liberals in the spring showed how willingly France would have accepted the dynasty if he had consented to a real reconciliation with Jthe spirit of selfgovernment. He rejected his chance then, and in his desire now to buttress up liis throne he has done his best to throw Was there no warning in the fatal ending of tbe passion for predominance that mastered the elder Napoleon to save the younger from yielding to the same ambition? Was it necessary, in pursuing the example Sf t before him, that Napoleon 111. should strive to subordinate Central Europe to his power, only to find his own throne slip from under him ?