NEW ZEALAND, THE TROOPS, AND THE COLONIAL QUESTION.

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume V, Issue 3, 4 January 1870, Page 2

NEW ZEALAND, THE TROOPS, AND THE COLONIAL QUESTION.

o Under this heading there appears in the European Mail a long correspondence between Sir George Bowen, and Earl Granville, on tbe subject of troops for New Zealand. We are unable to give this correspondence at length, but shall publish the memorandum of Mr. M'Lean, which must have set before the English Government the true state of affairs, and the letter of General Chute explaining the reasons for his permitting the detention of the 18th regiment. We also publish a letter from Lord Carnarvon, on the policy of the present Government; and to-morrow we propose to give Earl Granville's celebrated despatch. MEMORANDUM FROM MR. M'LEAN. " Since the date of the last memorandum of July 3rd to your Excellency, giving a narrative of events from the Ist of May, no fresh military operations have been undertaken against the rebel Maories, and no collision between them and the Colonial forces has occurred. The Colonial forces were employed in garrisoning a line of posts extending from the Bay of Plenty towards Waikaremoana. The inclemency of the weather at this season of the year — the danger to which the working parties and convoys were exposed from the ambuscades of the enemy — the impossibility, except at a cost beyond the rescources of the colony, of keeping up supplies, and, lastly, the fact that the posts maintained were of no advantage for defensive purposes—rendered it advisable that the force should be withdrawn, reduced in numbers and redistributed as garrisons were most necessary. A force, under Lieut.-Colonel

Herrick, composed chiefly of natives, and which was originally intended to co-oper-ate with Colonel Whitmore against the Uriweras, when that officer withdrew from the Uriwera country, commenced operations at Waikaremnana with a view of punishing the Uriwera tribe who had taken part with Te Kooti in the massacres at Poverty Bay and Mohaka, and was now occupying fortified pahs ou the lake. This expedition required very extensive and costly preparations. Pontoons and boats had to be built, and the materiel and provisions for the force to be conveyed a distance of 30 "miles over tracks which the incessantrains had made almost impassable. The enemy also had managed to send parties round to our rear (on one occasion an orderly with despatches was killed within three miles of camp), and thus increased the difficulty of communication and supply. The nature of the country, and the difficulty of crossing the lake, rendered success at best doubtful; and as the result would not be commensurate with the cost, this enterprise was abandoned and the expedition withdrawn. The natives have returned to their homes, and the remainder of the force, consisting of armed constabulary, will be stationed at posts protecting the frontiers of settlements and the line of telegraph now in process of extension from Napier towards Taupo, ultimately to join the wire from Auckland to Waikato which, when accomplished, will place all the chief towns of New Zealand in communication with each other. About the date of the last memorandum Te Kooti left the pah he had been occupying on the southern shore of Lake Taupo, and being joined by Te Heu Heu, the principal chief of that part of the island, proceeded to Waikato. with a following of about 300 for the purpose of seeing the Maori King. He was met and received by Rewi Maniapoto and by Tamati Manu whir i, uncle of Tawhiao, whose influence with the latter was expected to be sufficient to induce him to receive favorably if he did not join Te Kooti. Ifc was also believed that Titokowaru, Kereopa, and Hakaraia would meet at Waikato, and it was for some days unknown what attitude Tawhiao would assume towards these men. During this period the settlers in the Waikato distiict and all who foresaw the disasters which would probably result to the colony from a union of rebel leaders, were in a state of anxious suspense, and war in its worst forms threatened the country. At this time, when a threatened outbreak, not clearly defined, but not tbe less dangerous was hanging over the colony, your Excellency will no doubt recognise the spirited manner in which the volunteers of the Wairoa, Waiuku, and Thames districts came forward for the defence of their felllow-settlers in the Waikato. The reports of Majors Tisdall and Cooper on the subject are attached. Among the natives matters soon assumed an unexpected form, for no sooner had Kooti arrived in Waikato than he commenced to make demands which even those most desirous of joining him regarded as outrageous. He ordered the greenstone ornaments and other heirlooms, so valued by the Maori people, to be given up to him or destroyed. He also demanded to be recognised as their prophet, that the religion he taught should be embraced, aod that Orakau, a valuable tract of land should be given up to him as payment for the Uriwera, who fell in its defence when taken by the Imperial and Colonial forces under General Cameron. This was tantamount to asking for all Waikato, and Tawhiao, no doubt, feeling that his next step would be to proclaim himself king (indeed he had likened bimself to Jehu already), refused to see him, and used all his influence against him. Copies of letters and telegrams received by the Government detailing these occurrences are enclosed, from which it will be seen that Te Kooti was compelled to leave Waikato j and the more imminent danger which threatened the district has for the present subsided, although it cannot be said to have passed away, for thare is no knowing under what circumstances Te Kooti might return. On the west coast the Pakakohe tribe, who are more or less implicated with Tito Kowaru in the murders of settlers and other unprovoked outrages, have to the number of between 300 and 400, including men,' women, and children, either been brought in by scouting parties of the colonial forces and friendly natives or given themselves up. Of these about ninety-five men have been removed from Patea to Wellington, and while awaiting

trial by the Supreme Court, are placed on board a hulk iv this harbor. Though there are no military operations to report this month, there is yet no doubt that the danger of the colony is very great. Tho hostile natives are numerous and unsubdued, and only waiting their opportunity to pounce upon that settlement which shall seem to them most to invite attack. The central position occupied by Te Kooti enables him to threaten Waikato, Taranaki, Tauranga, Opotiki, Poverty Bay, Napier, and other places. Tito Kowaru also threatens Taranaki ; or he can descend upon the Patea and Waitotara ; and were it not for the restraining power exercised over the rebels by the presence in New Zealand of Her Majesty's 18th Regiment, there is no doubt that active hostilities would before now have been resumed. "Donald M'Lean. " Wellington, August 6, 1869." Enclosure. " Copy of an Act, dated August 6, 1869, to make Provision by Law for the Payment of Imperial Troops. " Copy of a Letter from Major-General Sir T. Chute to the Under-Secretary of State for "War. "Melbourne, August 14, 1869. " Sir, — In acknowledging the receipt of your letter of May 21, with enclosure, and referring to my telegram of this day, I have the honor to state, for the information of the Right Hon. the Secretary of State for War, that with the view of carrying out my instructions for the withdrawal of the 2nd battalion 18th Regiment from New Zealand, tenders for tonnage were called for at Auckland on July 10. On August 4, however, despatches were received from the Governor of New Zealand, with enclosures from the Colonial Government, representing the alarming state of affairs, and urging upon me * the disasters which the removal of the regiment would, in all probability, occasion.' Further, the Colonial Government agree ' to pay whatever sum the Imperial Government may choose to impose as the condition of the temporory detention of the 18th Regiment.' Under these circumstances, I have consented to retain the regiment, pending further instructions, which, I trust, will meet the approval of the Secretary of State for War. " I have, &c, "T. Chute. " The Under-Seeretary of State, War Office. " P.S. — Dr. Featherstone, tbe Superintendent of the Province of Wellington, has arrived here, having been deputed by the New Zealand Government, at the desire of his Excellency the Governor, to urge upon me the imminent danger of a rising in the Waikato, and the necessity of the retention of the 18th Regiment, and to furnish me with any information I might require. " T. C." LORD CARNARVON'S LETTER. The following letter from Lord Carnarvon appeared in the Times of Nov. 3 :—- ----"If Parliament were now sitting or about to sit, or (again) if it were my object to make this an opportunity of attacking the Colonial Office, I should not ask leave to call attention through your columns to the present position of New Zealand. lam rather influenced by the feeling that we are rapidly drifting into serious difficulties, which may not only affect the fortunes of English colonists and their relations with us as fellow-subjects or allies, but which may imperil the honor and integrity of the empire, and that it may be soon too late to speak words which, if they have any worth at all, are only valuable in the present stage of the question. " I purposly set aside the more abstract considerations of policy sometimes mooted — the revision of our relations with the various dependencies of the Crown, the possibility of in some degree resuming the Imperial authority which we have so unreservedly surrendered, and the remarkable proposal of the present Colonial Minister to recognise the Maori King and his jurisdiction. So, too, it wouid be impossible here to recapitulate the complicated details of past negotiatioLs, and unprofitable to revive the complaints or recriminations of either party in this long controversy. There has certainly been misunderstanding ; perhaps there has been here, as in many similar cases, fault on both sides.' What more immediately demands consideration is the future ; and

when I observe the amount of suffering which to a colonist may not unnaturally seem indifference, I fear that we may find ourselves involved in a political crisis which every one will then deplore, and which a calm re-examination of our position might now prevent. "It has not been difficult to make out a strong case as against the Colony. No doubt that the colonists asked for independence in the management of the native affairs ; that they accepted the responsibilities of self-defence which are necessarily associated with such independence ; and that the policy of land confiscation which — whether wise or unwise — they adopted, was their act and deed, and, though not formally disapproved by the Home Government, did not originate with us. lt is also certain that, so long as British troops were detained in New Zealand without any cost to tbe Colony, the colonists were more than satisfied with an arrangement which provided for their defence, strengthened their native policy, and benefitted tbe places where the troops were stationed. No doubt also that the Home Government were justified in insisting open the withdrawal of the troops for which the colonists, after accepting the responsibility of native government, declined to pay. But the case has now assumed a different complexion ; the colonists in tbe Northern Island are in great straits, perhaps in considerable danger of life and property ; they bave avowed their inability, for the present at all events, to carry into effect the self-reliant doctrines of a former day, and, if I do not misunderstand them, they have offered, thongh with some reluctance, to pay whatever sum the Home Government may consider to be right, if only they are allowed to retain for awhile the protection of the one regiment left in the Colony. As a matter of rigorous logic, it may be that the Government are right in considering that the time when it was open to the Colony to claim that moderate amount of protection has gone by ; but there are other considerations which must at least have a share in determining this question. In the government of a great empire, loyalty and affection are not trifles to be thrown away and resumed at pleasure ; and even from a purely material point of view a small outlay now may be found to be ultimately the best economy. "Be this, however, as it may, we are arriving at a stage when, perhaps, a decision may be forced upon us from a sudden catastrophe within the Colony, such as an extensive massacre of settlers, or from a grave political contingency without, such as an appeal by the colonists in their despair to some foreign Power — a contingency which I regret to have heard mooted in this country. But unless English feeling is strangely altered, we shonld be slow to acquiesce in either of these conclusions. Logic would be thrown to the winds, and we might find ourselves committed to issues on which it is, perhaps, better not now to speculate. Is, then, any course, consistent with honor and sound policy, still open to us? •'Let me, without entering upon any considerations that affect the principle by which the relations of a colony to the mother country should be regulated, briefly state some of the various lines of action, whether desirable or otherwise, which the present stage of this question may seem to suggest. "1. Tbat our general policy towards the New Zealand colonists, under which we have surrendered to them the control of native affairs, and they have accepted the corresponding duties of self-govern-ment and 'self-reliance,' should be permanently reversed I hold to be practically impossible. The original concession may have been premature and wrong, but, once made, it cannot be recalled. Nor can there be any doubt that in a few years the question of" native policy will solve itself by the natural wasting away of this unfortunate race. "2. That we should retain and pay English troops in New Zealand, and that the colonists should employ them at their discretion. But this would make us the mere instruments of a policy which we do not devise, which we cannot control, and which we might disapprove. This again, therefore, wouid be an impossible course to pursue. "3. That the colonists should pay the ordinary colonial subvention in aid of troops to be maintained for their defence, leaving their disposition absolutely to us. This, if done on a small scale, is free from serious objection;, it would provide for the

garrison of the towns, would set free the colonial militia for service in the field, and would give the Colony in the eyes of the Maories that moral support without which there is risk of an extensive and formidable native combination against us. But from the recent despatches published I fear that the recall of tbe last regiment leaves this alternative no longer open to consideration. "4. That by financial assistance we should give the colonists tbe means of crushing the insurrection, and of placing themselves* in a position of permanent defence. It is not difficult to anticipate the objections that would be made to a loan. Nor are colonial guarantees to be lightly granted. They are weighty instruments of the last resort, to be employed only in grave emergencies of Imperial policy, and to be justified by special circumstances. Such I believe to have been the recent guarantee to the new Dominion of Canada. It was money well laid out in consolidating the strength, and, as I trust, the enduring union of that noble people with tbe British Crown, and the present case in New Zealand though different, is one where a guarantee is fairly applicable. It can be justified by the particular crisis both in its local and Imperial bearing; it would place at the disposal of the Colony funds which, if properly employed, would enable them to conclude the war, releasing them at the same time from no inducement to conclude it by their own energies; it would satisfy the requirements involved in the doctrine I of self-defence; it would only do for our ! own flesh and blood in an English colony what we have done for far less deserving foreigners half over the world ; and, looking to the revenue, the population, and the resources present and future of the Colony, ifc would not entail upon ns any appreciable risk. The Government in the early part of the year declined to give such assistance; but I do not think that even now they are precluded from reconsidering their decision. The Parliamentary papers seem to show that the application made to the Colonial Secretary was by him referred to the Treasury, but without the customary expression of his wishes or opinions, or even au explanation of those circumstances connected with the Colony which the Treasury could hardly be presumed to know. It is therefore, no matter of wonder that this department should have peremptorily declined to entertain a request so introduced to it; and I cannot but regret that in this omissioD, as well as in the harsh and almost unfriendly tone of the subsequent correspondence, the inherent difficulties of this question should have been needlessly aggravated. " I suggested at the close of last session that, looking to the delays and difficulties of communication with the Colony, the Government should send out a commissioner who could, on the spot, ascertain the true state of affairs, and use such powers as might be intrusted to a man of eminence and discretion. Lord Durham in Canada, Mr. Gladstone in the lonian Islands, and Sir H. Storks in Jamaica, were cases that furnished precedents of more or less analogy; and I thought then, as I think now, that such a course might have soothed the sense of irritation, and have offered the best prospect of a proper settlement of this anxious question. Its adoption is, perhaps, even now out of place if combined with such assistance as we may see our way to offer ; but time is flying fast, and if her Majesty's Government delay much longer, they may live to see the beginning, but not the end of a great national disaster."