The Nelson Evening Mail. TUESDAY, JULY 6, 1869. MINISTERIAL STATEMENT.

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume IV, Issue 156, 6 July 1869, Page 2

The Nelson Evening Mail. TUESDAY, JULY 6, 1869. MINISTERIAL STATEMENT.

■ O " *'■ The following able speech was delivered by the hon. Mr. Gisborue in the Legislative Council on Friday afternoon last: — Mr. Gisborne said: I will first touch on the topic which is uppermost in all our minds — that is, the internal defence of the Colony. "' When we look back at the events of the last twelve months, we eaunot fail to be impressed by the fact that the Native disturbances and the expenditure on account of those disturbances have been increasing during that period. The Native insurrection, which about eleven months ago was confined to the neighborhood of Patea and Poverty Bay, has extended along the coast to the north of New Plymouth, to Tauranga, to the vicinity of Napier, and to the interior at Taupo, and the expenditure during that period has, I may safely say, increased from £100 per diem to more than £1000 per diem. Sir, this impression, painful as it is, is also suggestive. It leads me to believe that the sword is not the ouly instrument of peace, and that we have to colonise as well as to conquer, and to fight the battle of life as well as the battle of death. Each campaign which has occurred has left us little, if anything, in advance on our road to conquest, while it has re-acted with very destructive effect on colonisation,, which affords us the only means which will enable us not only to fight, but actually to exist. I think we have been pursuing in vain this phantom of conquest. It is like the mirage iv the desert, which mocks the thirsty traveller, and leads him on till he perishes from exhaustion. This Government does not advocate any policy of peace at any price. The sword must for a time be uusheathed. We cannot consent to coudone the crimes of those who have murdered helpless women and children, and have perpetrated other unparalleled atrocities. Stern retribution, although it now proceeds with halting steps, pursues those men, andrmust at last overtake thorn and punish their enormous guilt. But in this world we have not only to look at the object in view, but have carefully to consider the means we have to attain that end. I cau only say that, if the Colony is to undertake a policy which is to lead to the conquest and armed occupation of the- Northern Islaud, I can foresee nothing but failure and the ruin of colonization for many years to come. Sir, our policy does not contemplate any abandonment of our territory, or any craven retreat in the face of the enemy. We cannot occupy all the country, but we hope to be able to maintain those defensible posts which may be considered the keys of bur outsettlements, and by thus concentrating our forces to effect great economy in our expenditure, and to enable the Colony to have some breathing time, and by peaceful means, and by the legitimate progress of industry, to augment its strength and its resources, so as to be able to cope successfully with those difficulties which it has to encounter. I will now say a few words on the Colonial standing array. We propose gradually, and so far as circumstances will permit, to substitute for that army an armed police, which i we think ; will be more economical and ■ more efficient. There are, we think, obvious 'objections to the maintenance* of a Colonial; standing , army, and defects in. "it which materially.. 3 neu tralize its good effect. . What is the essential j > condition and characteristic of an, Inaperial array ? It /is the; per-, : marience i of .; its character. My honorable fspi ~ gallant friends' in tbJs Council who ,j admit that it ia that element in! an" 1 army

organization, that a regiment of old soldiers has as a heritage that priceless element of confideuce which can only be gained by the experience of many years ; and Napoleon has " 'stated "that"' "irP "war," moral is to physical force as three to one. The Imperial army has that qualification. Persons -who enter -it feel secure, if they couduct themselves well, of a competency for life, and they hope they may be able to earn the appropriate rewards of valor and distinction. But, Sir, a Colonial standing army has no such advantages. It is ephemeral and exceptional in its character. The Colony can only hope to raise temporary levies ou the condition of their early disbandoument. It caunot hope to organise a system which will provide pay, half-pay, pensions for retirement, and also adequate rewards for meritorious services. What is the case with our own army ? To the men we can offer little, even during active service, but the daily pay; to the officers, it-is true, we have given rapid promotion, but that promoting power is soon exhausted, and I believe its exercise re-acts in a vicious circle, and aggravates the very evils it is desired to remedy. When, as soon, I hope and trust, may be the case, this army is disbanded, what will become of these caplaius and field officers ? They ■will have to retire into comparative obscurity and neglect, and perhaps destitution. I may be told such should not be the case, but I argue that the | CoJouy which keeps a standing army i cannot avoid these evils. This precarious position, both with regard to officers and men, combined with the natural license of the military camp, leads to a laxity of discipline and consequent demoralization. It lenders the Colonial army cumbersome I and expensive, and comparatively inefficient. We believe a more mouest force, an armed police force, will not be opeu.to these, objections. We thiuk. we can impress on such a force a character of permaueuce, and we can make provision for the adequate reward of merit and for cases of discharge after long service. Another advantage of this police force wiil be that it will be adapted to civil as well as military work, and that it may ultimately merge into the civil police force of the Colony, and that the members of that force will be qualified, by their training and discipline, to become good settlers, and hold offices of trust in other capacities. We have precedents in the other colonies of armed police in a high state of discipline and efficiency, and I thini we may follow that example with beneficial effect in New Zealand. I now come to the question of the retention of the Imperial regiraeut. The paper which I have just laid on the table — the letter from General Chute — renders us, I fear, powerless with regard to the retention of that regiment. There is a faint hope, but one on which I almost fear to rely, that - the news of the massacre at the White Cliffs, which would reach England about the end of April last, may induce the Home Government to reconsider the matter, and refrain from consummating a measure which I believe will inflict disaster on New Zealand of a very ..gravel character. Ido not think the most earnest advocate of self-reliance would say it was a prudent step, in these circumstances of the Colony to withdraw the only' lmperial regiment which remains in it. We hope to be able to induce the Home Government to allow us to raise a New Zealand regiment,, or, if the 18th Regiment is removed, then probably two New Zealand regiments, to be composed of officers and men now in the Imperial service, to be enlisted for a fixed period of service in the Northern Islaud of New Zealand, with the prospect of becoming, by the exercise of land scrip, ultimate settlers in that island. Sir, there will be this advantage in such an arrangement, that it will obviate the objection the Imperial Government 'has ' to detach a '{regiment for service in., the Colony,:* and it will also enable us to get an Imperial regiment, for we intend that it should be under Imperial discipline, and regulations, for service and ultimate settlement in the Northern Islaud. Of course Sthe -Colony —would I : hsy¥; r t6\ pay ' such a capitation 'rate' as mighV be' fixed between the Cqlqny.and the Home Government. With regard; to; the. war, I 1 am unable to speak except with the utmost . hesitation. ": I may say^we hope! or at least we feel wiß should, ifT^it; is i- to, do; so, to ;i confine the 'expenditure to the Revenue, and if we raiseany lpan it should ; be, not for . fcbie ppr^oseipf b&rn£ frittered

away in war, but the materially improving and strengthening the Northern Island, and so rendering war in future an improbable event. Of course this loan, -which would be raised oil the T credit of "the whole Colony, would, with respect to the charge for interest and sinking fund, rest exclusively on the North Islaud, which would materially benefit by it ; and we' think that such au arrangement, in order to render it permanent, should^ he ratified by an Act of the Imperial Parliament. We should also lose no opportunity to obtaiu, if possible, the Imperial J guarantee to such a loan. There is another subject I will now allude to — the case of the rebel prisoners. We believe these should be brought as soon as possible to trial, and should, on conviction, receive the just punishment awarded to their crimes, in the several degrees which may attach to those crimes; •_ If the present law does not admit, of this being done without tedious delay; we should be prepared to bring in a Bill to enable the law to be amended in that respect ; but of course wa do not wish to puuish any prisoners unless they are fairly tried, convicted, and sentenced. There is only one other subject , with which I will trouble the Council — it is that of Provincial institutions. We wish cordially and sincerely to co-operate with those who administer these institutions, in the fulfilment of the conditions which may legitimately devolve on them. We are not, however, prepared to ask the Colony to add to its burdens to aid in that fulfilment. We do not contemplate asking tb.B Legislature for any constitutional or organic change; but if any Province becomes virtually bankrupt aud is unable to discharge the functions it should discharge, it must remain with the Geueral Assembly by special legislation, to make provision for the future".- •