COMPETITIVE STATE FACTORIES.

Maoriland Worker, Volume 3, Issue 50, 23 February 1912, Page 14

COMPETITIVE STATE FACTORIES.

Sir, —All efforts to harmonise the relations between Capital and Labor have failed, and must continue to fail so long as the capitalist private employing class takes all the surplus profits. The reason that Capital and Labor cannot agree is Inicausc of the maimer of disposing of tho profits. The capitalist has usually a large salary, a good living, and a comfortable home. The worker's rate of wages, tenure of employment, mode of living, and home comforts are uncertain, and governed hy his ability to make surplus profits for his employer. All efforts to regulate the relationship between the privato employer and the employee must fail until the cause of their disagreement is removed. The surplus profit, as liefore stated, is the basic and real cause. Lot us assume that a legal net maximum per cent, of interest or protit is recognised and fixed for capital over and abovo all legitimate expenses, upkeep, reserve, and a percentage on tho volume of business for management, and that the accounts are audited annually and the surplus profits returned to tho consumers, or appropriated in whole or in part by the State for the benefit of all. In that case, the humanitarian instincts of the capitalist employer would be unfettered, and there would be no incentive to pay other than fair remunerative wages, etc. Without going into details, it will bo seen that a proposal of this nature would leave the industries of the country in private hands and under private management. The capital used would be private, and receive a fixed rate of interest or profit. A specified percentage would bo allowed for management, and all legitimate expenses and upkeep would be provided for, and the surplus earnings would bo returned to the consumers in proportion to their purchases. The lean years could be provided for by a gradually accumulated reserve. It would not be a difficult task to work out a fair, reasonable and just basis for both Capital and Labor. Hut would the capitalist or private employing class listen to any such proposals ?No ; not they! Any proposal that interferes in the slightest degree with their usual profits would be rejected. If a Commission or a ''Board of Prices" were called into existence for the purpose of regulating the price of commodities, such commission or board would be strenuously opposed by the same class, and rendered useless by any private enterprise government, so far a3 the workers are concerned. That is so. At-torney-General Wickersham, of the United States Federal Cabinet, claims that a board to regulate prices, 01 to extend the Interstate Commerce Commission's powers, "would be merely an extension of the principles already accepted in Uie U.S.A." Mr. E. H. Gary, President of the Steel Trust, recently startled an investigating committee in Washington by assorting his belief that governmental regulation of prices was bound to come. Senator Newlande introduced a Bill to form a Commission, having regulatory powers over the gicat industrial organisations of the United States. This shows the trend of thought to some extent. I submit that any commission or board for the purpose of regulating prices and not profits must fail. The surplus profits are at the base and core of the whole matter, and it would be much easier to regulate profits than it would be to regulate prices, but wo need not look for either. Tho time is not far distant when the modern combination, consolidation and protection of our industries wilt be recognised as «n absolute necessity. Competitive State factories, managed by competent commissioners under a sympathetic sociallabor government, would effectually cheek the trusts, combines, and association agreements; fix the conditions of labor, employ surplus labor, govern the wages of labor, do the arbitrating, and make in New Zealand most of the goods imported. Competitive State factories would also standardise production and the juices charged to the consumers. How? Simply because private concerns would find it necessary to follow the example and lead of tho competitive State plants, otherwise the workers and tho trade of the workers, etc., would gradually but surely go over to tlie people's own State plants. There is no doubt that a sympathetic government would bo able to command the services of the best managerial ability, and would succeed, whilo a government opposed to the principle of public ownership, and in favor of keeping conditions as thoy are, must be expected to fail, when abundant success might otherwise be assured. Tlie question arises, under which system would New Zealand and the people of New Zealand bo_ bettor, viz., private production for private profits, or social production for public profits? I think it will be found that New Zealand would boom, and that the great masses of the people would prefeT public ownership, reliable public employment, and their share in the accu- j initiated profits.—Yours, etc., Cltch. T. J. McBRIDB. j