LAW AND JUSTICE.

Manawatu Times, Volume III, Issue 100, 13 December 1879, Page 2

LAW AND JUSTICE.

It has always been the boast of the Resident Magistrate for Rangitikeir Manavratu that m the Court over which he presides lie has, to a verygreat extent, made law subsidiary to equity m his decisions, 'Although we are not prepared to say to what extent he ia thus justified m setLin}? aside the legal guides set down for his direction, and pitting his opinion against the written law, we are not inclined to cavil at a proceeding wh^ch we trust arises from a conscientious, desire to deal equitably hetweeii litigants. Whether the motive has been thai for which we have given him credit we cannot say, but m these columns we have always written of Mr. Waki* as a most painstaking, courteous, and apparently conscientious magistrate. In fact, so consistent and persistent has been our commendation of that gentleman." and so willing have we been to attribute his mistakes to over zeal, that we have been on more than one occasion twitted with an undue partiality for him. "We are heartily pleased that such has been the case,*for the reason that a matter has lately occurred upoti which wo feel bound to make a few remarks, and as they will be somewhat condemnatory of that gentleman, we ■will not only be acquitted of any bias whatever, but our strictures wall carry the greater weight vvith them. On last Friday, at the Fosilding Police Court, a charge of arson was preferred agaiust Mr. Halcombb, the informant being a. tenant of the Corporation, named John Belk:. The heariug of the case occupied a considerable time, and evidence went to prove — indeed it was n,ott attempted to be denied by the defence — that the defendant wilfully and designedly set fire to a building erected by the informant. The charge before the Court was one of arson, and without asking counsel to call witness for. the defence, Mr. Ward, dismissed the information, not; upon the facts as brought out m evidence, but upon a question of title and an analysis of the motives which prompted the alleged felony. In taking exception to the judgment and opening up the matter of Hie inquiry, we- are perfectly well aware "that we are -taking a course which will subject us to some citicism and much ill-will, nevertheless we fe«'l that an official who should be above the influeuce of fear or. favor, has — either through culpable* ignorance, 'or the. want of moral courage to do his dufc^— allowed a grosg miscarriage of justice to b.e perpetrated, and wo feel we should be wanting m our duty were we to allow the matter, to pass by without comment. Had Mr. Warp been entirely ignorant of th,e relations between informant aud defendant, and tinder the impression that the latter >%§ jjhe undisputed. qyss of the laad^

there would be just the shadow of a ground for dismissal m equity — but not m law ; but Mr. Wabd was thoroughly conversant withall the factb of the case before the hearing, and during the ex. amiuation ample sworn testimony was submitted that' Mr. Halcombe had no legal right to the land— in fact, th« balance was to the contrary — for while the evidence on his side merely proved that he had made improvements upon it, the verdict of the Supreme Court ruled that Bulk had been m possession from the signing of the original contract up to the, bearing or the case. Although the question of title was one which should not have been permitted to be mixed up with the evidence adduced m the Police Court, much less weigh with the magistrate: m the decision, as such a course was allowed, we cannot do better than repiint the several findings of the Supreme Court upon the issues as to title,- and then it will be seen that when Mr. Wabd dismissed the case because the defendant " was' acting upon the bond fide impression that he was the owner of the land," both defendant and magistrate must have, contemptuously ignored the verdict of the Supreme Court. Tbe following are the issues, as submitted to the Jury, and thejinswers thereto : — 1. Did the plaintiff at the time he purchased the land mention m the declaration, know that the defendant wa3 m possession of the said land ? Answer— So. 2. Did the plaintiff with such knowledge procure the transfer to be made to him of the said land ? Ans. — No. 3. Did the defendant (Belli) contract with the Corpoi-ation as m the first paragraph of the plan alleged ? Ans. — Yes. 4. Has the defendant (Bolk) ever since been m possession thereof, under the said contract. ? Ana. — "s£es. 5. Has the Corporation excused the defendant (Belk) from the performance' of the said contract? Ans. — Yes. 6. Has the defendant (Belk) been always ready and willing to perform on his part all and every the conditions, stipulations, and agreements contained m his contract with the Corporation ? Ans. — Yes. In the legal authority which apparently formed the basis upon which Mr. Ward's framed his judgment- — "-Jios— coe's Digest of Criminal Jsvidence "-r---tLo o&iice of arson, which is a felony at common law, is defined by Lord Coke to be a malicious and voluntary burning the house of another by night or by day ; and it further says : — Every punishment and forfeit ure by this Apt imposed on any person maliciously nonv mitting any offence, whether the same be punishable upon indictment, or npr>n mimmary conviction, "hall equally apply and be enforced, whether the offence shall be comm^'ed from malice conceived against the owner of the property m respect of which it sliall be committed, or otherwise. That is conclusive to prove that malice against the owner of the property is unnecessary; and with regard to another point upon whioh Mr. Ward based his dismissal — no intent to defraud — we may quote the utterance of Chief justice Ttndad m his charge to a Grand Jury at Bristol .- Where the statute directs, that to complete the offence it must have been done with intent to injure or defraud some person, fcl'ere is no occasion that either malice on ill will should subsist against the person whose property is destroyed. It is a malicious Act m comtemplation of law, when a man wilfully does that- which is illegal, and its necessary consequence must be to injure his neighbor. It will be thus seen that at the very outset, as the crime set forth m the information was arson, it was entirely beyond the province !of the magistrate to go into the question of tiflo ; secondly, the bulk of evidence both beFore and beyond ihe Court was against the claim of ownership of Mr. Haxcombe ; and thirdly, although accordins; to Bospoe, evidence of malice and intent to injure was not necessary, there was abundant evidence produced to prove both, as there had been a longstanding vendefcta between the parties, and Belk had suffered tta loss of the house. When Mr. Snblson was committed far trial, although there was by no means such a clear prinna facie case made out. no one cavilled at the action of Mr. Wam>. and he got the crodit of conscientiously discharging his duty, and it is a matter far regret that he did not display the same firmness and judgment at FeilcHng. We would deeply regret to see Mr. HAtoostßE suffer the consequences of what we believe was nothing but a rash act, still such a decision as that given is eatenlated to impugn the purity of the courts of justice, and make legal tribunals a farce. We would be very sorry to dp Mr. Ward »n injn«rt«e, but «ur sincere belief is that had the positions of Mr. Hat.oombb and Bblk been reversed, the latter would now stand committed for trial, and that opinion is fnlly endorsed by those who lrnow the facts of the case. Th'° grounds of the decision are so absurd, that .there are but two "onel'i^i'ms to be drawn from it — either thai: Mr. Wa.rt> is thoroughly incompetent, for the position he holls. or he is not possessed of sufficient moral courage tn perform its functions without respect of persons or positions.