DIVISION IN THE COMMONS

Manawatu Standard, Volume LX, Issue 136, 9 May 1940, Page 9

DIVISION IN THE COMMONS

CLIMAX TO POLICY DEBATE PREMIER ACCEPTS CHALLENGE VOTE FAVOURS GOVERNMENT (United Press Association.—By Electric Telegraph—Copyright.) Received May 9, 11.25 a.m. LONDON, May 8. In the House of Commons to-night, the motion for the adjournment of the debate on the Norwegian campaign was carried by 281 votes to 200 after being forced to a division by the Labour Party as a gesture of no-confidence. •Afc the conclusion of the speech by Mr Herbert Morrison (Labour), who referred particularly in his criticism to Mr Chamberlain, Sir John Simon (Chancellor of the Exchequer) and; Sir Samuel Hoare (Minister of Air), the Prime Minister intervened. Mr Chamberlain said that, as head of the Government, lie •accepted the primary responsibility for the Government’s actions. His colleagues would not be slow to accept their responsibilities. Ho Government could prosecute the war efficiently unless it had public and Parliamentary support. He accepted the challenge y of a division—indeed he welcomed it. I?'“At least we shall see who is with us and who is against us,” added the Prime Minister.

: MINISTERS UNDER FIRE. The Dominions High Commissioners, including Mr W. J. Jordan (New. Zealand) say in the crowded galleries of the House 'of Commons when the debate was (continued. Mr Herbert Morrison said tliat in the eyes of the world Britain’s prestige had been badly let down. “I wonder whether the Government, instead of (taking this business seriously, are merely discharging the moral obligation \of protecting themselves from criticism,” he said. ‘‘How near must we gfet to disaster before the Ministries try to understand Hitler’s psychology. We must understand we are fighting jan enemy not worried overmuch- about neutral rights. It was most unwise -to tell Hitler’ we were going to lay mines-before laying them. "We should have laid the mines first and told the world afterwards.

“Is Mr Churchill being used as a shield for Mr Cljamberlain ? It is tinfair to overburden Mr Churchill with responsibility for the policy.” Mr Morrison named, Mr Chamberlain, Sir John' Simon and Sir Samuel Hoare as being ufiequal to their task. More than any other three men they were responsible for not avoiding the war. They lacked courage, initiative, imagination, and liveliness in the conduct of Britain’s fcjreign policy. Lack of tliese qualities was again manifesting itself in the actual conduct of the. war.

“I feel that if these men remain in office we run a grave risk of losing the war,” declared Mr Morrison. Mr Morrison prefaced his criticisms by declaring that on neither side was the House actuated by partisanship or personal’considerations. The issue was far too , serious for that. The Goi'ernment, however, ought’, to_ have known enough of the ways, habits, probabilities, and intentions of (Hitler to have anticipated this attack; upon Norway. Mr Morrison, criticising the personnel of the Government, said it was felt that the whole spirit, temper, and temperament of the Ministers had been wrong, inadequate, and unsuitable. PREMIER’S ACCEPTANCE. When Mr Morrison announced that Labour would divide the House this evening, Mr Chamberlain electrified the House by springing up and declaring the challenge made the occasion graver still. . “I; accept -the primary responsibility for the actions of the Government, and my colleagues are not slow to accept their fesponsibihty,’ the Premier declared.

This was not a case of any personal consideration, because no one would fqr a moment desire to hold office a moment longer than he retained the confidence of the House. “But this is a time when we are facing a relentless enemy, who must he fought with united action,’’ added Mr Chamberlain.

AIR POLICY DEFENDED. Sir Samuel Hoare said the Germans were in' control of all the strategic aerodromes of Central and Southern Norway, where it was very difficult to improvise new landing places. From the very outset the Royal Air I orce had suffered under the very heavy handicap of being remote from their bases while the enemy had his on the spot, was operating on interior lines of communication, and had many refuelling points between Germany and Scandinavia. While faced with the task of winning a foothold for the fighters in Norway, everything possible was being ii«ne to reduce the scale of the air attack upon our sea bases. In the face of these difficulties there had been no delay.

Reconnaissances were made, and, taking the first night when the weather was possible lor flying, intensive bomber attacks were started upon the aerodromes in Norway, on one of the key aerodromes of Denmark, and on one of the key aerodromes of Germany. Since then, always day after day and night after night, in the face of terrible weather conditions and all the difficulties involved in the long flight backwards and forwards across the North Sea these intensive attacks upon the chief points in the German position were made with definite, marked results.

ENEMY losses. Th C v had been able very materially to reduce the scale of air. attacks upon our bases and had inflicted upon the German air force three times the loss they had inflicted upon us. In the course of fifteen hours, thirty German machines had been put out of operatloAfter giving a stirring account.of against bombers? From the .very fl«£ + P_ dancer had been realised, witu J o rtccessity for air bases in Nonvay from which fighters could operate. dir Samuel Hoare said that if the should have got .a ba^.^ ; scalo S of Ce thc German bombing at-.

tacks, the maintenance of sea bases without a fighter force became impossible.

No impartial judge would say it would have helped to have sent more aeroplanes or more troops. So long as we could not maintain sea bases the effect of sending more aircraft would have made the situation worse. On the other hand, Sir Samuel Hoare did not accept the other conclusion that, having no air bases, we should have done nothing. No responsible Government would have stood still in the face of the Norwegian appeal and the issues at stake. Inevitably we should have taken the risk. As to the question, “Is German air power invincible?” he said that where we had fighters we had shown liow well they could cope with German bombers.

Eight months of war showed the superiority of the British fighter over the German bomber. Tlie operations showed that a strong air Power must be met by a still stronger air Power. The fact that, over hundreds of miles of the North Sea night after night we could maintain heavy-scale attacks or inflict great damage upon the key points of the German air attack, and, although it was a case of bombers very often being pitted against fighters, that we could take a much heavier toll of their machines, showed the strength of British air power—in quality unsurpassed, in quantity not nearly big enough.

But production was gathering. The figures for last month were by far the best we had ever had. The momentum was now gathering speed. Sir Samuel Hoare said there was no foundation for the rumours that the British squadron arrived in Norway without petrol and -with the machines destroyed before they went into action. TRENCHANT CRITIC.

Mr Lloyd George, referring to Sir Samuel Hoare’s statement, that there were no air bases available unless they were captured, declared that picked men ought to have been used and measures taken in combination between the Army and Navy to guaranteo suc- ° The conduct of the operations, lie claimed, constituted the most serious condemnation of the Government., “ After a good deal of reflection, I say deliberately that there is, in my judgment, no cause for panic, hut there is grave cause for pulling ourselves together. You cannot do it until vou tell the country the facts. They must realise the magnitude of our jeopardy,declared Mr Lloyd George, who added:

“The Prime Minister has appealed for sacrifice. The nation is prepared for sacrifices so long as you show clearly what you are aiming at, so as you make it have confidence in its ■ leaders. And I say now solemnly to the Prime Minister that lie should give an example of sacrifice, because 1 tell him that nothing would contribute more to victory than that ho sacrified his seals of office.

“AVe want real action —not sliam action. Hitler’s greatest triumph is that he has put Germany into a bettei strategical position and has put us into greater jeopardy. Mr Chamberlain has met Hitler in peace and war, and has always been worsted. (Loud cheers ) We. were too late in Norway, although we had a warning. Norway brings the German ’planes and submarines two hundred miles nearer. It is a grave menace. AVe are infinitely worse off. Our promissory notes are now rubbish in the market. AVe must restore our prestige if the war is to be won. AVe are in the worst, strategic position in which this country has ever been placed. pl , ou( j to re ad of the gallantry of our troops—it is all the more to our shame that we should make fools of them. Everybody is dissatisfied, knowing everything has been done half-heartedly, ineffectively, and unintelligently.”' , , Mr Lloyd George sat clown amid loud Opposition clicers and Government counter-cheers. NEED FOR REFORM.

Air A Duff-Cooper (a former First Lord of the Admiralty) said: ‘‘l will vote against the Government, this is not a time when any man has the right to wash his hands like Pontius Pilate and take neither side. . “It would be far better not to have a division. I had hoped the Government would be sufficiently impressed by the debate to make some of the drastic reforms so urgently needed. Discussing Mr Churchill’s new position. Mr Duff-Cooper said: “It is fundamentally unwise to put one service Minister in a superior position to the others. How can disputes between two departments he referred to an arbiter who is the head of one ot them?’’ Referring to Ttaly he' said: “I am very sorry at the denial of the report that .the Ambassador has been sent to Signor Mussolini with a stern message. It is over three weeks since Count Grandi said Italy could not

long remain an observer. If a man of such importance makes that statement, our Ambassador should go to Signor Mussolini and ask the meaning of the statement. (Loud cheers.) AVe should send our leading statesmen to the Balkans to tell them that their salvation lies in cooperation with England and France.”

NEED FOR CONVICTION. Sir Stafford Cripps (Labour) said: “I found in the United States nothing but scathing criticism of the British Government. Here there is no conviction of success—only doubt, despondency, and., uncertainty. I am certain Mr Churchill intended to risk surface vessels as well as submarines in Norway, but there was a change of policy, influenced perhaps by fears that a loss of capital ships might bring m Mussolini.