CROWDED HOUSE

Manawatu Standard, Volume LX, Issue 135, 8 May 1940, Page 7

CROWDED HOUSE

CLOSE INTEREST IN DEBATE PREMIER’S EXPOSITION. “A CALL ANSWERED.” (United Press Association— By Electric Telegraph.—Copyright.) Received May 8, 11.85 a.m. (British Official Wireless.) 7 RUGBY, May 7. What is regarded by many as the most important Parliamentary occasion since Britain went to war began when Mr Chamberlain rose in a crowded Chamber amid the loud and long cheers of his supporters. The galleries were full, and in the Distinguished Strangers’ Gallery sat. the Norwegian Foreign Minister (Professor Kokt). The House followed the Premier’s statement with close attention. The tenseness was revealed at one moment when Opposition interjections caused the Premier to invoke the Speaker’s authority. Mr Chamberlain was cheered at tlie end of his speech. The Opposition Leaders spoke immediately alter Mr Chamberlain, and tlie debate was continued by the backbenchers, and the House listened with special interest to the critical speech from Sir Roger Keves, whose role in connection with Zeebrugge will he recalled. (He conceived, organised, and carried out the British raid which was destined to influence German naval policy later in the Great War.) Mr L. C. M. S. Amery spoke next. A passage in Mr Chamberlain’s speech which drew cheers from all parts of tlie House was liis tribute to the magnificent gallantry, of the British troops back from the campaign in Southern Norway, which lie declared was now at an. end. They hod carried out their task in a way which liad added still further to the great traditions of the Army, and in the very hard fighting against superior forces with superior equipment had shown great courage and endurance. The Premier’s statement fell into three parts—an explanation of the reasons for the attempt to take Trondheim, an account of tlie execution of that plan and the eventual decision to abandon it, and a discussion of the political organisation at home. He argued that there was general agreement on the necessity for securing Narvik, but allowed that there might be an inquiry why the Government liad sent an expedition to Trondheim which* would be faced with local enemy superiority in the air and the probability of "meeting strong enemy reinforcements. \ “MUST BUN BISK.” Mr Chamberlain explained that the governing consideration was tlie wish of the Norwegian Government and High Command. The British Government felt it must run the>risk and “do our best to give help to a ■ brave people who, with extraordinary courage in spite of their tiny numbers, and the fact that they had almost forgotten what war meant, liad liad the stamina to stand up. to the German bully and make an effort to save the freedom and independence of their country. “I feel myself that if we had refused to answer the call made to us from Norway we should have justified the reproach that our only object in Scandinavia was the iron ores of Sweden, and that we cared nothing for the freedom of the .small nations,” declared the Premier. RAPID NAZI ADVANCE.

Mr Chamberlain made clear that the possibility of ail assault on Trondheim itself had been weighed and had never been ruled out. Tlie effectiveness of the landings at Namsos and Andalsnes, which they had preferred first to test, was, he indicated, compromised by the rapid advance of the Germans with tanks, artillery and mortars—an advance which the British authorities had counted upon being delayed by the blowing up by the Norwegians of railway bridges and effective obstruction of the roads. Mr Chamberlain dealt fully with the complaint that the force and transports prepared for Finland had been dispersed. He argued that, whatever forces were available, they could not have forestalled the Germans unless the Norwegian Government had invited the Allies in first. “Unfortunately, in their determination to preserve the strictest neutrality, the last thing the Norwegians would do was to allow us to enter their ports unopposed and, consequently, we were helpless to prevent the German stroke, made easy by treachery inside Norway and prepared loug beforehand.” The force for Finland consisted of advanced troops and the Second Contingent. The advance party had been retained ready to leave, and it was a misconception to suppose that the transfer to France of the Second Contingent would have delayed its going to the support of the advanced troops if they had been able to establish themselves. The Premier then summed up the reasons for the failure of the plan, and assessed the i>rofit and loss from the German and Allied point of view. NO DIVISION. Coming to the position at Home, Mr Chamberlain asked for the closing of the ranks. There was no division among'the Ministers. Four members of the War Cabinet all directly associated with the military conduct of tho war would speak in the course of the debate. All of them would be replying to criticisms, and all them were aware of the attempts which had been made to separate them front one another.

The Premier intimated that his long experience of Cabinet procedure left him unconvinced by arguments for a smaller AVar Cabinet, but no doubt other changes in the . form of government and of the functions of individual Ministers might be desirable, and he kept his mind ' open for such fresh considerations. Regarding the new duties assigned to the First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr Chamberlain mentioned that, after Mr Churchill had had some experience of the arrangement—revealed by the Premier on April 11 —by which lie (Mr Churchill) was chairman of military co-ordination in Cabinet, lie had suggested that he should have closer touch with the Chiefs of Staff. Under the new arrangement ~ the Chiefs of Staff retained their collective responsibility to the Cabinet- and their individual responsibility, to their own Ministers.- .;•■■■ ' : •-. Replying to Mr Lloyd ' George, Mi-

Chamberlain said be was relying on Mr Churchill to let him know if he found that the new task imposed upon him made it difficult to fulfil his work at the Admiralty, and in such a case lie would take steps to relieve him. Mr Churchill would be provided with a small staff under a senior staff officer, Major-General H. L. Isma.v, who had been appointed an additional member of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. In two impressive passages the Premier placed the Norwegian incident against the background of the wider strategic considerations. OTHRR FRONTS, TOO. “Although we will give all the belli to Norway we can, and as soon as we can, we must not forget there arc other fronts which might at any moment blaze up into a conflagration,” declared Mr Chamberlain. “Germany, with her vast, well-equip-ped armies, is so placed that she can at any moment attack at any one of a number of different points. We want to be ready to meet the attack wherever it may come. “Lain hound to say that, whilst I think the implications of the Norwegian campaign have been seriously exaggerated, and whilst I retain my complete confidence in our ultimate victory, I do not think the people of this country yet realise the extent of the imminence' of the threat which is impending against us. “We may—and if we arc wise we shall—learn many useful lessons from Norway. I am not going to say how onr strategy and plans may •be affected by these lessons. The experience of Norway does show us how swiftly the scene alters in the rapid changes of Avar. Therefore, let. us beware of making such a dispersal) of our forces as might suit the. pui>i poses of the enemy. Let us beware, also, of bickering and division amongst ourselves when presently .. we may be faced by Avar in its most A-iolent form, directed against this country in the hope of breaking our courage and Avillpower.”