ALLIES’ ACTION

Manawatu Standard, Volume LX, Issue 133, 6 May 1940, Page 7

ALLIES’ ACTION

MILITARY FACTORS. REASON TOR WITHDRAWAL AIR BASE NECESSARY. (United Press Association—By Electric Telegraph.—Copyright.) (British Official Wireless.) RUGBY, May 4.

Clearer views of the military operations carried out by the Allies in Norway and the tactical conception which inspired them are now possible. The latter was based on certain assumptions which it can now be seen did not allow enough either for the ingenuity, thoroughness, and disregard for conventional restraints of the Nazis or for the failure of the Norwegian authorities to rea-, lise the danger which threatened their country.

With the knowledge that the Germans were practising amphibious operations, the Allies prepared small forces which would have been sufficient to forestall the Nazi invasion had the call for assistance come in time. The forces, provided for the purpose of establishing a protecting ring round ports such as Stavanger, Trondheim and Narvik, behind which reinforcements and supplies could have been landed and through which larger forces could have passed when necessary to the assistance of the Norwegian army, were on a scale sufficient to carry through an unopposed landing but were insufficient to do much more than had been planned for them. The rapidity with which the Germans established themselves in the key ports by attacks treacherously executed and treacherously aided by elements suborned within the Norwegian defence organisation presented the advance parties of the NorthWestern Expeditionary Force with problems quite different from those for which they had been prepared. This force, _ like the one prepared for Finland before it, was held in readiness against the eventuality of a call for help from the country for which it was destined. British and French aid, unlike German “protection,” is not given unasked, nor does it take the form of the forceful seizure of the ports and aerodromes of the country it purports to be defending. EARLY SETBACK.

The troops were derived from formations gathered earlier to help I inland, but much of the equipment of the Finnish expeditionary force had been dispersed, and among this —unfortunately as it proved in the event —was a considerable part of the provisions of anti-aircraft guns, because the advance parties, after landing successfully, were subjected to very severe attacks from the air. Anti-aircraft guns in whatever quantities would probably have been inadequate to the task of beating off these attacks, and the supreme lesson which emerges from the experience of the Allied troops round Trondheim is that, with the support of fighter ’planes operating from an air base in Norway, the force sent would have been adequate, not only to its original tasks but to whatever additional demands tlie early German successes necessitated. The Allied troops liad most valuable support from the R.A.F. long range fighters and irom the Fleet Air Arm —support generously acknowledged by the military authorities. One lighter squadron based nearby would have made all the difference between success and failure. Lack of the right kind of support from the air, which it was not possible to provide in time, made inevitable the withdrawal of the troops from round Trondheim carried out so skilfully this week. VALUE OF NARVIK. The importance of Narvik in the scheme ot the expedition was due in part to the fact that it could provide a centre from which tlie Allies could operate less menaced by intensive aerial bombardment such as was to lie expected and was met with further south. The successful landings north and south of Trondheim found early justification in drawing off the enemy and in bringing needed moral support to tlie Norwegian forces. The Namsos force, under the command of Brigadier C. G. Phillips, included men from tlie 49th division, and tlieir landing was unopposed. They pressed on toward Trondheim. While the British, troops' were pressing forward on the northern coast of the fiord, the enemy made use of • the mobility afforded them by the presence of German ships in the neighbourhood and delivered a flank attack. For a time the British were in a bad position, hut they extricated themselves and reformed even though some of the advance troops had been cut off. LANDING IN SOUTH. The landing at Andalsnes, some 200 miles further south, was carried out under slightly more difficult conditions, but Brigadier H. de Rimer Morgan, D. 5.0., who was in command, carried through tlie operation despite enemy bombing. It is now known that Brigadier Morgan was immediately faced with a difficult problem. He received an urgent call from the Norwegians for help a considerably long way down the Gudbrands Valley. Without waiting for reinforcements, Brigadier Morgan responded and in a very short time bad pressed forward to Lilleliammer. His action is fully endorsed, since it was tlie essential object of the expedition to bring aid to the Norwegian forces :n their resistance to the Nazi aggression. General Paget followed with a French contingent and the German advance was held up. Several enemy tanks were destroyed, but events at tlie base which was being formed at Andalsnes made it too difficult to maintain supplies and evacuation was ordered. Persistent bombings were aided by the shortening nights and the landing of further troops and supplies became too hazardous to warrant-further attempts. Namsos, too, came in for severe air attacks and some supplies and munitions were blown up. From the military point of view the withdrawal from round Trondheim is regarded by good judges as by no moans all to the disadvantage of the Allies, though; it is not disputed that politically it cannot but occasion some temporary loss ,of prestige.