THE ENEMY IN NORWAY.

Manawatu Standard, Volume LX, Issue 133, 6 May 1940, Page 6

THE ENEMY IN NORWAY.

With tlie clearing of mucli of tlie fog of Avar on the operations in Norway, consequent upon the Allied abandonment of operations at Trondheim and Namsos, it is natural that questions should be asked regarding the strategy adopted in the campaign. One fact stands out prominently — that though the Supreme War Council knew the Germans were practising embarking and disembarking on transports accumulated at Baltic ports, stark evidence of an impending act of aggression though none could accurately forecast where it Avould .strike, the force assembled for Finland was almost entirely dispersed. A month ago “certain small forces” were kept in readiness to occupy the western jiorts of Norway at short notice in case of German aggression there. From these facts it is quite obvious the responsible authorities completely underestimated the strength Avith which Germany would strike, and it might be asked, Avliy did not the Allied Air Forces bomb those concentrations of transports and men ? The ansiver must come from those directing the war. It is clearer now than ever before that we are engaged with a most formidable, ruthless, and treacherous enemy, aa4io has built up an efficient fighting in a skilful manner. Norway lias felt the sharp impact of its strength, and Holland and Belgium may be next. The . pincers movement at Trondheim failed because of Hie enemy’s superiority, but the Avitlidraival must be regarded in the far Avider strategy of the Avhole war. We had our hard knocks in 1914-18 when mistakes were .made and disasters suffered, but the Allies never Avavered in their purpose and the same will throughout their countries to-day will take them to victory. Only a month has elapsed since the' enemy struck at Norway, but that brief period has seen the Nazis, in spite of their hold in Norway, frustrated in their attempt for a speedy victory, upon which such-inva-sions are based for their success; the German Navy very seriously damaged and many transports and supply ships sunk, and comparatively minor damage done to British ships. Those are gains which should be taken into account. .