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GALLIPOLI AND NORWAY.

The appeal made by Admiral of the Eleet Sir Roger Keyes to the Government not to forget the lesson of Gallipoli in the present Norwegian campaign, is one of the most arresting statements made by any individual since the outbreak of hostilities. In short. Sir Roger seeks to spare the land forces the torture of a long campaign when a bold naval stroke might prove decisive. The readiness of the Navy to undertake extreme hazards has been amply proved—there was never, any doubt about it, of course—by the River Plate and Narvik exploits, as well as countless deeds less spectacular. The great naval leader’s utterance revives the old controversy over the withdrawal from Gallipoli by the Allies, and the present is not the time to dwell upon who was to blame for failure to take a bold risk then; but because it is Sir Roger Keyes who points to the lesson as applicable to Norway, the statement deserves the greatest consideration. When a commodore, Sir Roger was chief of staff to ViceAdmiral de Robeck, who was in charge of the naval operations at the Dardanelles. In October, 1915, with the Admiral’s consent, Sir Roger Keyes proceeded to England to lay before the Admiralty and the War Council a plan for rushing a naval squadron through the Straits—that the navy should be allowed with the co-operation of the military forces,’to make a last attempt to snatch a victory. The plan had the enthusiastic support of RearAdmiral Lord Wester Wemyss. ivho succeeded de Robeck in command of tlie naval forces, but it was opposed b.y General Sir Charles Monro. Commander-in-Cliief of the Military Forces, and other leaders, though General Birdwood was less hostile but withheld his approval. When the War Council decided upon the withdrawal in December, 1915, Admiral Wemyss endeavoured to prevail upon the Government to change its mind in favour of the Keyes plan, but military opinion prevailed and within a few weeks the last British soldier had left the shores of the Dardanelles. Some time later, Lord Wester Wemyss, dealing with the campaign, said that “it will remain through all ages to come an imperishable monument to the heroism of our race, to the courage aud endurance of our soldiers and sailors, to the lack of vision and incapacity of our politicians.” That there should not be the same fear of responsibility, and hesitancy to make a bold stroke in to-day’s amphibious expedition, is the warning of the author of the Keyes plan now. It is given added weight when ’we remember liis Zeebrugge exploit.

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/MS19400502.2.44

Bibliographic details

Manawatu Standard, Volume LX, Issue 130, 2 May 1940, Page 8

Word Count
429

GALLIPOLI AND NORWAY. Manawatu Standard, Volume LX, Issue 130, 2 May 1940, Page 8

GALLIPOLI AND NORWAY. Manawatu Standard, Volume LX, Issue 130, 2 May 1940, Page 8

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