DANISH SHIPS

Manawatu Standard, Volume LX, Issue 127, 29 April 1940, Page 8

DANISH SHIPS

ALLIED UNDERTAKING. TRANSFER CONDITIONS. 'United Press Association—By Electric Telegraph.—Copyright.) (British Cilicia[ w ue.ess.) RUGBY, April 27. The , Allied attitude towards the Danish mercantile marine was explained by the Minister of Shipping, (Mr-R. Hudson) in a speech to-day. lie said ' that so long as a ship was under the Danish Hag she could be requisitioned by the Danish Government which, in tiie existing circumstances, meant by the Nazis, who dominated the Government of Denmark. ‘AYhen we have driven the German merchant fleet from the seas,” lie continued, “ can anyone expect us to look supinely on and watch the place of that fleet lie taken by ships flying the Danish flag, but under German control, with the proceeds of their earnings going into German pockets? In international law we have every right to sieze a Danish ship found on the high seas and condemn her as a lawful prize. By law we can justly condemn her without compensation. ‘AYe are sorry, however, for the Danish owners, and especially for the Danish masters and crews. Ate have offered to pay reasonable hire rates for such ships on two conditions. First, that they are transferred to the British or French flag; and secondly, that the proceeds of the hire do not get back to. Germany.” CAPTURED CRAFT. After paying a tribute to the British merchant service, Mr Hudson pointed out that while the losses of British shipping through enemy action representing 3 per cent, of the total British merchant tonnage, this had been almost wholly made good by new building, purchases and captures, “fn a recent week.” Air Hudson continued, “our gains from new construction and purchases were actually more than j double our total losses from all causes.” Speaking of captured ships, Air Hudson said he had had cause to ask why there was such a long time taken to get these running in the British service, and he found that in particularly all cases the Nazi ships had been neglected and required a thorough overhaul and repairs, while more than half of the crews’ quarters wero so ■unsatisfactory as to necessitate extensive structural alterations. “This state of affairs,” he addeded, “maywell reflect the economic strain under which Nazi Germany has been living during the last few years and it augurs well for the effect our blockade must have on her.” TRADE PARALYSED. Speaking from the report of a British official living near Copenhagen, Mr Hudson revealed interesting facts concerning Danish trade before the Nazis’ invasion. Though the Danish Government was under obligation to issue licenses upder the 193 G trade agreement to Danish ■ importers of British goods, no such licences were forthcoming after a partial issue in January. As a result, by the time of the German invasion the warehouses in the free port were overflowing and importers of United Kingdom goods were clamouring for licences to clear their merchandise, but were unable to obtain them. “What was the reason for this reluctance on the part of the Danes?” Air Hudson asked—“a real lack of foreign exchange, tiic result ol direct German pressure, or a wish to he in a position ‘to Iced the brute’ and avoid a worse fate. Whatever the reason, the plan of the invaders was immediately evident. Early on the morning of April 10 all roads to the famous Langelinio harbour and to the free port were blocked by armed guards and a general looting of Copenhagen began. Down adjacent streets began an endless procession of lorries loaded with goods ol every description, drums of oil, grease, rubber tyres, boots, shoes, cement, scrap iron, every conceivable commodity were rushed in a steady stream. The showrooms of importers of British cars began to bo emptied. Everything which the mauraudors could lay hands on was removed lor shipment to parts unknown, hut which it was easy to identify.” Mr Hudson also revealed that Norway had now joined the inter-Allicd shipping executive and thus was working in close co-operation with Britain and France in unified control over the Allied shipping resources.