SAFETY OF SINGAPORE

Manawatu Standard, Volume LVIII, Issue 49, 26 January 1938, Page 15

SAFETY OF SINGAPORE

DEFENSIVE STRENGTH. VALUE OFSITUATION. LONDON, Dec. 22. Since Sir lan Hamilton, a few days ago, told how he, with a brigade of Singapore (which is only 25 miles long with a maximum width of 12 miles), with a maximum widt hof 12 miles), there has been a good deal of discussion among interested persons as to how strong Singapore really is, now that so many millions sterling have been spent on its defences. Is is reasonably safe? is a familiar question. If the answer is important to Britain, it is vital to Australia and New Zealand. Of all those who have written about this great harbour, Mr It. T. Barrett, who Has spent the past eleven years in Hong Kong, and who is familiar with the Imperial problem in the Ear East, has written a most interesting article. Discussing the question, “Is Singapore Impregnable?” Mr Barrett, writing in “Great Britain and the Far East” notes that it is not surprising that the Defence Department is giving little away with regard to details of the armaments, but the assumption is that the first thing to do was to make the place strong enough to beat off any possible attack.

He also observes that, all that is disclosed is that the garrison consists of between 6000 and 7000 regulars; the monitor Terror, with a couple of 15-inch guns, is stationed at Seleter, the new naval base; and the Air Force consists of two squadrons of flyingboats and two squadrons of bombers. There are two landing fields at Seleter and an immense air port just outside Singapore city. Two new R.A.F. squadrons, according to Beuter, are shortly to be added.

The naval base was recently stated, by Reuter, to be within four months of completion, but, according to the naval estimates for 1937, £640.000 was to bo spent in the current year and' another £3,369,000 had been earmarked. STRATEGIC POSITION.

Singapore’s main strength, in Mr Barrett's words, lies in its distance from any possible foe. Japan is 2500 miles away, Canton is 1500, Manila 1340, and Formosa 1600. Hainan and the extreme south of China are about 1100 miles distant.

Any operations against .Singapore would, therefore, have to be conducted at immense range and through seas strewn with islands, easily convertible into temporary outposts by the defenders. Singapore would be on the flank of any attack on India, and if operations were conducted by Japan against the Dutch East Indies, Japan would have to do it at long range. If we sought to prevent her, Singapore would present a grave menace. Equally, Singapore would be on the flank of any descent upon either Borneo, New Guinea, or Australia. In operating fleets and aircraft in the Malayan seas, we should be fighting at infinitely closer range to our big source of supply than Japan. Sinagpore is 1445 miles from Hong Kong, and, in these days of speed, well able to succour that outpost. As a base of operations against Japan, Singapore is, of course, useless, because it is too far off. AMAZING STRENGTH.

Mr Barrett states: “Singapore, flat and fertile, with red roofs and white walls rising among banks of trees, is slightly reminiscent of Southampton, on a clear summer day. Unlike Gibraltar, Aden, and Hong Kong, it gives no impression of strength. It is a manmade fortress, but the natural line of defence of Seleter is a wide belt of mangrove swamp. This is utterly impenetrable, and any attacking force must keep to the roads. “North of Singapore the Federated Malay States stretch for 300 miles. There is a good railway and road connection with Penang, a good harbour, and secondary naval and air stations, 360 miles distant, on the west side of the Malay Peinsula. “Singapore can draw the food and the labour she requires from her own hinterland, and for military stores and reinforcements she has an excellent supporter in Penang. Colombo and Calcutta are both about 1600 miles away or a good deal closer than Japan. ’ “Few places in the world fulfil so strikingly the requirements of a strategic base.”