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RONGOTAI TRAGEDY

AIR BOARD INQUIRY. EVIDENCE BY EXPERTS. WELLINGTON, Jan. 25. An Air Board inquiry was held at Wellington yesterday into the crash of a Middle Districts Aero Club machine on the Miramar golf links in the evening of December 3, 1937, when Ridley Lenderyou Elliott, of Palmerston North, was killed. Members of the board were Mr W. F. Stilwell, S.M. (chairman), Squad-ron-Leader H. B. Burrell and Commander A. G. .Gerrand, of the Royal New Zealand Air Force and Union Airways respectively. Dr N. A. Foden conducted the inquiry on behalf of tile Department of Civil'Aviation and his chief witness was Mr R. C. Kean, Inspector of Accidents. Mr A. M. Ongley, of Palmerston North, appeared for the pilot, William Smillie, of Palmerston North. The ’plane was flown down from Palmerston North on December 3 by Elliott, who took the passenger’s seat when Smillie met the machine at Rongotai. The crash occurred shortly after 6.30 p.m., when the ’plane stalled and dived on to a mound almost in front of tlio golf course clubhouse. Frederick Lionel Truman, instructor to the Middle Districts Aero Club, said that he had trained both Smillie and Elliott. Smillie had had 18 hours’ dual instruction and 40hr smin solo flying experience. Pilots at the aerodrome had been notified of circuit rules issued on September 13, 1937. It i was understood that pilots were to read such notices to airmen before proceeding on cross-country flights. The ?oute taken by the pilot on taking off at Rongotai for the return Slight was described by ivitness as being “rather silly.” Turning down the wind would be a rather risky thing to do in view of the hills and Moa Point, which caused a down current of wind. In reply to Mr Ongley, he said that the majority of circuits at New Zealand aerodromes were left-handed, though at Rongotai the circuit to be used was indicated by a panel. Asked whether he thought Rongotai rather exceptional for landings and departures, witness said he considered it a rather tricky place in certain winds. He said that Smillie and Elliott .should have known the circuit rule at Rongotai. EVIDENCE BY PILOT. William Smillie, aged 19, pilot of the machine when it crashed, said he arrived at the aerodrome in time, to see the incoming ’plane circling the aerodrome, but he was unable to say what line of flight the machine had been on previously. They eventually took off at 6.40 p.m. after a wait of about seven minutes. Dr. Foden: Why didn’t you look at the circuit sign ? —I assumed it to be the left circuit. He explained that as Elliott had landed on the left circuit he had not thought of taking off on the right. Witness said lie noticed that the revolutions were approximately 1850 just after leaving the “ground. He took a wide climbing turn to the left, after attaining a height of approximately 200 feet, when he eased the throttle back. He imagined the speed before turning to be about 60 ni p.h. He could not remember what his horizon was before starting the turn. He said he remembered heading straight up Evans Bay after taking a turn through approximately 180 degrees, designed to bring him on his ordinary course. The machine was bumping about a bit, turning to the left, and he turned the stick to the right, and the left wing dropped. Questioned by Dr. Foden, witness said that he could not remember what he did after that. He said he saw the ground in front of his nose and that was all. He admitted that the machine was out of control. There was no conversation between himself and Elliott from the time the machine took off to the time of the crash. THE TIME FACTOR. Dr. Foden: Isn’t there a rule prohibiting flying after sundown? —I have never lieardi of it. Dr. Foden: Don’t you think that the trip was started a little late? — No. Sunset on December 3 was at 7.30 p.m., and Dr. Foden suggested that the margin of time left to fly to Palmerston North did not leave any time for delay through an emergency. Smillie denied that they had taken off hurriedly to avoid wasting any time. Reginald William Roots, ground engineer’s assistant at Rongotai, said he saw the ’plane land when it arrived at the aerodrome from Palmerston North. It made a good landing and there was no indication of anything being wrong with the machine so far as he could see. The engine was kept running all the time, about five or six minutes, and it seemed to be functioning well. When the ’plane took off it appeared as though it were flying in a slightly tail-down position, as though it were tail heavy, and it seemed to be sinking or “squashing.” Then he saw it make a steep turn to the left and spin back into the ground. Claudius William Roots, officer m charge of the aerodrome, said the minimum wind gust on the day of the crash had been 14 miles an hour and the maximum 28 miles an hour. The wind was from the south-south-east and was steady. There was no peculiarity about Rongotai that could have caused the crash, he said in answer to a question by Dr. Foden. EXPERT’S EVIDENCE.

Roy Champion Kean, inspector of accidents, said that there was no definite rule about flying after sundown, but the regulation stated that machines flying after sundown had to be equipped with landing lights. He agreed tha.t the return flight was .being cut a little fine. The pilot had no time to lose, and because of this there might have been some haste and neglect of precautions. Explaining why the manoeuvre was, in his opinion, a faulty one. witness said: “The start of the take-off was more or less normal, into the wind. Instead of turning to the right he turned left and made a turn of 160 to 170 degrees, bringing his course along the eastern boundary of the aerodrome. Making that turn to the left, half-way round he would be confronted with hills. A pilot in taking off is concerned with gaining height, and it is extremely likely that the hills would create in the pilot’s mind an obstacle to be cleared. “He completed this turn and the tact that the pilot had the impression that it was necessary to carry out an adjustment to the tail trim lever seems to indicate that it was forced on the pilot’s mind at this stage of the flight that the machine needed adjustment. This adjustment is not one normally made till the pilot has gained height —it has no effect on the machine, it merely makes flying easier and eases the load on the control column. “After the turn he had the benefit of a 25-mile an hour tail wind, the speed jumped up to 80 to 85 miles an hour, and his natural tendency would be to climb the machine. There is another factor that could influence the pilot in tha.t corner of the aerodrome 1 in the lee of the hills. It is quite pos-

sible that there may have been down draughts and this could create in the pilot’s mind the idea that he was not gaining height as quickly as he would normally. “In a machine that is badly stalled, all lateral control is lost. The slightest disturbance could cause a wing to drop, in this case the port wing. The instinctive thing for a comparatively experienced pilot to do would be to endeavour to correct it. In normal flight he would correct the drop of the port wing by moving the stick to the right. When in a badly stalled condition this would be the very worst thing that he could do, in so far as it would make the port wing drop further. “The main contributing factor to this accident, in my opinion, is the turn to the left, contrary to the circuit signal then showing,” witness added. “After making the turn he would be under the influence of down currents of air from the hills and he would also be under the impression of high air speed. The controls of the machine were definitely misused, otherwise the machine would not have been brought into that stalled condition.” After cross-examination by Mr Ongley, witness said to Dr. Foden that a. scheme where pilots from other aerodromes would be required to report to instructors at aerodromes they might be visiting would be a good one. It would, however, bo limited to holders of A licenses and student pilots.

Percy Robert Hughes, ground engineer at Milson Aerodrome, said he had no doubts about letting the machine go from Milson. He did not think the flight was prepared in a hurry or .at the last minute. Elliott, was hot told the machine was wanted at Palmerston North that night. He knew of the left and right-hand rules at Rongotai, but did not mention them to Elliott as all pilots received the notification. The machine had full equipment for night flights except tor navigation and dashboard lights. SERIOUS VIEW TAKEN. “The department takes a serious view of the accident, and considers the pilot guilty of gross carelessness and neglect of his responsibilities as a pilot in three ways,” said Dr Foden, addressing the board; “to his passenger, to the aero club in respect to the ’plane, and to third- parties.” He submitted that the safety rules which had been designed should bo strictly adhered to, because if ignored it would not be long before thero would be an air disaster of much greater magnitude than had yet occurred, which might involve commercial aircraft. Last year, he said, there were five lives lost in civil aviation, but in commercial Hying ’planes had travelled more than 1,000,000-miles without mishap to the 40,000 passengers carried. “1 make the contrast to show that if the safety rules are ignored it will not be long before some pilot disobeying them might involve commercial aircraft in a disaster. The department takes the view that the onus is on a pilot to make himself acquainted with the general rules and regulations and local rules. The success of flying in New Zealand or elsewhere must necessarily depend on a strict appreciation by pilots of _ their responsibilities. Flying in itself is not dangerous, but pilots who lack a sense of responsibility are. “The very fact of this accident happening indicates the desirability of strict compliance to local rules. This particular rule is such that it lends itself to- easy observance. In this case the notice to airmen was made available, and it seems clear that though his attention had not been drawn to the notice the responsibility was his to have become familiar with it.” SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES. Rongotai was exempt from the general regulations as pilots had found there was a difficulty in leaving it as others were left, said Mr Ongley. Though a breach had been committed in this case its explanation could bo found in a sot of very unfortunate circumstances. “Elliott was a pilot of very limited experience,” lie said. ‘ “Truman was away from Milson and had no opportunity of explaining the route to him when he left on his first trip to Rongotai, or of giving him any particular instructions. Elliott made a breach of tlio rules when landing at Rongotai, and Smillie, having seen lwm land, was lulled into a sense of false security—that of going out the same way as coming in. “It was unfortunate that there was no one at Rongotai when Elliott landed, for had there been the breach would have been corrected. If Smillie’s breach of the rule is not totally excusable it is very well explainable.” The board then adjourned to consider the evidence and to make its recommendation _ to the Minister in Charge of Aviation.

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/MS19380125.2.166

Bibliographic details

Manawatu Standard, Volume LVIII, Issue 48, 25 January 1938, Page 9

Word Count
1,986

RONGOTAI TRAGEDY Manawatu Standard, Volume LVIII, Issue 48, 25 January 1938, Page 9

RONGOTAI TRAGEDY Manawatu Standard, Volume LVIII, Issue 48, 25 January 1938, Page 9

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