AIR FORCE “MUDDLE”

Manawatu Standard, Volume LVIII, Issue 45, 21 January 1938, Page 4

AIR FORCE “MUDDLE”

CABINET ASPECT. LONDON, Jan. 13. It is said picturesquely in informed quarters that the “air rearmament muddle” is packed with political dynamite. At the very core of the affair, from the political viewpoint, is whether the Secretary for Air (Lord Swinton) should not be relieved of his portfolio, which should bo handed over to someone such as Mr Winston Churchill, who is freely mentioned ns the most suitable for the post. The Prime Minister (Mr Chamberlain) however, is a great friend of Lord Swinton, whoso departure Mr Chamberlain would possibly be reluctant to contemplate. On the other hand, it is remarked that aircraft manufacturers dislike Lord Swinton. Mr Churchill is unquestionably the greatest independent political figure in matters of defence outside tho Cabinet, and there is a feeling in certain quarters that it would bo greatly to tho Government’s benefit to have Mr Churchill in a position where lie would not ho moved to make damaging attacks on the Government. At tho same time, he is considered to he tho ideal person to build up the forces rapidly. No one tries to disguise the fact that the Government is shaken by the extent to which the public has heeomc disquieted ns the result of disclosures that all is not well, either on the Ministerial or manufacturing side, and that there is no real co-operation. SUPPLY OF VITAL INSTRUMENTS “I learn that tho centre of the trouble in the past, from tho viewpoint of the manufacturers, lias been the supply of vital instruments and other vital parts to tho manufactures. For these, the Air Ministry is solely responsible, yet they have more or less continually failed to arrive either altogether or in sufficient quantities. To a certain extent, this can be excused by tho suddenness of the decision to expand the Air Force. “The difficulty of co-ordinating supplies which have recently been arriving more promptly is another source of trouble.

“This can be traced to the natural desire of the Air Ministry to secure the latest types of machine. This has caused a certain amount of hesitancy in placing final orders for the production of _ certain fighters, although it is seemingly now obvious to the Air Ministry that there must be a definite limit to the postponement of orders, since either absolute perfection of any one type must be surrendered to the needs of production, or merely a few machines of each type must trickle out to the squadrons while industry remains virtually on a wartime basis so far as its staff is concerned.”