BRITISH POLICY
TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT. PACTS OR THE LEAGUE. LONDON, Jan. 6. Nothing is more incalculable than the shape that British foreign policy may assume in 1938. Yet it is a vital matter in which the dominions are increasingly most concerned. Lord Londonderry’s sarcastic description of the present policy as “opportunist” has been republished by the Times. It is interesting that his attack coincided with the reorganisation of the Foreign Office and the appointment of Sir Robert Vansittart to the new post of Chief Diplomatic Adviser.
The reshuffle came as a complete surprise to the public, which has not yet received a full explanation, and it is being thrashed out privately whether the change presages an alteration ill the course of Britain’s policy. Signor Gayda’s comment that the lines of British policy “are often filtered by internal considerations, such as Parliamentary pressure and tactics,” is being discussed with animation.
It is a fact that the lines of Britain’s policy are not bold. Primarily they are dictated by considerations of Imperial interests and ako the maintenance of certain traditional friendships and the cultivation of others, importantly related to defence and Imperial interests.
Australia and the other Dominions base their own embryo foreign policies on the firmness of these essential lines. Supporters of the British Government are split on the question of which is the best way to strengthen the policy. At present, foreign policy leans towards a form of collective security, w-ith France as the first and indispensable ally.
It is a principle opposed to bilateral agreements, except in certain specific cases, such as the Anglo-German Naval Agreement. Nevertheless, there is room to believe that important influences are working for the breaking up of the policy of collective security in favour of something akin to an understanding between Britain, Germany, Italy and France —in other words, a reversion to Power politics, by the establishment if either a three or four Power bloc. Apart from appearing to urgo the
Foreign Office advisers to take greater notice of Germany, Lord Londonderry’s remarks do not lead anywhere, being purely destructive criticism, and w-ould be of little value but for the fact that they merely underline the astonishing state of uncertainty among many people in high positions as to what is the correct course that the policy should pursue. A denunciation of Britain’s policy by Herr Hitler could not be more severe in its essence than Lord Londonderry’s LORD LONDONDERRY’S GROUP. Lord Londonderry is a member of an important group favouring better treatment ot Germany on the ground that, so far, British diplomacy has shown itself almost at its worst whenever it has dealt with Germany, and that the policy should be adjusted so as to be less “foolish.” Mr Eden and Sir Robert Vansittart are believed to lead a group supporting the maintenance pf the present policy. _ • If there is any hidden significance to Lord Londonderry’s criticism, it may be that it could provide some sort of a clue to the importance of Sir Robert Vanaittart’s new job, which lias been described by the Times as “experimental,” The job may mean a victory for the collective group, since it enables Sir Robert Vansittart to communicate his views direct to the Cabinet instead of through the Secretary of State. On the other hand, he is nowin a position in which he may be directly attacked from various quarters, with the possibility of the position being squeezed into one of small importance. It is believed, however, that Sir Robert Vansittart will choose co accept the new position, which indicates that he expects reasonable chances of firmly entrenching himself. (Sir Robert later accepted the position.) Some critics interpret Lord Londonderry’s attack as proving that Sir Robert Vansittart has scored a substantial victory. Certainly, one influential Conservative section eeems to urge protection against a whittling down of the importance of the job by suggesting that Sir Robert Vansittart should not he sent round Europe frequently, but should remain close to the Cabinet. In the meanwhile the peoples of the Dominions might profitably assist Britain by making up their minds how I they would respond to the swinging of the helm this way or that.
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Bibliographic details
Manawatu Standard, Volume LVIII, Issue 43, 19 January 1938, Page 5
Word Count
697BRITISH POLICY Manawatu Standard, Volume LVIII, Issue 43, 19 January 1938, Page 5
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