POLICY OF NAPOLEON TOWARDS ENGLAND.

Marlborough Press, Volume I, Issue 44, 3 November 1860, Page 3

POLICY OF NAPOLEON TOWARDS ENGLAND.

A short time ago, the French Ambassador communicated to Lord John Russell a private letter of a very remarkable character, addressed to him (M. Persigny) by theEmperor of the French. This letter, which' contains the most friendly sentiments towards England, and expresses a desire that the policy of the two nations should be identical, was published by the journals on August 1. The following is a copy of it: St. Cloud. July 25, 1860. My deaf. Persigny — Affairs appear to me to be so complicated, thanks to the mistrust excited everywhere since the war in Italy,, that I write to you in the hope that a conversation, in perfect frankness (5 cceur onvert), with Lord Palmerston will remedy the existing evil. Lord Palmerston knows me, and when I affirm a thing he will believe me. Well, you can tell him from me, in the most explicit manner, that since the peace of Villafranca I have had but one thought, one object—to inaugurate a new era of peace, and to live on the best terms with all my neighbours, and especially with England. I had renounced Savoy and Nice; the extraordinary additions. to Piedmont alone caused me to resume the desire to see re-united to France provinces essentially French. But it will be objected, “You wish for peace, and } r ou increase, immoderately, the military forces of France.” I deny the fact in every sense. My army and my fleet have in them nothing of a threatening character. My steam navy is even far from being adequate to our requirements, and the number of steamers does not nearly equal .that of sailing ships deemed necessary in the time of King Louis Phillippe. I have 400,000 men under arms; but deduct from this amount 60,000 in Algeria, 6,000 at Koine, 8,000 in China, 20,000 gonsdarmes, the sick, and the new conscripts.and you will see, what is the truth, that my regl**r ,x ments are of smaller effective strength than during the preceding reign. The only addition to the army list has been made by the creation of the Imperial Guard. Moreover, while wishing for peace, I desire also to organise the forces of the country on the best possible footing, for, if of the last war foreigners have only seen the bright side, I myself have, close at hand, witnessed the defects, and I wish to remedy them. Having said thus much, I have, since Villafranca, neither done, nor even thought, anything which could alarm any one. When Lavalette started for Constantinople, the instructions which I gave him were confined to this, “ Use every effort to maintain the status quo. The interest of France is that Turkey should live as long as possible.” Now, then, occur the massacres in Syria, and it is asserted that I am very glad to find a new occasion of making a little war, or of playing a new part. Keally, people give me credit for very little common sense. If I instantly proposed an expedition, it was because my feelings were those of the people which has put me at its head, and the intelligence from Syria transported me with indignation. My first thought, nevertheless, was to come to an understanding with England. What other interest than that of humanity could induce me to send troops into that country ? Could it be that the possession of it would increase my strength? Can I conceal from myself that Algeria, notwithstanding its future advantages, is a source of weakness to France, which for thirty years has devoted to it the purest of its blood and its gold ? I said it in 1852, at Bordeaux, and my opinion is still the same: I have great conquests to make, but only in France. Her interior organisation, her moral development, the increase of her resources, have still immense progress to make. There a field exists vast enough for my ambition, and sufficient to satisfy it. It was difficult for me to come to an understanding with Italy on the subject of Central Italy, because I was bound by the peace of Villafranca. As to southern Italy, I am free from engagements, and I ask no better than a concert with England on this point, as on others ; but, in heaven’s name, let the eminent men who are placed at the head of the English Government lay aside petty jealousies and unjust mistrusts. Let us understand one another, in good faith, like honest men as wc are, and not like thieves who desire to cheat each other. To sum up, this is my innermost thought. I desire that Italy should obtain peace, no matter how, but without foreign intervention, and that my troops should be able to quit Itome without compromising the security of the Pope. I could very much wish not to be obliged to undertake the Syrian expedition, and in any case, not to undertake it alone; firstly, because it will be a great expense, and secondly, because I fear that this intervention may involve the Eastern question ; but, on the other hand, I do not see how to resist i>ub!ic opinion in my country, which will never understand that we can leave unpunished, not only the massacre of Christians, but the burning of our consulates, the insult to our flag, an d the pillage of the monasteries which were under our protection. I have told you all, I think, without disguising or omitting anything. Make what use you may think advisable of my letter. Believe in my sincere friendship, (Signed) Napoleon.