WHAT THE NEW ZEALANDERS HAD TO FACE.

Mount Ida Chronicle, Volume XLV, Issue XLV, 21 September 1917, Page 1

WHAT THE NEW ZEALANDERS HAD TO FACE.

♦ EFFECTS OF THE BRITISH BOMBARDMENT. (From Malcolm Ross, Correspondent with the New Zealand Forces in the Field.) June 12. As the days go by we are beginning to ascertain the exact strength of the position in and around Messines which the New Zealanders had to attack and capture on the morning of the 7th. It was indeed a, strong one, but such was the destructive effect of our artillery that both its outer and inner defences suffered greatly during the preliminary bombardments, and also with, the drum tiro that churned the ground again on the morning of the attack. One of the main advantages the enemy had in this position was the splendid observation obtainable from the crest and the forward slopes of tho ridge. Looking liack from Messines now at the position' we held one marvels why the enemy did not blow our roads and tramways to pieces, and hold up our traffic a great deal more than they did. Probably the enemy are no longer as flush of munitions as they were when at the zenith of their power. Perhaps it was that the vastness of our preparations gave them such, a bewildering array of targets that they could not make up their minds what was" best to do. But looking down from tho ridge we have now won it seems as if they had failed to make the most of their opportunity. DUGOUTS AND UEI^LARS.

Tho importance of Messines «s the southoru corner poet of the Wytschaote salient was fully recognised by the enemy, and in consequence fully a month before the attack a permanent responsible commander —one Thomas—was appointed for the outer and inner defences. Looking back at some of our bombardments ouo wonders what happened to Captain Thomas. The outer defences of Messines consisted of an elaborate system of trenches, the print cipal of which were known to us as Oyster Reserve and Ulcer Reserve, the latter goiug right round the town ou the right and behind it till it joined up with Oxonian trench on the left. lii front of these trenches there was considerable wire. Even the trenches behind the toyn were wired on the side away from the town, this in case our attacking force should get round the village and come in, as it were, by the back door

The inner defences were based on live concrete works which commanded the lines of tho streets. More of these were planned and were being constructed early in May. In the event of our getting through the outer defences the town itself was to be defended by sectors, the main defence being five concrete dugouts, which were connected by a close system of obstacles. Each dugout was in itself a strong point, and orders were given that it was to be defended to the last—even till the place was retaken, should our men have gained an entrance. In the northern part of the town a company was held in reserve in cellars facing the square There were platoons in strong dugouts. Even the cookhouses for the companies in line and in Messines were iu cellar's. Battalion Headquarters were similarly protected. Under the' Institution Eoyale, the most prominent of all the shattered buildings on the crest of the ridge, there were cellars and deep dugouts to hold considerable numbers of men protected from our shelling. These dugouts took the form of long timbered tunnels, 20ft below the ground, and fitted witbi bunks. Pioneers were stiE working at them some time after the preparations for our attack were well advanced. The spoil was carried out hi sand bags at night. Some of the cellars were strengthened with reinforced concrete. There was even a canteen in the cellar under the InThe Germans took their usual pains to give thorough instruction to all leaders and detachments, and especially to their machine gunnners, as to what they were to do in case of attack, and practice drills in manning posts were held. ANTICIPATING- ATTACK. We knew from prisoners that we had taken that an attack was expected. At first the enemy expected it at a much earlier date than the actual day. By the end of May they had narrowed their guessing down to a date between the 3rd and the 10th June. This idea they had probably obtained from some prisoners they had taken from our side. But the exact date was, of course, unknown to them, as it was to our own men, and, above all things, the time of the attack was a close secret. By the end of May a complete regiment oi heavy artillery had arrived, and was already in position in reinforcement of the artillery already in the sector, >and the resting battalion was no longer in the Divisional Reserve, but was available foi regiment in the line. Every man was no

tified that he must resist to the utmost i the front line, and was told that suppoi would always be available to help bin Company leaders were impressed with tl necessity for immediate connter-attacl which they were assured would always 1 effective. Extreme precautions were to be take against our gas attacks, especially in vie of the fact that another division had lo 100 men through one of these attack Emphasis was laid on the desirability i determining tho exact moment of our a tack, so that destructive fire could 1 brought down before our infantry ai vanced, in order to cause them heavy cas alties; and special instructions were issu< as to the avoidance of our heavy artillei lire. One other precaution taken may 1 cited as throwing light on the declinii C4erman morale. On movements of coi panies into line an energetic officer was i ways detailed to march in rear of t column to prevent men from falling 01 and every man who left the front or t reserve Hues had to have a pass stati either that he was sick or was on a rati or other fatigue. In a captured order dated the day befc the battle we read : '• The enemy must r ; get the Messines Ridge at any price." TJ order was issued to the 17th* Bavarian " fantry Regiment. The regiment was structed how to act in the event of c breaking through. The regiment was self broken! It coidd not stem the i rushing tide. It failed to carry out instructions. a "If," says another order, "the ene: j have pushed forward so far that no hi is left of holding out, then the last lis grenade must be used for the destruct of the machine gun. Then the gun te must take their revolvers and do tt

best. It is the duty of every man to see that the machine gun does not fall into the hands of the enemy." As a matter of fact, long before the last hand grenade was used many of the German machine gunners were holding their hands up and crying " Mercy, kamerad!'' The New Zealand Division alone captured 38 machine guns. The hanl in field and other guns was not so important, for the reason that the New Zealanders did not have to go so far afield as some other troops. OUR ARTILLERY REPLY. Having given in some detail an idea of the great strength of the enemy position in Messines, and the efforts made to hold it, 1 shall now give some information regarding the steps we took to batter it down, reserving for subsequent articles particulars of the part played in the attack by individual units of our infantry. What our military describe' as their " destructive shoots." indulged in before the battle proper, did great - damage to the enemy trenches, to their wire entanglements, and to their strong points. The concrete emplacements were often broken, and the wire, in the language of the field, was "blown to blazes." The trench mortars did particularly good work, both mediums and heavies. The personnel of this section of our division is of a very high order, and one can scarcely praise their efforts overmuch. One day, when they fired over 2,000 rounds, was probably a record day for any division. One

dugout received seven direct hits, and the' mortar men made things so uncomfortable in that quarter that finally a dozen Germans were seen to make a hurried bolt out into the blue. These were promptly fired upon by one of the trench mortars, and one round that -was seen to fall in their midst accelerated their retreat and caused several casualties. Our artillery shot practice barrages, and many enemy routes and tracks were kept under fire at night. The heavies further behind our lines engaged many hostile batteries, and great explosions were caused. We watched the smoke clouds rising two and three thousand feet in the air, and knew* that for the enemy the worst had happened to some ammunition dump or tram. Enemy batteries and roads to tho south-east ot Warneton were damaged. The (Jhemin du Temple was badly strafed, and Warneton itself was damaged. The enemy went on digging new trenches and putting up new wire, but as fast as their new work appeared it was shot away, or at least' partially destroyed. They used smoke screens to hide their operations. We learned from prisoners captured on ; the night of June 2-3 that their trenches had been badly knocked about, and in .. places almost obliterated. Communication trenches were blocked almost every few yards, and reliefs had to come up over- ' land. The morale of these prisoners was poor, and they seemed resigned to their late. Gas shells were used on particular spots. Aeroplane photographs confirmed these statements. It was interesting to compare these photographs from day to day. All this time the hostile shelling was fairly heavy, and we did not, of course, escape casualties. Some of our. dumps also "went up," affording thrilling spectacles. Field guns, heavy howitzers, and guns of the naval type were in action against our front lines, supports, and back areas. Gas and tear shells came • back at us, making work in certain localities difficult and dangerous. But we kept ' on the even tenor of our way, and the • fire from the enemy guns' was nothing like • as heavy as the fire from our side. In I short, the weight of our artillery was in- > finitely superior. v j L .. ",