CAN THE REVOLUTION SUCCEED?
\ •• «~ ■ WHAT BLOCKS THE WAY? [By Geokge Kexicax. in the New York ; 'Outlook.'] On the night of March 12, 1917. when l it.became certain that the Russian revoluI tionary movement had succeeded, there ; came into existence in Petrograd, almost > simultaneously., two independent and rival Governments—viz., (1) an Executive Com- . mittee, composed of 12 former members . of the Duma (mostly Constitutional Demo- . crate, Octobrists/ or Progressives): and (2) a- Workman's Council, made up of Socialist .leaders and artisans from the Petrograd lactones. The Hrst Govern- . ment were chosen by the leaders of the Imperial Duma (which was not then in session), and it represented in the main j Jjh® moderate Liberals of the Progressive . "bloc." The second Government, who • 1 of the old Workmen's Coun- , ed ot 1905-06, consisted at first of a com--5 paratively small body of men, who repre--1 seated almost exclusively the political mr- " 'IT ° f tl the o Ex . tr , en l! I*ffr-VK.. the Social- . ists, the Social Revolutionists, and the . Labor group. So far as character, educa--3 tion. and knowledge were concerned, the . Executive- Committee of the Duma were far superior to the Workmen's Council. s Xirev had quite as much patriotism as the ; IT *' a M- . fai * more Prudence, wisdom 1 and familiarity with public affairs. Nearly [ ail tlie members had for rears served oil . important Duma committees, and bv 3 virtue of long study and experience,'had - acquired a thorough knowledge of economic and administrative problems. On i the other hand, the Workmen's Council s consisted mainly of idealists, socialistic i theorists, Pacrfists, and plain cranks, who t • had had little practical experience ii>. tl>e
art of government, and who held generally the visionary ideas of the Russian proletariat. The two rival Governments began at once the work of organisation. The Executive- Committee appointed a Ministry of very able men, who were described by Baron Rosen (formerly Russian Ambassador at Washington) as "the flower of the nation—the greatest and most distinguished men in every respect." All of these men were Constitutional Democrats, Octobrists, or Progressives, except the Moderate Socialist Kerensky, who was taken in partly to secure the support of his followers and partly to get the benefit of his acknowledged ability and influence. The first step of the Workmen's Council was to extend their membership and to consolidate their power, particularly in the army. Upon the plea that a strong democratic and popular organisation was necessary as a means of guarding' against a counter-revolution, they called upon all soldiers and workmen for support. The garrison and factories of Petrograd responded promptly, and in less than a fortnight the membership of the council increased from a few score—or perhaps a few hundred—to more than 2,000, with an Executive Committee of 45. Nobody knew who they were, or what factories and regiments they represented; but they assumed supreme authority, regardless of the Provisional Government, and proceeded to issue " orders," as if they were a newly-elected Duma empowered to speak and act for the Whole nation. (Before the end of March Professor Zakharof, of the Petrograd University, published a letter in the ' Djenj,' or ' Day,' saying that the citizens of Russia would like to know who were the members of the Workmen and Soldiers" Council who were issuing "orders" to the army and the people. What factories and regiments do they represent? What educational qualifications have they? To what political party or parties do they belong? Who is their president, and who constitute their Executive Committee? Up to the present time, not only the people of Russia, but even the citizens of Petrograd, are in ' profound ignorance of the personnel of the council.) At the same time, the council adopted shrewd and practical measures to strengthen their hold on the army, and to facilitate a socialistic propaganda among the soldiers, both in Petrograd and at the front. They began at once to publish their own journal,' the 'Bulletin of the Workmen and Soldiers' Council,' and virtually forbade the niili- " tary authorities to prevent its circulation among the troops. In this journal they soon issued a series of " orders " directing all soldiers of the Petrograd military district to form company, battalion, and regimental committees, who were to report to the council and act in their name. Soldiers were instructed that they might obey their officers in matters of military routine, but that on all social and political matters they were to take orders from the Council of "Delegates. At first they were permitted to elect their own officers, but in a later "order" they were told that, while elections already made were confirmed, the question whether, the elective system should be made permanent or not had been referred to a special committee for decision. -Meanwhile the soldiers should have the right to protest to the council against the appointment of any particular officer who might be objectionable to them. Soldiers were instructed to" address their officers as
Mr" instead of "Your High Nobility," and officers were forbidden to use the pronoun " thou" in speaking to soldiers. The saluting of officers by soldiers was, left optional. Officers were to refer to their men simply as "soldiers," not as "the lower rank." and all military commands and responses, such as " Attention!" (literally "Be quiet!"). " Jiast so." "1 don't know/' " We are glad to bestir ourselves." and " We wish you health," were strictly prohibited. Soldiers were to be freed from social distinctions of every kind, and were to have the right to become members of any club, union, society, or other organisation having political aims, and to take part in the proceedings thereof. In short, the army to be " democratised-" by mailing the soldier as good as the officer, if not better, and by giving him all the rights of a professional politician. The various "orders" and instructions naturally disturbed the pre-existing relations between officers and men, broke down discipline, and mors or less demoralised
a large part of the army. But this was not the worst of the usurpation of military authority by the Council of Delegates. Both -with and without the council's sanction, hundreds of demagogues and political orators hurried to the front and there began to harangue the soldiers on various social, political, and military questions, particularly on desirable terms of peace. This added, of course, to the demoralisation, and turned almost ever}- regiment into a political debating society. Generals Brusiloff, Korniloft', and Gurko would not stand ..this, and all resigned. (Brusiloff and Gurko afterwards withdrew their resignations when the Coalition Ministry were formed, and when Kerenski, as Minister of War, announced his determination to enforce " iron discipline." General Korniloft', then commanding the Petrograd garrison, refused to reconsider, saying that he was not willing " to take orders from common soldiers, and ignorant workmen." But apparently Kerenski's influence induced him to follow the example of the other generals.) Even General Alexieft', then Commander-in-Chief, urged that the representatives were to be sent to the front by the Council of Delegates to address soldiers on political matters, they should at least be furnished with credentials, and should report to him before organising meetings; otherwise it would be impossible to keep out spies and provocateurs. To these remonstrances and requests little attention was paid, and Socialistic agitators, inspired perhaps by Germany, were even allowed to go so far as to tell the soldiers that the war was being carried on for the benefit -of British and French capitalists.
Such were the first results of the work done in the army by the Council of Delegates. That body has since sobered a little, and now talks about the importance of "re-establishing discipline." but if it had not broken down discipline in the first place discipline would not now require to be re-established. The., influence of the Council in the Petrograd factories was quite as strong and quite as disastrous as in the army. It was even easier to organise the workmen than the soldiers, and the Council soon gotT them thoroughly in hand. As soon as the turmoil of the revolution subsided a little they were ■ instructed that they might go to work, but that " they must hold themselves in readiness to drop their employment at the first signal." This was apparently a warning to the Provisional Government 'that if they disputed or resisted the authority of the "Council the munition factories would be tied up. Before. April 1 the Council had acquired almost complete control of the factory operatives, as well as of the garrison troops, and were in a position to say to the Provisional 3ilinistry : "If you. don't make terms with us and adopt our policy, we'll swing the whole garrison against you, and close all the_ ammunition factories." This - threat, which might possibly bring about civil war, was the club that the Council used to force the Provisional Government into submission. Meanwhile large numbers of factory workers, feeling that they, or their representatives., were, the real Government, became so unruly and insubordinate, and made such impossible demands'of all kinds, that both the Manufacturers' Association and the Union of Engineers appealed to the Council to harmonise dissensions in order to avert what threatened to be a national catastrophe. The breakdown of discipline in the munition factories was almost as serious as that in the army. Having made their position almost impregnable by gaining control of the troops and workmen of Petrograd. the Council of Delegates invaded another field of activitv by establishing a new Press Censorship". Certain newspapers—among them the ( Zemscluna.' * Golos Russie,' 'Kolokol,' ' Groza,' and ' Russkoe Znamva '—desired to resume publication after the revolution but were not allowed to do so. AH were* permanently suppressed by the Council's orders. The ' Novoe Yremya,' one of the best-known journals in Russia, was temporarily suspended merely because it had resumed publication without the Council's permission. Most of these journals, it is true, had been reactionary in tendeiicv before the revolution, and "their suppression might have been expedient or necessarv as a political measure; but it was none'the less a usurpation of the power and authority of the Provisional Government, lhe repression, moreover, was one-sided -Lhe Council closed up the reactionary papers, but they allowed * Pravda,' the organ, of the Leninites and the extreme $Q-
cialists, to advocate openly the overthrow of the Provisional Government and the substitution for the latter of "a dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry;." Tha Council wanted free speech for the extreme party of the Xeft and a gag for the extreme party of the Right. . . . This leads up to the question: Why did the Duma Executive Committee and tha original Ministry yield to the Council of Delegates whenever opinions clashed and whenever there was an opportunitv for a decisive trial of strength* Apparently they did not dare to face the risk of civil war in the capital, where, as it seemed to them, the Council of Delegates had an overwhelming predominance of -brute force. I hava already expressed the opinion that tha leaders of the Progressive " hloc '■' made a serious mistake m not keeping the Duma in continuous session, and then, with that body at theu-back, challenging the supremacy of the Council at the very beginning. [ , the e vid ence seems to show that if the whole Duma had fought the Council" of Delegates at the outset; they would have Had the active, support of four-fifths of the nation, including practically all or the army outside of the Petrograd garrison, and would have established their supremacy without civil war. But the men who organised the Provisional Government were apparently so afraid of what, the soldiers and workmen in retrograd might do that they lost their grip, and allowed themselves to be intimidated orced down, and we finallv by a group of Socialists, pacifists, iconoc.asts, and cranks, who had no qualifications tor government or leadership? except audacity. and nerve. All the misfortumjs that have come to Russia—dissentioa everywhere, break-up of discipline and of lighting efficiency in the army, the arrest 01 General Kuropatkin. the removal of tha Grand Duke Nicholas as Viceroy of tha Caucasus and Commander-in-Chief hi Asia ilinor, the discouragement of generals lika Brusiloff, Gurko, Korniloff, and Sheherbalolf, disorder in ammunition factories," and agrarian disturbances in the provincesare all due to the Sociahstac theories and visionary arms of the Workmen and boldiers' Council, by whom the Provisional Government fox more than two months have been influenced, dominated, and controlled. ...
I : have already given a ■ few instances ot the assurances of support that the Provisional Government received from the .'army and,the people soon after their organisation. Among them were literally thousands of telegrams and letters from regiments, divisions, corps, and whole armies; from Zemstvos, boards of trade, and assemblies of nobles; from peasant communes, educational institutions, and cooperative societies; and from civil organisations of all kinds in all parts of the country. The officers and soldiers of the First Infantry Division gathered up all their medals, decorations, and crosses of honor, won for- bravery in battle, and sent them in a mass to the Provisional Government, as evidences of their recognition of their authority and loyal devotion to the Government. Yet, in spite of all this support. from the country at large, the Duma Executive Committee and the Provisional Government hesitated to begin a fight with the Council of Delegates merely because that organisation had, or seemed to have, an overwhelming preponderance of, brute force at the seat of government. In a recent speech, for-which tie Council of Delegates removed liim from tha chief command of the European armies, General Alexiefi used these words: " Where is - that strong power which tha country desires?.. Where is that mighty power which would compel each citizen to perform honorably his duty to the country?" The answer must be: There is mi such power, but there might be if the Provisional Government, -with the whole Duma at their back, had 'refused two months ago to • submit to the Workmen and Soldiers' Council; had appealed to the whole army and the whole nation for support, and firmly- established their supremacy by efiec-tive force. The Socialistic Government of Free Russia may not be weaker than the bureaucratic Government of autocratic Russia; but they certainly are no stronger, because they' are paying more attention to impracticable schemes for getting peace without victory than they are to the far more important business of winning victory as a means of securing peace.
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Mount Ida Chronicle, Volume XLV, Issue XLV, 17 August 1917, Page 1
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2,400CAN THE REVOLUTION SUCCEED? Mount Ida Chronicle, Volume XLV, Issue XLV, 17 August 1917, Page 1
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